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ABSTRACT
Theoretical tools for network analysis: Game theory, graph centrality, and
statistical inference
by
Travis Bennett Martin
Chairs: Mark E. Newman and Michael P. Wellman
A computer-driven data explosion has made the di culty of interpreting large
data sets of interconnected entities ever more salient. My work focuses on theoretical
tools for summarizing, analyzing, and understanding network data sets, or data sets of
things and their pairwise connections. I address four network science issues, improving
our ability to analyze networks from a variety of domains.
I first show that the sophistication of game-theoretic agent decision making can
crucially e↵ect network cascades: di↵ering decision making assumptions can lead
to dramatically di↵erent cascade outcomes. This highlights the importance of dili-
gence when making assumptions about agent behavior on networks and in general.
I next analytically demonstrate a significant irregularity in the popular eigenvector
centrality, and propose a new spectral centrality measure, nonbacktracking centrality,
showing that it avoids this irregularity. This tool contributes a more robust way of
ranking nodes, as well as an additional mathematical understanding of the e↵ects of
network localization. I next give a new model for uncertain networks, networks in
xiv
which one has no access to true network data but instead observes only probabilistic
information about edge existence. I give a fast maximum-likelihood algorithm for re-
covering edges and communities in this model, and show that it outperforms a typical
approach of thresholding to an unweighted network. This model gives a better tool
for understanding and analyzing real-world uncertain networks such as those arising
in the experimental sciences. Lastly, I give a new lens for understanding scientific
literature, specifically as a hybrid coauthorship and citation network. I use this for
exploratory analysis of the Physical Review journals over a hundred-year period, and
I make new observations about the interplay between these two networks and how
this relationship has changed over time.
xv
CHAPTER I
Introduction
A network, at its simplest, is a collection of things and their pairwise connections.
We call these things nodes and call these connections edges. A near infinitude of
real-world systems can be and are fruitfully modeled as networks. To name a few
data sources, social networks model people and their relationships; the World Wide
Web consists of web pages and their hypertext link connections; and protein-protein
interaction networks model the chemical relationships between proteins in organisms.
Network science studies not only the above but all complex networks, with the
ultimate goal of better modeling, describing, and understanding networks in the real
world from a variety of disciplines. One major undertaking of network science is
the development of general techniques for understanding networks which can then
be applied broadly across domains. Originally, networks were small and analyzable
by hand, see for example the network of grade school friendships in Figure 1.1, and
these techniques were simple manual calculations such as counting the edges in the
network. As computers and algorithms have improved and proliferated, network data
has grown to a scale which makes simple network understanding more challenging.
How can one begin to make sense of the network of information sharing on Facebook
shown in Figure 1.2? But this proliferation has also enabled the creation of more
powerful computerized techniques.
1
Figure 1.1: A network of friendships between third graders, from 1934 [130].
Figure 1.2: A network of a single meme spreading through Facebook, from 2016 [34].
2
These days, we need computerized algorithms and methods for summarizing and
aggregating large-scale network data in productive ways. My work in network science
gives new theories for making sense of the deluge of network data available today.
In this thesis I discuss four techniques for summarizing and analyzing network data.
I show that processes on networks can depend crucially on whether the agents in a
network behave strategically. I give a new algorithm for finding important nodes in
a network, and a new model for reasoning about networks about which we only have
uncertain information. Lastly, I give a new lens for analyzing an academic network.
1.1 History and overview of network science
In the 18th century, mathematicians asked a simple question about the amply
bridged Prussian city of Ko¨nigsberg: can one walk between the four landmasses of
the city while crossing each bridge exactly once? In 1735 Leonhard Euler presented
a general solution to this problem [64], and his representation of landmasses and
bridges using dots and lines is commonly regarded as the beginning of the field of
graph theory and also as the beginning of network science.
While graph theory has a long history, the first examples of modern network sci-
ence came from the study of social networks. In 1933 Moreno gave early examples
of social networks in his book about sociograms, or “The problem of human inter-
relations” [130]. In 1969 Travers and Milgram ran an experiment to measure how
closely arbitrary people in the United States were connected, finding famously that
their participants were connected on average by “six degrees of separation” [173]. In
the 1970s Granovetter [74, 75] contributed the seminal sociological theories that weak
connections between individuals are essential for widespread influence, and that hu-
man collective behavior, such as rioting, can be very sensitive to a group’s individual
makeup. In a 1977 field study [189], Zachary tracked the classic Karate Club Network
as an internal conflict caused one karate club to split into two clubs, and showed that
3
clusters of friends in the club’s original social network almost exactly predicted the
makeup of the split.
More recently, the impact of network science has diversified to an encyclopedic
scale. A selection of major network science results follows. In Section 1.2 I define and
discuss several of these concepts in more detail.
Early mathematical developments such as the study of random graph models by
Rapoport and Erdo˝s and Re´nyi [59, 60, 61, 157] laid the groundwork for theoretical
analysis of networks. Producing tractable-yet-useful models for explaining networks
has remained a core pursuit of network science. Many models have communities,
or groups of similar nodes with similar connection behaviors [1, 10, 27, 86, 95, 108,
183, 184, 192]. Most networks feature a highly skewed connectivity distribution,
with a small number of nodes having substantially more connections than the rest.
Numerous graph models give possible mechanisms for this commonality [56, 106, 154].
For example, Baraba´si and Albert [14] gave the preferential attachment model, in
which nodes are more likely to connect to nodes which already have more neighbors.
Other models aim to replicate properties of specific varieties of networks such as
directed edges [179], bipartite structure [109], hierarchies [182], and arbitrary degree
distributions [37, 144].
A network centrality measure gives a way of assigning numeric importance scores
to the nodes of a network, and is often used as a way to quantitatively find the
important nodes in a network. PageRank [29] is likely the most famous centrality
measure, and was Google’s primary original method of ranking web pages on the
World Wide Web. A host of other centrality measures exist [25, 67, 97, 103, 118],
and the relevant measure depends on what one values as important [28].
Many applications, from epidemiology to advertising, can be modeled as a spread-
ing process on a network. Granovetter’s sociological contributions included seminal
work on network cascades [74], in which a small local event, such as the adoption
4
of a fad, spreads over the network edges. Cascade data is becoming increasingly
accessible on the Internet, and many cascade variants have been discussed in the lit-
erature [32, 34, 71, 99, 101]. Kempe et al. [99] considered a model of an advertiser
maximizing the spread of a cascade, and many such strategic cascade maximiza-
tion problems have been considered since [35, 73]. Mollison [128] extended simple
fully mixed epidemiological models, where all individuals interact homogeneously,
to models with heterogeneous contact probabilities based on the distance between
individuals. This laid the groundwork for network-based epidemiology, and many
network-based epidemiological studies have followed [76, 96, 137].
Computer scientists and statisticians have long been interested in clustering data
points [114] and dividing graphs [100, 123], but network science has developed many
targeted techniques for finding communities or other empirically inspired structures
in networks. Structure can be found by fitting graph models such as those above to
data [10, 105], or by taking a more metric-based algorithmic approach to finding com-
munities. Newman and Girvan [142] define modularity, which states that a division
of a network into communities is good to the extent that there are more edges within
communities than one would expect according to chance. Many community finding
algorithms aim to optimize modularity [22, 80] or other criteria [6, 39, 66, 85, 133,
148, 162].
Graphs are a convenient representation for many economic models of interacting
agents [98, 91], and network science has contributed to a better understanding of these
models. In some models the network governs how the economic agents interact [68,
73, 92, 163], while others give possible rationalizations for the network structures we
commonly observe [8, 90, 171].
A more complete landscape of Network Science can be found in books by Wasser-
man and Faust [180], Newman [140], and Easley and Kleinberg [57].
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1.2 Basic network science techniques
Here I describe a variety of basic network science concepts that are used through-
out the thesis. Refer to Wasserman and Faust [180], Newman [140] or Easley and
Kleinberg [57] for a complete introduction.
1.2.1 Graph notation
A network can be represented as a graph G = (V,E), where V are the nodes of
the graph and E ✓ V ⇥V are the edges of the graph. Two nodes are neighbors if they
are connected by an edge (i, j) 2 E. I denote the set of neighbors of i by nb(i) ⇢ V .
I commonly let n = |V | and m = |E|.
Networks may also be represented in matrix form using an adjacency matrix, A,
with n rows and n columns, where Aij is an element of the matrix having value one
if there is an edge between nodes i and j and zero otherwise.
Adjacency matrices are often a computationally e cient method of storing and
manipulating dense networks, those with many (m is ⌦(n2)) edges between nodes.
But for sparse networks, where m is o(n2), it can be more e cient to use an adjacency
list representation, which lists all connections for each node.
1.2.2 Types of networks
In an undirected network edges are symmetric, so Aij = Aji, while a directed
network allows the possibility of edges in only one direction. In an unweighted network
all edges are equivalent, while a weighted network can have edges of varying numeric
weights, represented by Aij = w for w 2 R. A network with self-loops allows a node
to be connected to itself, and a network with multi-edges allows a pair of nodes to
have multiple edges between it. A network without self-loops or multi-edges is simple.
Examples of these types of graphs can be seen in Figure 1.3. In this thesis I primarily
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Figure 1.3: An undirected, unweighted network without self-loops or multi-edges
(left) and a directed, weighted network with self loops and multi-edges (right), and
their adjacency matrices.
consider undirected, unweighted, simple graphs.1
1.2.3 Degree distribution
The number of neighbors a node has is called its degree, d. For node i, di = |nb(i)|.
One granular description of a network is its degree distribution, which is a vector p of
the fraction of nodes with each possible degree. Many networks, especially large social
networks, have power-law degree distributions. That is, the fraction of nodes in the
graph with degree d, pd, is approximately proportional to d ↵ for some ↵ > 0, termed
the power-law exponent. While the degree distribution is rarely enough information
to uniquely identify a network, it characterizes an often-useful aggregate network
property.
1.2.4 Clustering coe cient
Edge relationships in graphs are frequently transitive, which is the property that
if i is connected to j and j is connected to k, i is also connected to k. The only fully
1However, I also employ self-loops or multi-edges when they make my calculations cleaner.
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transitive graphs are collections of cliques, a graph structure with an edge between
every pair of nodes, but networks may also be partially transitive. That is, for many
edge pairs (i, j) and (j, k), i is also connected to k. This is true for a vanishingly small
fraction of edge pairs in most large random graphs, but is quite common in most real
networks. Many explanations for this partial transitivity exist. In social networks
this is equivalent to saying: I’m often friends with my friend’s friends. This could be
because a shared friend is likely to introduce us, or simply because our shared friend
increases the chances that we run in the same circles and thus would be friends with
or without our mutual friend.
The extent to which edges in a network obey transitivity is captured by the global
clustering coe cient [182], which is defined for a given graph as,
global clustering coe cient =
closed node triplets
connected node triplets
, (1.1)
where a connected node triplet is any three nodes with at least two edges, and a
closed node triplet is any three nodes with three edges among them. For example,
the clustering coe cient in the unweighted graph in Figure 1.3 is 24 .
1.2.5 Centrality measures
As discussed before, network centrality is a way of measuring how important,
or central, each node in a network is. The simplest of centrality measures, degree
centrality, is the number of connections a node has to other nodes. If one assumed
that importance in the world depended exclusively on how many friends one had, one
could find important people simply by calculating and ranking by degree centrality.
Eigenvector centrality [25] is a more sophisticated variant which recognizes that
not all acquaintances are equal. I am more important, or influential, if the people I
know are themselves influential. Eigenvector centrality defines a centrality score vi
8
for each node i in an undirected network. vi is proportional to the sum of the scores
of the node’s network neighbors, vi =   1
P
j Aijvj, where   is a proportionality
constant and the sum is over all nodes. Defining a vector v whose elements are the
vi, we then have
Av =  v, (1.2)
meaning that the vector of centralities is an eigenvector of the adjacency matrix. If we
further stipulate that the centralities should all be nonnegative, the Perron-Frobenius
theorem [170] states that v must be the leading eigenvector (the vector correspond-
ing to the greatest positive eigenvalue  ). There are many ways of computing this
centrality. One can directly use any number of matrix-based algorithms, or one can
initialize v arbitrarily and iterate Eq. (1.2) to convergence. We further characterize
behavior of this centrality measure, and propose an extension, in Chapter III.
1.2.6 Random graph models and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs
A random graph model gives a method for generating network instances to emulate
real network data sets. These models can provide useful controlled data for testing
new methods or tractable systems for deriving mathematical results. The models can
also be used in reverse—instead of generating a network, one can infer structure by
fitting a random graph model to a data set.
Erdo˝s and Re´nyi defined the simplest random graph model in use [59]. In an
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph, every distinct pair of nodes is connected by an undirected edge
with independent probability p = c/(n  1), where c is the expected mean degree of
a node. While its simplicity makes it an attractive starting point for random graph
models, its homogeneous structure and narrowly peaked binomial2 degree distribution
make it a poor approximation of most real-world networks.
2Often approximated with a Poisson distribution for large graphs.
9
1.2.7 Preferential attachment
Many large networks of a wide variety of types, from Twitter follower networks
to gene regulation networks, have degree distributions which obey a power-law in
the tail. While the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model and stochastic block model (Section 1.2.8)
are mathematically elegant models for some simpler networks, a richer random graph
model is necessary for generating networks with power-law degree distributions.
The preferential attachment model of Baraba´si and Albert [14] is a simple undi-
rected graph model for generating networks with power-law degree distributions which
also simulates the growth of networks over time. This model is a special case of the
cumulative advantage model of Price [154].
The preferential attachment model begins with n0 nodes, each with c arbitrarily
distributed edges.3 In each time step t one node appears and adds c undirected
edges to the nodes in the existing network. These edges are randomly distributed
in proportion to the existing node degrees, so the probability of adding an edge to
existing node i is P (di) =
diPnt 1
j=1 dj
. Thus the number of nodes at time t is nt = n0+ t
and the number of edges is exactly mt = cno+ ct, so that the average network degree
is always 2c.
The rate that a node receives edges over time, in the limit of large t and with a
continuous approximation, is
@di
@t
= cP (di) = c
diPnt 1
j=1 dj
= c
di
2tc
=
di
2t
.
Integrating with respect to t gives the degree of a node that joined at time ti at
some time t in the future,
di(t) = c
✓
t
ti
◆1/2
.
3The original source [14] doesn’t specify the initial configuration of edges, which have no influence
on the properties of the network in the limit of long time. Here I assume a uniform initial degree of
2c for each node, for simplicity.
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Thus, this model produces networks in which we expect the degree of a node to
asymptotically depend exclusively on its age. The full derivation [14] also shows that
we expect an overall degree distribution with pd ⇠ d 3.
1.2.8 Block models
The stochastic block model (SBM) is a random graph model widely used for mod-
eling communities in networks [86, 95, 146]. In the conventional definition of the
stochastic block model, n nodes are distributed at random among k groups, each with
a probability  r of being assigned to group r, where
Pk
r=1  r = 1. Then undirected
edges are placed independently at random between node pairs with probabilities !rs
that depend only on the groups r, s that a pair belongs to. Thus each node in group r
has a degree drawn from a binomial (approximately Poisson) distribution with meanP
s n s!rs. The ordinary block model is a simpler deterministic special case of the
stochastic block model, where probabilities of connection are either 0 or 1.
If the diagonal elements !rr of the probability matrix are larger than the o↵-
diagonal entries then one has traditional assortative community structure, which
means the network has a higher density of connections within groups than between
them. But one can also make the diagonal entries smaller than the o↵-diagonal entries
to generate disassortative structure or mixed structure types. Methods for detecting
assortative, disassortative, and other structures in networks are discussed below.
1.2.9 Community structure and detection
Most networks have groups, or communities, of nodes which have similar connec-
tion behaviors. For example, within the network of all college students, students at
University of Michigan (UM) display assortative structure, as they are much more
likely than average college students to be friends with other UM students. As another
example, the national college dating network may display disassortative structure, in
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that students more frequently date students of a di↵ering gender. In the community
detection problem, one is given only the nodes and edges of a network and must infer
the underlying node a liations. Community detection has proven to be a robust way
of simplifying and understanding networks.
A division of a network into k communities is given in the form of a vector
g 2 {1, ..., k}n, where the community assignment for each node is represented by
an integer. A central question of community detection is, “What makes a particular
community division good?”
Computer science has many metrics for evaluating graph partitions, such as mini-
mum cut or conductance. One popular metric in network science is modularity [142],
which informally is the extent to which a network has more edges within communities
than one would expect by chance. That is, if one were to re-wire edges completely
at random while preserving the expected degrees of nodes, one would expect there
to be an edge between nodes i and j with probability didj2m . However, in an actual
network with adjacency matrix A, the relative probability is deterministic, given by
Aij. Formally, the modularity is defined as
modularity =
1
2m
X
(i,j)2E
✓
Aij   didj
2m
◆
 (gi, gj),
where   is the Kronecker delta:  (a, b) = 1 () a = b. There exist many procedures
for maximizing this criterion in order to find communities, for example via greedy [22]
or spectral techniques [141].
There exist several problems with modularity maximization, one of which is that
it fails to account for communities of nodes which are disassortative, as in the dating
example mentioned above. A popular technique for handling more general types of
community structure is to assume that the network came from a stochastic block
model, with blocks corresponding to communities. Community detection then be-
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comes a problem of inferring the unknown block model from the network data.
1.2.10 Maximum likelihood estimation
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is a general statistical technique in which
one estimates unknown model parameters to be the ones that maximize the likelihood
of observed data. This allows one to infer the parameters of a generative model, such
as the SBM, from an observed instance of that model, such as a network.
For the SBM, we can write down the probability of generating a particular SBM
network A as a function of the parameters   and ! and can marginalize over the
latent group variables g,
P (A| ,!) =
X
g
P (A|g,!)P (g| )
=
X
g
Y
i<j
!Aijgigj(1  !gigj)1 Aij
Y
i
 gi
 
. (1.3)
Then we say that the MLE block model parameters are those that maximize Equa-
tion (1.3). This could be computed exactly in exponential time by summing over all
kn possible values of g, but in practice this maximization is approximated by methods
such as the expectation-maximization algorithm or simulated annealing.
1.2.11 Expectation-maximization algorithm
As noted above, straightforward computation of MLE requires the maximization of
a generally intractable sum. The expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm [53, 122]
is an iterative procedure for finding a local maximum, useful as a heuristic for global
maximization.
For example, to apply the EM algorithm to the SBM setting, we maximize
P (A| ,!) by iteratively estimating values for  ,!, and g. First, it is easier to
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maximize the log-probability,
logP (A| ,!) = log
X
g
P (A|g,!)P (g| ). (1.4)
We simplify our log-of-a-sum expression using Jensen’s inequality, which states that
for any set of positive-definite quantities xi, the log of their sum satisfies
log
X
i
xi  
X
i
qi log
xi
qi
, (1.5)
where qi is any probability distribution over i satisfying the normalization conditionP
i qi = 1. One can easily verify by substitution that the exact equality is achieved
by choosing
qi =
xiP
i xi
. (1.6)
Thus choosing qi according to Eq. (1.6) e↵ectively maximizes Eq. (1.5) with respect
to q.
Returning to Eq. (1.4) and applying Jensen’s inequality gives
logP (A| ,!)  
X
g
q(g) log
P (A|g,!)P (g| )
q(g)
. (1.7)
We choose q(g) according to Eq. (1.6),
q(g) =
P (A, g| ,!)P
g P (A, g| ,!)
=
P (A, g| ,!)
P (A| ,!) . (1.8)
While Eq. (1.7) appears more complicated than our original Eq. (1.4), it has the
desirable property that, given q(g), it can be directly maximized by di↵erentiation
with respect to parameters  ,!. This is called the M-step. The EM algorithm
performs maximization by iteratively maximizing Eq. (1.7) and then performing the
so-called E-step, updating q(g) according to Eq. (1.8).
14
A series of simplifications yields
q(g) =
P (A, g| ,!)P
g P (A, g| ,!)
=
P (A, g| ,!)
P (A| ,!) = P (g|A, ,!). (1.9)
So the EM algorithm has the added benefit that, upon convergence, Eq. (1.8) gives
an estimate of our latent group variables, giving us a way of measuring community
structure. I give more details of the EM algorithm applied to the SBM and extensions
of the SBM in Chapter IV.
1.2.12 Belief propagation
Belief propagation [150] gives an exact and e cient method of calculating a joint
probability distribution over discrete random variables whose dependencies can be
represented by a tree, and is used for example in studying graphical models. It
works by iteratively passing messages between nodes, and has been shown to be
approximately correct in practice, though inexact, in real-world non-tree graphs.
The message-passing approach has recently proved useful in network science for
e ciently calculating network properties [50, 105, 165]. In particular, it allows us
to more quickly calculate the values in Eq. (1.8), as I show in detail in Chapter IV.
In the SBM, the messages that nodes pass to each other are estimates of the nodes’
community memberships.
1.2.13 Random matrix theory for networks
An adjacency matrix, like all square matrices, has n not necessarily distinct eigen-
values. These eigenvalues together are called the spectrum of the matrix. The re-
stricted form of the adjacency matrix allows us to say useful things about its spectrum.
For example, the adjacency matrix of an undirected graph is always symmetric, and
therefore has an all-real spectrum. The mathematics of random matrix theory allows
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us to further characterize the usual behavior of simple-enough random graph models,
giving us further insight into the structure of networks [134, 172, 191].
In the limit of large n, the spectra of many random graph models, including the
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and SBM, obey general trends. They often consist of a continuous band
of eigenvalues, with only a few outlying eigenvalues below or above this band. These
outlying eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors frequently contain useful
information about network structure.
For example, as mentioned above, every network has a greatest eigenvalue which is
positive and has a corresponding all-positive eigenvector which gives the eigenvector
centrality. In the SBM, the number of outlying eigenvalues above the continuous
spectral band is equal to the number of communities in the model [191].
Many network science techniques use the spectral properties of other graph ma-
trices, such as the modularity matrix [190] or the graph Laplacian [19].
1.2.14 Game theory on networks
Game theory is the study of systems of interacting, self-interested, and intelligent
agents. Such a system is termed a game. A game has n players, and each player i
has her own strategy set Si of possible strategies, from which i chooses a (possibly
randomized) strategy si 2 Si. The outcome of the game is determined by the strategy
choices of all players, s = (s1, ..., sn). Each player has a utility function ui(si, s i)
which depends on the strategy of player i and the strategies of all other players, s i.
An agent’s goal is to maximize her expected utility.
How does one determine what will happen for a given game? How will agents
reason about other agents and choose their own strategies? Game theory has many
equilibrium concepts which attempt to answer these questions. The Nash equilibrium
defines an outcome s to be an equilibrium if and only if no agent could strictly
increase her expected utility by changing strategies while all other agents stayed the
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same. That is, for all i,
ui(si, s i)   ui(s0i, s i) for all s0i 2 Si. (1.10)
A Nash equilibrium represents one of many potentially justifiable rational outcomes
for a game, and thus could be a reasonable guess for what might happen in a game.
Game theory also gives extensive theory for more sophisticated situations, including
games in which people make decisions in some order after observing the actions of
others, and games in which agents have uncertainty about the details of the game.
There are rich connections between game theory and network science. Many nat-
ural games involve networks, and networks also give a convenient way for expressing
relationships between agents, for example by representing agents as nodes and their
influences by edges. As has been repeatedly shown, including in Chapter II and
a study of network cascades [120], the structure of the network can have dramatic
impact on the game result, so tools for understanding networks are vital for under-
standing these types of games.
1.3 Overview of chapters
In this chapter I’ve given an introduction to network science, an overview of the
landscape of related work and major results, and some basic notation and concepts
that are used throughout the chapters to come. In the next four chapters I describe
new theoretical tools for network analysis, which together contribute to the growing
body of techniques for understanding and analyzing networks in the real world.
In Chapter II I ask, “What is the impact of the sophistication of agent (game-
theoretic) decision making in network cascades?” I show that di↵ering assumptions
about agent decision making can lead to dramatically di↵erent cascade outcomes,
highlighting the importance of care when making assumptions about agent behavior
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on networks and in general. For this project I wrote the majority of the manuscript,
and formulated and proved the majority of the results. Michael Wellman originally
suggested this model. Grant Schoenebeck derived the cloud network result and the
result limiting performance for non-adaptive schedules. This chapter is based on work
published in the proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computa-
tion [117].
In Chapter III I analytically demonstrate a significant irregularity in the popular
eigenvector centrality, and propose a new spectral centrality measure, nonbacktracking
centrality, showing that it avoids the irregularity. This tool contributes a more robust
way of ranking nodes, as well as an additional mathematical understanding of the
e↵ects of localization. I calculated all numerical results for this project, and wrote the
first manuscript draft. Xiao Zhang, Mark Newman, and I jointly discussed analytical
results and edited the manuscript. This chapter is based on work published in Physical
Review E [118].
In Chapter IV I create a new model for uncertain networks : networks in which
one has no access to true network data but instead observes only probabilities of
edge existence. I give a fast maximum-likelihood algorithm for recovering edges and
communities in this model, and show that it outperforms a typical approach of thresh-
olding to an unweighted network. My model gives a better method of understanding
and analyzing these real-world uncertain networks such as those arising in the experi-
mental sciences. I calculated all numerical results for this project and derived the final
definition of an uncertain network. I collaborated with Brian Ball and Mark Newman
in brainstorming possible uncertain network models, finding analytical solutions, and
deriving the BP equations. Brian Ball gave the first, Kullback-Leibler-based, formu-
lation of an uncertain network. This chapter is based on work published in Physical
Review E [119].
Lastly, in Chapter V I give a unique way of understanding scientific literature,
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specifically as a hybrid coauthorship and citation network. I use this for exploratory
analysis of the Physical Review journals over a hundred-year period, and I make
new observations about the interplay between these two networks and how this re-
lationship has changed over time. For this project I was the primary author, and
collaborated with Brian Ball to decide which measurements to perform, program the
network analysis scripts, interpret the results, and write the manuscript. Brian Kar-
rer preprocessed and disambiguated the data, and Mark Newman helped in selecting
which results to include and with manuscript revisions. This chapter is based on work
published in Physical Review E [116].
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CHAPTER II
Strategic cascades
2.1 Introduction
A common topic in the study of network behavior is that of contagious or cascad-
ing processes, in which a number of nodes, or agents, start with some property they
then spread to their neighbors according to some specified propagation rules. This
naturally represents phenomena such as the spread of trends, technologies, or influ-
ence among people or groups, or cascading failures in structures such as power grids
or banks. Scientists have, for many years, observed that processes can be heavily in-
fluenced by the network on which they occur [167, 75, 74, 42]. This influence has been
confirmed in the real world by experiments from a wide array of fields [41, 43, 110, 11]
including the study of product adoption [16, 30, 115, 71].
Various models with simple spreading rules have been proposed [7, 131, 181] to
explain, for example, how breaking news spreads over the Internet or how a new
technology spreads in popularity. Such models can be roughly classified in two cate-
gories, according to whether the spread is defined directly as a stochastic process, or
in terms of decisions by self-interested agents who derive utility based on their choices
and the choices of others in the network. In the latter case, the cascade scenario can
be framed as a game, and agent strategies cast as equilibria in the game. Due to
the complexity of such games, however, typical agent-based cascade models assume
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that agents make decisions myopically, evaluating utility of alternative choices in the
current state, without explicitly considering the future choices of others, nor their
own potential impact on those choices.
Our goal in this research is to investigate the implications of more forward-looking,
or strategic agent behavior. In what way do cascade patterns di↵er if agents behave
strategically rather than myopically? How does the sophistication of agent decision
making a↵ect one’s ability to influence a cascade process through scheduling of agent
decisions?
2.1.1 Approach
To address these questions, we employ the framework of Chierichetti et al. [35],
described in Section 2.2. This prior work presents many interesting results about
cascade behavior of myopic agents, and demonstrates the striking power of a scheduler
to influence myopic cascades. Under our new assumption of strategic behavior, we
find that even many simple cases of this game, such as pairwise agent interactions on a
line, seem intractable to analyze. Thus instead of solving the game generally, we take
the approach of bounding the di↵erence in cascade outcomes between myopic and
strategic agent types. We find that cascade outcomes can be markedly di↵erent, as
can the potential influence of a scheduler, depending on the particular network setting.
We are able to obtain tight bounds through two easily analyzed graph families.
2.1.2 Results of Chierichetti et al. for myopic agents
Chierichetti et al. investigate a network of agents making choices between two
options with positive externalities, Y and N , under the influence of a scheduler. (We
adopt their model and describe it in detail in Section 2.2.) The primary contribution
of these authors is in analyzing the impact of the schedule: the order in which agents
make choices. They show that for any network there is some schedule which gets an
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expected constant fraction of the agents to choose Y . They also give networks and
schedules which cause all but a constant number of agents to choose Y , in expecta-
tion. Lastly, they show that nonadaptive (fixed-sequence) schedules can obtain 50%
expected Y -adoption at best.
2.1.3 Related work
Sequential voting and information cascades are two facets of a vast literature
attempting to explain herd behavior [36]. Sequential voting models [3, 52] consider
strategic agents aiming to choose the majority decision, but with an additional private
preference. Information cascades [12, 21] consider strategic agents with a noisy signal,
attempting to determine the correct choice. Both of these models tend to simplify
network e↵ects by placing agents on a complete graph.
Granovetter [74] introduces the threshold model, a foundational theory of network
cascades which has since been studied and extended by many others [54, 160, 99].
In the threshold model, agents take an action if a certain number of their neighbors
have taken the same action. Altman et al. [4] give an example of self-interested
agents behaving in accordance with the threshold model, but in general self-interested
behavior may not align with set thresholds.
Some agent-based cascade models [158, 131] allow agents to revise their decisions
over multiple rounds of play. In each round, an agent myopically adopts its best
choice in the current state. Some research on such models [24, 58] also introduces an
element of noise in agent choice, and investigates the convergence of cascades over
time.
Galeotti et al. [68] introduce a model with strategic agents which have access to
incomplete information about the network outside their direct neighbors, thus making
strategic agent behavior tractable. Lastly, Chierichetti et al. [35] introduce a cascade
scheduling problem on networks based on a model studied by Arthur [7], which also
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assumes simple myopic agent decision making. Their model has been further extended
by Cao et al. [31] and Hajiaghayi et al. [81].
2.2 Model
We model a game F = (G, p, ⇡) in which a collection of agents choose between
two actions, Y (“yes”) and N (“no”). Agents make their choices one at a time in a
sequence determined by the scheduler. Once an agent has decided, it cannot change
its action. We refer to the collection of agents as V , the total number of agents as
n = |V |, an individual agent as i 2 V , and the choice agent i makes as ci 2 {Y,N}.
Agents are vertices on the finite simple graph G = (V,E), and we say that two agents
are neighbors if they are connected by an edge e 2 E. We denote the set of neighbors
of i by nb(i) ⇢ V .
Each agent i has a preference type, ti 2 {Y,N}, which is independently randomly
assigned at the beginning of the game. An agent is assigned type Y with probability
p (a game parameter) and type N with probability 1   p. We assume that Y is the
less likely preference, so p < .5. Types are private: only i knows the value of ti (until
it is possibly revealed by i’s choice).
Agents make their choices to maximize individual utility. An agent obtains utility
⇡ (a game parameter) for choosing its type (ci = ti), and a unit of utility for each
neighboring node making the same decision that it does. Thus a node faces tension
between choosing its type and the type it expects the majority of its neighbors to
choose (when these types disagree). Formally, agent i’s total utility is:
ui(ti, ci, c i) = ⇡ (ci = ti) + |{j 2 nb(i) : cj = ci}|,
where is the indicator function and vector c i represents the choice of all other
nodes.
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We di↵erentiate between two modes of agent decision making: myopic and strate-
gic. At the time agent i makes its decision, some nodes have already chosen and
the remainder are undecided. A myopic agent makes its decision based on only the
choices of decided nodes. It does not look into the future to consider the likely ac-
tions of undecided nodes, hence the term “myopic”. Let mY (i) and mN(i) denote
the number of neighbors of i who have chosen Y and N , respectively, at the time i
is scheduled to decide. Then a myopic i chooses ti if |mY (i)  mN(i)|  ⇡, and the
majority type among its decided neighbors otherwise.
A strategic agent aims to maximize its expected utility at the end of the game.
We assume it knows the details of the game (G, p, and ⇡), the schedule S (discussed
below), and the decisions of already-decided agents. The agent reasons about the
likely choices of undecided agents, assuming they all are strategic and play according
to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). In our setting, each agent moves exactly once
and types are independent, so there is no relevant updating. Under these conditions,
each node of the game tree is essentially a singleton information set, treatable as
a subgame. Thus, the PBE concept here corresponds exactly to game solution by
backward induction. To determine an agent’s utility-maximizing action in some game,
one can first solve for the choice of the last agent to move in all possible subgames
with only one agent left to move. Knowing the choice of the last agent, one can
solve for the choice of the penultimate agent in all subgames where all agents but two
have moved. This reasoning can be repeated until the behavior of all agents in all
subgames is known, yielding a PBE.
We make the additional assumption that an agent chooses its preference type, ti,
if it would otherwise be indi↵erent between options. We show that any game and
schedule combination correspond to exactly one PBE consistent with this assumption
(see Theorem 2.12). Thus the behavior of all strategic nodes is well defined.
Following Chierichetti et al. [35], our analysis includes a scheduler whose goal is to
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determine a schedule S that maximizes the expected number of agents choosing Y . A
schedule determines the order in which agents make their decisions. We consider two
classes of schedule: nonadaptive and adaptive. A nonadaptive schedule is simply a
fixed ordering of nodes, that is, a permutation of V . An adaptive schedule, in contrast,
can select the next agent to choose based on previous agent decisions. Formally,
adaptive schedule S is a function of agent choices, S : {Y,N, U}n ! V , where U
indicates that the corresponding agent is as yet undecided.
We evaluate schedules by their performance, which is the expected number of
nodes choosing Y once all have decided. An optimal schedule has the greatest per-
formance among all schedules, or optimal performance. We use strategic and myopic
to qualify performance. For example, a schedule’s strategic performance is the per-
formance of the schedule for strategic agents. A state of a game in progress, in which
some but not necessarily all agents have decided, is a situation.
We say that a situation is a Y -cascade if every future agent chooses Y regardless
of type. We similarly define an N -cascade. A situation is a total cascade if the first
agent necessarily initiates a cascade of its type. A game is a predetermined Y -cascade
if the starting situation is a Y -cascade. We similarly define predetermined N-cascade.
2.3 Roadmap of results
The main result of this chapter is a demonstration that cascade outcomes can
vary drastically depending on the assumption of myopic or strategic agents. Specifi-
cally, we show that the di↵erence in performance between myopic and strategic agents
can be arbitrarily close to the maximum possible di↵erence of 100% in either direc-
tion. In addition, we solve for equilibrium agent behavior in several particular game
classes, provide miscellaneous results characterizing the behavior of cascade games
with strategic agents, and show a result demonstrating the importance of the capa-
bilities of the scheduler:
25
• In Section 2.4, we analyze the clique—both as a first example and as a way
of introducing intuition, techniques, and results useful for subsequent sections.
We present instances in which strategic performance is 0%: strictly worse than
the constant expected adoption guaranteed for myopic agents. We conversely
present instances for which strategic performance is greater than myopic per-
formance.
• In Section 2.5, we show that myopic performance can be much larger than
strategic performance: the di↵erence can be arbitrarily close to 100%. We
prove this by analyzing a specific class of games which occur on a graph we call
a council graph.
• In Section 2.6, we show the converse: strategic performance can be arbitrarily
close to 100% greater than myopic performance. We show this by analyzing a
class of games which occur on a graph we call a cloud graph.
• In Section 2.7, we give several results. In particular we show that performance
in the nonadaptive setting is bounded by p for both myopic and strategic agents.
This improves upon the results of Chierichetti et al. [35] showing a myopic agent
upper bound of 12 . We also demonstrate a family of graphs in which myopic
performance is always at least as great as strategic performance, no matter the
parameter settings.
• In Section 2.8, we investigate the commitment power of the scheduler and show
that, in some cases, an ability to make non-credible threats can strictly enhance
performance.
• Finally, in Section 2.9, we present an algorithm to compute the performance
of a graph with strategic agents that is e cient on a certain class of highly
symmetric graphs.
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The complete analysis of some results and several lemma and theorem proofs are
relegated to Appendix A.
2.4 Clique analysis
A clique is a complete graph where every two agents are connected. We begin our
study of the di↵erence between strategic and myopic performance with a description
of behavior on the clique because it is illustrative of the di↵erence between the myopic
and strategic settings, and is used in subsequent proofs. The clique is also easier to
analyze as nodes occupy indistinguishable positions in the network, rendering all
schedules identical.
2.4.1 An example
Let ⇡ = 1.1, p = 0.09, and our graph be a clique of size 3. We name the nodes in
the order that they are scheduled: 1, 2, and 3. Note that on a clique all nodes have
the same neighbors, so all schedules are identical. We reason about the behavior of
strategic agents in this game by backward induction.
First consider the behavior of the last node to choose, agent 3. If agents 1 and
2 have both chosen N or have both chosen Y , 3 will match with them. Otherwise,
c3 = t3.
Next consider the behavior of agent 2. If t2 = N , c2 = N no matter what. Even
if c1 = Y , agent 2 can expect to get a match from 3 with probability 0.91 if c2 = N .
Its expected payo↵ would be 2.01 for c2 = N versus 2 for c2 = Y . If t2 = Y , c2 = N
if c1 = N . This is because agent 2’s expected payo↵ for c2 = N is 2, versus 1.19 for
c2 = Y .
Knowing this behavior, c1 = N regardless of t1. Suppose t1 = Y . Then agent 1
gets payo↵ 2 for c1 = N , or payo↵ 1.1+ 0.91(0+ 0.09) + (0.09)2 = 1.3619 for c1 = Y ,
so is best o↵ choosing N .
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Even this very simple graph demonstrates a qualitative di↵erence between strate-
gic and myopic behavior. As Chierichetti et al. [35] show, the optimal schedule for
any graph with myopic agents achieves at least a constant fraction of Y -adoption,
in expectation. In this example, myopic agents achieve over 6.7% expected adop-
tion. Yet for strategic agents, the example scenario yields zero adoption. We further
characterize the behavior of the clique graph in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.2 Asymptotically large clique
We characterize the behavior of games on cliques in the limit of large clique size.
For the remainder of this section, we assume p and ⇡ to be fixed and represent a game
F = (G, p, ⇡) solely by its graph G. When G is a complete graph (clique) of size n,
we use Kn. Games on cliques can be divided into two classes of asymptotic behavior.
Theorem 2.1. For any fixed 0 < p < 1/2 and ⇡ > 0, there exists an M such that
for all n  M , Kn gives either:
1. A predetermined N-cascade (all agents always choose N), or
2. A total cascade (first agent chooses its type t and the remaining agents match
t, starting a t-cascade).
We denote these two classes of behavior by CPNC and CTC . The class a particular
game belongs to depends on p, ⇡, and n. The proof of this theorem, in Appendix A.1,
follows from the fact that, as cliques become very large, a node prefers any guaranteed
cascade over a chance of being left out of a cascade.
We find cliques in both CPNC (see Section 2.4.1) and CTC (see below). CPNC
corresponds to cases where myopic agents give higher performance than strategic
agents, and CTC corresponds to the opposite. A clique transitions from CTC to
CPNC as p decreases and ⇡ increases. On the boundary of this transition we find
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cases where a clique alternates, depending on the parity of n, between CPNC and
CTC . Computational confirmation of these results can be found in Section 2.4.3.
When Strategic Outperforms Myopic on a Clique Section 2.4.1 presents an
example where strategic agents yield zero performance but myopic agents give positive
performance. One might expect the clique to always favor myopic performance, as
strategic agents are aware that Y -preference is less likely, and thus might be more
likely to choose N than their myopic counterparts. We show that this is not the case.
When 1  ⇡ < 1 + p, myopic agents underperform strategic agents because two Y
decisions are required to start a myopic Y -cascade and only one is required to start a
strategic Y -cascade. Thus the probability of a Y -cascade is p
2
p2+(1 p)2 ⇡ p2 for myopic
agents and p for strategic agents.
Theorem 2.2. For any 1  ⇡ < 1 + p, the probability of a Y -cascade with strategic
users on a clique graph is p.
Note that when ⇡ < 1, strategic performance is equal to myopic performance by
Lemma A.1.
Computational results in Section 2.4.3 suggest that for any ⇡   1, there exists
settings of p such that strategic performance is greater than myopic performance.
2.4.3 Clique computational solution
In Section 2.4.1 we prove that, under some parameter settings for the clique,
strategic agents result in a performance of zero. In Section 2.4.2 we prove that
other parameter settings result in strategic agents outperforming myopic agents. In
this section we provide computational verification for these two scenarios. For the
specifics of our algorithm, please refer to Section 2.9.
Figure 2.1(a) displays results of a program which simulates a clique of 40 agents,
each making the optimal strategic or myopic decision. We calculate the strategic and
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(a) n = 40 (b) p = 0.25
Figure 2.1: Strategic-to-myopic performance ratio on clique graph.
myopic performance for a variety of p and ⇡ combinations and plot their ratio in
the figure. The black region corresponds to the class CPNC and the lighter regions
correspond to the class CTC . The band at the bottom for ⇡ < 1 results from the
immediate total cascade (Lemma A.1). The band just above ⇡ = 1 in Fig. 2.1(a) cor-
responds to the region partially described by Theorem 2.2, where one agent can start
a strategic cascade but two agents are necessary for a myopic cascade. Figure 2.1(b)
displays results of the same program, but with fixed p to examine the e↵ect of varying
n. The resulting black area is governed by two simple bounds. The lower pink area
results from ⇡ < 1 according to Lemma A.1 as described above. The left pink wedge
appears when ⇡ is large relative to n and all agents choose their preference. At the
pink-black border we see non-trivial behavior.
2.5 Myopic outperforms strategic
We exhibit a setting where myopic performance is (100  ✏)% but strategic perfor-
mance is zero. Thus, unlike in the myopic case, where performance is always bounded
above some constant [35], it is possible to get zero strategic performance while simul-
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Figure 2.2: A council graph, as described in the text, with intra-clique connections
excluded. The large circle is the council and the small circles are subcliques.
taneously having arbitrarily high myopic performance. This constitutes the first half
of our core result. We prove this bound constructively, by characterizing the behavior
of a family of graphs which have optimal strategic performance of 0% and an optimal
myopic performance which approaches 100% in the limit of large graph size.
Our graph is a modified version of a clique graph, which we call a council graph
(see Figure 2.2). It consists of a large clique, the council, of size K and M smaller
subcliques of size 5.1 M is o(K), for example, M =
p
K. Each of the subcliques
is completely connected to a unique node, its representative, from the council. This
gives K  M council nodes of degree K   1, M council nodes of degree K + 4, and
5M subclique nodes of degree 5.
Near 100% Myopic Performance We demonstrate a schedule giving perfor-
mance tending to 100% in the limit of large graph size. We do not prove this schedule’s
optimality, but it gives a lower bound su cient for our purposes. We say a subclique
1Any subclique of constant size   5 will work.
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is fresh if none of its nodes have been scheduled. Our schedule, S, is the following:
1 Choose any fresh subclique, j.
Schedule nodes from j until one chooses N or all have chosen Y .
If all nodes in j have chosen Y , schedule j’s council representative, rj.
2 Repeat 1 until three representatives have been scheduled or no fresh subcliques
remain.
3 Schedule all council nodes without N -decided neighbors.
4 Schedule all remaining council nodes in any order.
5 Schedule all remaining subclique nodes in any order.
Theorem 2.3. For any p < .5, 2 < ⇡ < 3, the myopic performance of S approaches
100% as K !1.
Proof. Our proof proceeds by a careful description of behavior at each point in the
schedule. First note that a myopic agent will choose its type if  2 of its neighbors
have been scheduled, and Y if   3 more of its neighbors have chosen Y than N .
So with probability p3 a fresh subclique from Step 1 will be a Y -cascade and its
representative will also choose Y . With probability 1   p3 a fresh subclique from
Step 1 will not be a Y -cascade and its representative will not be scheduled.
We can bound the probability of (the undesirable event of) not having 3 subclique
Y -cascades by:
✓
M
2
◆
(p3)2(1   p3)M 2 + Mp3(1   p3)M 1 + (1   p3)M < M2(1   p3)M 2.
Once there are 3 subclique Y -cascades, the entire council chooses Y . Thus, the
expected fraction of Y is at least:
K(1 M2(1  p3)M 2)/(K +M),
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which tends to 1 as K !1.
0% Strategic Performance We characterize behavior of the council graph with
strategic agents and prove that certain choices of p and ⇡ give 0% performance. This,
together with the results from above, gives a tight bound on the extent to which
myopic performance can be greater than strategic performance.
Theorem 2.4. For some p < .5, 2 < ⇡ < 3, any schedule on a council graph with
strategic agents has 0% performance.
The following lemma is used in the proof below.
Lemma 2.5. For some p < .5, 2 < ⇡ < 3, a clique of k   5 undecided nodes and
one node guaranteed to choose Y will result in k N-decisions and 1 Y -decision.
We prove this lemma in Appendix A.2 by direct comparison of expected utilities.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. The council graph was chosen to facilitate analysis by simpli-
fication to more easily understood cliques. As such, we invoke Lemma 2.5, which
proves the existence of cliques and settings of p and ⇡ which strongly favor N , in the
sense that even if a common neighbor of the clique is guaranteed to choose Y , the
bias towards N -preference results in a predetermined N -cascade.
Thus, even if a clever scheduler convinces the whole council to choose Y , we see
by Lemma 2.5 that, for some p and ⇡, the subclique chooses N .
The nodes in the council, being fully strategic, know any subclique neighbors they
have are guaranteed N -neighbors. By another application of Lemma 2.5, we see that
all council nodes choose N and thus, for some p and ⇡, any schedule is doomed to
0% performance.
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Figure 2.3: An example cloud graph.
2.6 Strategic outperforms myopic
By now it is natural to see how strategic agents’ expectations of futureN -preference
lead to lower strategic performance than myopic performance. As seen in Sec-
tion 2.4.2, there are also games where strategic agents give higher performance than
myopic agents. In this section we show the second half of our core result, that this
di↵erence can be as large as (100  ✏)%.
We prove this bound constructively by analyzing a special graph we call a cloud
graph. We first show that for certain parameters on the cloud graph it is possible
to obtain strategic performance of 100%. Recall that no graph can achieve exactly
0% or 100% myopic performance, because the first myopic node always chooses its
type. We do, however, show that for some settings on the cloud, myopic performance
approaches 0% while strategic performance remains 100%, giving our desired bound.
A cloud graph (Figure 2.3) consists of two singular outer vertices of degree a and
b respectively, one singular inner vertex of degree a+ b, and two clouds of vertices of
respective size a and b, with each vertex of degree two. Each of the outer vertices is
connected to every vertex in a distinct cloud. The inner vertex is connected to every
vertex in both clouds. We call the cloud with a vertices A and the one with b vertices
B.
Theorem 2.6. Fix arbitrary ✏ > 0. Then there exist parameters a, b, p, and ⇡ < 2
such that strategic performance on the cloud graph is 100% whilst the myopic perfor-
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mance is at most ✏.
This follows from Lemma 2.7 and Lemma 2.11, proved in the remainder of this
section.
100% Strategic Performance We give su cient conditions for obtaining 100%
performance with strategic agents in a cloud graph. We refer to the singular vertices,
from left to right, as 1, 2, and 3, and assume that a < b.
An optimal schedule, Sopt, is the following:
1 Schedule 1.
if 1 chooses Y then
Schedule 2 followed by 3.
else
Schedule 3 followed by 2.
2 Schedule all cloud vertices in any order.
An overview of the proof of optimality is as follows. Scheduling agent 2 be-
fore agent 3 guarantees that 2, and thus all nodes in A, will match the choice of 1
(Lemma 2.10). On the other hand, scheduling agent 3 before agent 2 gives some pos-
itive probability that the nodes in A choose their type (Lemma 2.9). This outcome
results in lower utility for 1. Thus the adaptive schedule can be used to incentivize 1
to choose Y through threat of punishment for choosing N . We are able to show that,
for large enough cloud sizes, threat of punishment to 1 for choosing N is enough to
convince it to choose Y , giving 100% performance. This is given formally below.
Lemma 2.7. If cloud sizes satisfy a(1   p) + ⇡ < bp and ap2 > ⇡, then, under the
schedule Sopt, 1, and thus all agents, will always choose Y .
Proof. We are able to punish 1 for choosing N because scheduling 3 first gives a p2
chance of the nodes in A choosing their type, while scheduling 2 first guarantees all
nodes in A choose c1, a more desirable outcome to 1. We use several lemmas outlining
the behavior of agents 2 and 3, proved below.
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Assume 1 is N -type. Being Y -type only increases 1’s payo↵ for choosing Y . We
show below that 1’s utility for choosing Y is higher than its utility for choosing N
when a(1  p) + ⇡ < bp and ap2 > ⇡.
If 1 chooses N , then we schedule 3, followed by 2. In this case, Lemma 2.9 shows
that c2 = c3 = t3. With probability 1 p all nodes in A chooseN , and with probability
p A is split. 1’s expected utility is ⇡ + a(1  p) + a(1  p)p.
If 1 chooses Y , then we schedule 2, followed by 3. In this case, Lemma 2.10 shows
that c2 = c1. 1’s expected utility is a.
Then 1 will choose Y as long as a > ⇡+a(1 p)(1+p). Or, equivalently, ap2 > ⇡,
which is true by assumption. Once 1 chooses Y , the schedule leads to all remaining
nodes choosing Y .
We must pick appropriate cloud sizes (depending on ⇡ and p) and have ⇡ < 2 for
the theorem to be true. This is possible for any p by selecting large enough a and
even larger b. The following lemmas detail the behaviors of the clouds and agents 2
and 3 used in the proof of Lemma 2.7.
Lemma 2.8. The behavior of an unscheduled cloud neighbored by two decided singular
agents is completely determined by the singular agents’ choices. If their choices are
di↵erent, then every cloud agent will choose its type and an expected p fraction of the
cloud agents will choose Y . In this case we say that the cloud has been split. If they
make the same choice c, all cloud agents will choose c.
Knowing the cloud behavior, we can characterize the behavior of the case where
agent 3 is scheduled and then agent 2 is scheduled.
Lemma 2.9. When a(1   p) + ⇡ < bp, if agent 3 is scheduled to choose and 2 has
not been scheduled yet, c3 = t3. Then, when 2 is scheduled next, c2 = c3.
Lemma 2.10. If agent 2 is scheduled to choose after 1 but before 3, it will choose c1
if bp > ap > ⇡. When 3 is scheduled, it will match 2.
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Here, the scheduler persuades cloud agents to adopt the minority preference
through the threat of unfavorable adaptive sequencing. All nonadaptive schedules
have performance bounded by p (Theorem 2.17), and thus the above result clearly re-
quires adaptivity. In fact, the di↵erence in performance for adaptive and nonadaptive
scheduling can be arbitrarily large for strategic agents (Corollary 2.21).
Near 0% Myopic Performance By Lemma 2.7, we can obtain 100% adoption
with strategic agents for any p if we pick cloud sizes a and b large enough. The
proportion of myopic adoption, however, is some polynomial of p, and thus can be
made arbitrarily small. The combination of these two results gives us a tight bound on
the extent to which strategic performance can be greater than myopic performance.
Lemma 2.11. Fixing ⇡ < 2, the myopic performance is bounded by p(1   p)3(1  
p
1 p)
2 + [1   (1   p)3(1   p1 p)2]. In the limit of p ! 0, the proportion of myopic
adoption in the cloud graph also goes to 0.
Proof. We bound the myopic performance by a polynomial in p for ⇡ < 2.
Denote the current di↵erence between the number of agents in cloud A (B) who
have chosen Y and those who have chosen N by dA (dB). With probability (1  p)3,
all singular agents are type N . A singular N -type agent will choose Y only if dA   1
or dB   1. A cloud agent will choose its type or N unless at least one of the singular
agents has already chosen Y .
We bound the probability of a singular agent choosing Y by noticing that the
probability of a cloud ever achieving a Y majority by agents choosing their type is no
greater than p1 p , a result from the mathematics of biased random walks. Thus, the
probability that all cloud nodes choose their type (or N) is at least (1 p)3(1  p1 p)2.
This probability, which we denote q, tends to 1 as p ! 0. The expected proportion
of Y -adoptions is no greater than pq + (1  q), which goes to 0 as p! 0.
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2.7 Miscellaneous results
Having analyzed behavior of cascades on specific classes of graphs, we aim to give
properties of cascade behavior for arbitrary games, regardless of G, p, or ⇡.
We first address the issue of the multiplicity of PBE. The existence or uniqueness
of PBE is not guaranteed for all classes of games. The possibility of zero or multiple
PBE would render some of our key concepts, such as the performance of a schedule,
unclear. Fortunately, as we show below, our assumption that agents consistently
choose their type when indi↵erent between options always results in the selection of
a unique PBE. This follows from a simple backward induction argument. We also
give a technique for relaxing this behavioral assumption but keeping the unique PBE
property:
Theorem 2.12. If agents are never indi↵erent between choices, or always resolve
any indi↵erence in a consistent way—by choosing the same option whenever they are
in the same situation—then their PBE behavior is uniquely defined.
The following theorem shows that our assumption of indi↵erence can be avoided,
while keeping the same cascade outcome, by slightly adjusting ⇡.
Theorem 2.13. Given a game F = (G, p, ⇡), let P be the performance under an
adaptive schedule S with the assumption that a node always chooses its type if it is
indi↵erent between Y and N . Then there exists an ✏ such that F 0 = (G, p, ⇡0 = ⇡+ ✏)
also achieves performance P under S, and under S no node is indi↵erent between
choices.
The proof, in Appendix A.3, simply chooses ✏ less than the smallest utility di↵er-
ence.
We also prove that increasing p alone can never decrease the performance of the
optimal schedule. The main ingredient in the proof is a coupling argument. This
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monotonicity is not observed for ⇡ or n.2
Theorem 2.14. For any two games, F = (G, p, ⇡) and F 0 = (G, p0, ⇡), with 0 < p < p0 < .5,
the performance of any nonadaptive schedule S for F is weakly worse than the per-
formance of S for F 0.
Star Graph It seems that behavior on every graph we study varies unpredictably
as game parameters change. Even a graph as simple as a clique can exhibit drastically
di↵erent cascade outcomes from small changes in p or ⇡. However, this is not always
the case. Games on the star graph—a graph with one interior agent (of degree n 1)
connected to n  1 exterior agents (of degree 1)—have notably regular behavior.
Theorem 2.15. For any parameters on any star graph, the optimal performance in
the myopic setting is at least the optimal performance in the strategic setting for both
adaptive and nonadaptive schedules.
The proof, in Appendix A.4, establishes the optimality of threshold strategies for
nodes and then shows that the myopic thresholds always beat the strategic thresholds.
Knowing that myopic performance exceeds strategic on the star, we next explore
the degree of this advantage. We find that, for adaptive schedules, myopic perfor-
mance can be arbitrarily close to an additive factor of 50% greater than strategic
performance.
In the limit of large star graphs, adaptive myopic performance is p1 p for any ⇡ < 1.
Thus, for p arbitrarily close to .5, myopic performance approaches 100%. This result
does not hold for strategic agents: a backward induction argument shows that for
small enough ⇡, strategic performance is bounded by p.
Theorem 2.16. For any star graph with ⇡ < 1   p and any adaptive schedule,
strategic Y -type nodes choose N when a majority of nodes have chosen N , upper
bounding strategic performance by p.
2An example of non-monotonicity can be found in Figure 2.1(b).
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Figure 2.4: Strategic-to-myopic performance ratio on star, n = 41.
Proof. We characterize behavior on the star with strategic agents when ⇡ < 1  p by
backward induction. Let d be the di↵erence between the number of exterior nodes
who have chosen Y and the number who have chosen N : d = mY  mN . We show
that any node chooses N when d < 0.
Consider the behavior of the last node, i. Assume the best case for a Y choice,
that ti = Y . If d =  1, i receives p + ⇡ utility for ci = Y and 1 utility for ci = N .
By assumption, i prefers N . Any d <  1 gives i ⇡ utility for ci = Y and 1 utility for
ci = N . This completes the base case.
Next we prove the inductive step. Assuming the theorem holds when k 1 agents
remain, we show the theorem holds when k agents remain. Denote the agent choosing
with k agents remaining by j. Assume the best case for a Y choice, that ti = Y .
Using the inductive hypothesis, we find that utilities for j are exactly as above for
i.
We proved that optimal strategic performance is never greater than optimal my-
opic performance for a star graph. We also present computational verification. For
details of the algorithm used for computing solutions, see Section 2.9.
Figure 2.4 displays results of a computational solution of the optimal schedule
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for a star of 41 agents. We calculate the strategic-to-myopic performance ratio for a
variety of p and ⇡ combinations.
Nonadaptive Schedules Lastly, we prove that no nonadaptive schedule for strate-
gic or myopic agents can achieve more than a p fraction performance, on any graph.
A similar bound of p was proved independently by Hajiaghayi et al. [81, Theorem 1],
using di↵erent techniques, restricted to myopic agents on the clique graph. Their
theorem generalizes to the setting where agents can have heterogeneous ⇡ thresholds.
Whereas we do not explicitly address heterogeneity in ⇡ here, we note that the proof
of Theorem 2.17 immediately extends to this more general model.
Both results improve on the 50% bound of Chierichetti et al. [35], which covers
myopic agents on arbitrary graphs.
Bounding nonadaptive schedule performance for strategic agents entails that the
very high performance of Section 2.6 is not possible when the scheduler cannot react
to decisions made by nodes (Corollary 2.21). Moreover, it rules out the possibility of
predetermined Y -cascades with nonadaptive schedules. Our proof combines a careful
inductive argument with the repeated application of a result from the analysis of
Boolean functions.
Theorem 2.17. No nonadaptive schedule can achieve more than p fraction perfor-
mance for any p  .5, ⇡ > 0, in the myopic or strategic setting.
To prove Theorem 2.17 we use a lemma from Mossel et al. [132, Lemma 5.1]:
Lemma 2.18. Let f : {Y,N}n ! {Y,N} be a monotone function (so that flipping
input bits from N to Y cannot change the output from Y to N and vice versa) and
Pp(f = Y ) be the probability that f outputs Y when applied to random inputs each
Y with probability p. Also, let P1/2(f = Y ) = 1/2. Then Pp(f = Y )  p for all
0  p < 1/2.
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Proof of Theorem 2.17. We first prove the theorem for the myopic setting. We apply
Lemma 2.18 separately to each node, in combination with Lemma 2.19, to show that
each agent chooses Y with probability at most p. From linearity of expectations, we
know the myopic performance is at most a p fraction of the nodes.
Fix a game and schedule, and adopt the following notation.
Let ci : {Y,N}i ! {Y,N} be the function which takes as input the types of the
first i agents and outputs the selection of agent i.
Let c˚i : {Y,N}i ! {Y,N}i be the function which takes as input the types of the
first i agents and outputs the selection of the first i agents.
Let cˆi : {Y,N}i 1 ⇥ {Y,N} ! {Y,N} be the function which takes as input the
selections of the first i   1 agents and the type of the ith agent and outputs the
selection of the ith agent.
We denote the types of the first i agents as t(i) = t1, . . . , ti 2 {Y,N}i and denote
by ¬w 2 {Y,N}i the string with each coordinate the opposite as in w 2 {Y,N}.
Lemma 2.19 shows that ci(¬t(i)) = ¬ci(t(i)), from which we see that P1/2(ci =
Y ) = 1/2 because for each string, exactly one of w and ¬w evaluates to Y . Thus we
can employ Lemma 2.18 to see that Pp(ci = Y )  p, which proves the theorem in the
myopic case.
Lemma 2.19. ci(¬t(i)) = ¬ci(t(i)).
Proof of Lemma 2.19. We can do this by induction on i to show that both ci and
c˚i have this property. Note that because Y and N are treated symmetrically in the
myopic setting, we know that cˆi(¬w) = ¬cˆi(w) for all i.
The base case follows because c1(t1) = c˚1(t1) = cˆ1(t1), and we know that cˆ1 has
the property.
42
Assume that the statement is true for all j < i. Note that
ci(¬t(i)) = cˆi(˚ci 1(¬t(i 1)),¬ti)
= cˆi(¬˚ci 1(t(i 1)),¬ti)
= ¬cˆi(˚ci 1(t(i 1)), ti) = ¬ci(t(i)).
The first line follows from the definition of ci and cˆi and second line follows from
induction. Similarly, for c˚i:
c˚i(¬t(i)) = c˚i 1(¬t(i 1))   cˆi(˚ci 1(¬t(i 1)),¬ti)
= ¬˚ci 1(t(i 1))   cˆi(¬˚ci 1(t(i 1)),¬ti)
= ¬˚ci 1(t(i 1))   ¬cˆi(˚ci 1(t(i 1)), ti) = ¬˚ci(t(i)).
We next prove the strategic case of Theorem 2.17. The intuition is straightforward.
If a node imagines that all future nodes are equally likely to prefer Y and N , then
again Y and N are treated symmetrically, as in the myopic setting, and Lemma 2.18
applies. So given that this node’s type and the types of agents that have already
chosen are Y independently with probability p, the probability that each node chooses
Y is at most p. This probability only decreases when this node expects future nodes
to be Y -type less often.
We define cpi : {Y,N}i ! {Y,N}, c˚pi : {Y,N}i ! {Y,N}i, and cˆpi : {Y,N}i 1 ⇥
{Y,N} ! {Y,N} analogously to above, except here we assume that all agents play
strategically according to the case where each node is Y -type with probability p.
The outline of the proof of Lemma 2.20, given in full in Appendix A.3, is as
follows. We again see that P1/2(c
1/2
i (t
(i)) = Y ) = 1/2 by the same reasoning, and
applying Lemma 2.18 we see that Pp(c
1/2
i (t
(i)) = Y )  p. We would like to show
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that Pp(c
p
i (t
(i)) = Y )  p. To complete the lemma it is enough to show that cpi is
monotone in p. That is, increasing p only makes a Y outcome more likely.
By induction we will show that cpi is also monotone with respect to p. This
completes the proof of the theorem because then Pp(c
p
i (t
(i)) = Y )  Pp(c1/2i (t(i)) =
Y )  p.
Lemma 2.20. cpi and c˚
p
i are also monotone in their inputs and in p.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.17.
Theorems 2.17 and 2.6 imply that adaptive schedules can be arbitrarily more
powerful than nonadaptive ones in the strategic setting.
Corollary 2.21. For any ✏ > 0, there exists a game F with strategic agents for
which an adaptive scheduler can achieve 100% adoption and a nonadaptive scheduler
achieves  ✏%.
Similarly we see that adaptive schedules can be arbitrarily more powerful than
nonadaptive ones in the myopic setting by combining Theorem 2.17 and a lemma from
Chierichetti et al. [35, Lemma 3.1], which gives a graph with adaptive performance
of (100 O( 1pn))%.
Corollary 2.22. For any ✏ > 0, there exists a game F with myopic agents for which
an adaptive scheduler can achieve   (100 ✏)% adoption and a nonadaptive scheduler
achieves  ✏%.
2.8 Scheduler commitment power
Our model dictates that the scheduler chooses and publishes its (possibly adaptive)
schedule in advance. This publication is a commitment to follow the schedule even
in situations where, once reached, it is suboptimal. We refer to a scheduler who
can commit in advance as Stackelberg, after the classic economic model of imperfect
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Figure 2.5: A graph in which a Stackelberg scheduler achieves greater performance.
competition in which a first-moving player is notably advantaged by an ability to make
non-credible threats [175]. Such ability contrasts with a scheduler who is restricted
to schedules that make the performance-maximizing decision in every subgame.
Whereas the power to make non-credible threats allows players to obtain strictly
greater utility in some games, there are many natural games for which this power
yields no advantage. Our question is whether in this context Stackelberg scheduling
ability is strictly more powerful than the ability to only make credible threats. A
priori, it is unclear how non-credible threats could aid the scheduler. It seems that
the only way to convince a node not to choose N is to threaten to surround it with an
abundance of Y s in the case where it does choose N . Maximizing Y s, however, aligns
with the scheduler’s goal, and can only be non-credible if somehow concentrating
these Y s lowers overall expected performance.
We have, however, found a game instance, illustrated in Figure 2.5, for which
commitment power provides an advantage. For this graph, with parameters p = 0.18
and ⇡ = 1.85, a Stackelberg scheduler can achieve performance of 0.573 whereas the
best subgame-optimal schedule yields 0.371.
Our five node graph has three types of nodes which are in indistinguishable po-
sitions. We call the groups A,B, and C and don’t distinguish between nodes within
each group. We give the Stackelberg schedule in Figure 2.6(a) and the subgame-
optimal schedule, which corresponds to a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), in
Figure 2.6(b).
To see how the Stackelberg scheduler outperforms the PBE scheduler, note that
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Schedule A:
if A chooses Y then
Schedule A, then remaining
nodes in any order
else
Schedule C:
if C chooses Y then
Schedule A, then B, then B
else
Schedule B:
if B chooses Y then
Schedule B, then A
else Schedule A, then B
(a) Stackelberg schedule
Schedule C:
if C chooses Y then
Schedule B:
if B chooses Y then
Schedule A. All remaining
nodes choose Y
else
Schedule A, then A, then B
else
Schedule remaining nodes in any
order. All choose N
(b) PBE schedule
Figure 2.6: Schedules demonstrating the increased power of non-credible threats by
the scheduler.
the Stackelberg scheduler schedules A first and it chooses its type, whereas if the
PBE scheduler scheduled A first it would choose N . Both schedulers agree on what
to do if A chooses N . If A chooses Y , the Stackelberg scheduler schedules A next
even though scheduling B next would yield higher expected performance. The PBE
scheduler must pick B next in this case. The higher performance of picking B next
comes at the cost of giving fewer expected Y -matches to A, and thus makes A, if
scheduled first, less inclined to play Y . In this instance, the result is that a first-
moving A would play N if faced with a PBE schedule, and its type if faced with the
optimal Stackelberg schedule.
Since it cannot threaten A, the PBE scheduler does not schedule A first, and
instead starts with C, which gives fairly similar cascade behavior but results in fewer
nodes choosing Y , in expectation. This completes our example of a graph with higher
Stackelberg than PBE performance.
Assuming commitment power in the foregoing analysis simplifies our arguments
by avoiding the necessity of verifying optimal scheduling in all subgames. Results
for myopic outperforming strategic hold a fortiori if we relax the assumption of com-
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mitment power, as the ability to make threats is useful only for strategic agents.
Our derivation (Section 2.6) of the bound for strategic outperforming myopic exploits
commitment power, however, we have verified that a more complicated demonstra-
tion can be constructed supporting the same bound under the weaker assumption of
subgame-optimal PBE schedules.
2.9 Computational solutions to strategic cascades
It is straightforward to write a program which computes, by brute force, the
optimal3 schedule for an arbitrary graph. Node behavior can be solved by backward
induction. Logically, the exponential number of possible schedules and agent type
configurations makes this approach infeasible. In this section we describe an approach
to e ciently find solutions for strategic cascade problems on a subclass of highly
symmetric graphs.
Our code4 finds the optimal schedule for arbitrary block model5 graphs with strate-
gic or myopic agents. Block models have been studied extensively in the past [169, 179]
as a natural framing of networks in which nodes can be divided into classes or types
with shared characteristics. We define them in Section 1.2.8. For example, a block
model describing a social network at a high school could have a type for each grade.
Students would be more likely to have edges to students of their same grade, and less
likely to have edges to students of other grades. More abstractly, the star graph is
easily described as a block model in which the two classes are “interior agent” and
3Our algorithm calculates the optimal schedule under the assumption that the scheduler is acting
according to a PBE and cannot make empty threats. The main theoretical analyses of this chapter
assume the scheduler can make empty threats and is acting according to a Stackelberg equilib-
rium. On the star and clique these two equilibrium concepts give identical optimal schedules. See
Section 2.8 for in-depth discussion.
4The work in this section was performed in collaboration with Erik Brinkman. Code can be
found at https://github.com/tbmbob/block-scheduling. block dp.py is the file containing the
solver. Code has not been prepared for public release. Please contact travisbm@umich.edu with
any questions.
5Any graph can be expressed as a block model graph with n blocks. Our algorithm works
e ciently only for graphs with a small number of blocks.
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“exterior agent”.
Our code finds optimal schedules e ciently for graphs with a small (constant)
number of types. The star, clique, and cloud graphs all fit this requirement. Running
time is polynomial in the number of agents and exponential in the number of blocks.
The code solves for the optimal performance through a combination of dynamic pro-
gramming and backward induction. It first solves all possible scenarios with one node
left to choose and stores the results. Then, by using these results, the program solves
optimal behavior when there are two nodes left to choose. It continues this process
until it solves for the optimal behavior with all nodes left to choose. It avoids the
exponential running time of a naive backward induction by treating all agents within
a block the same. It is then able to consider only which block to schedule next, not
which node to schedule next. By reasoning over blocks instead of node types, the
scheduler needs only to compare between O(b) choices at each step, where b is the
number of blocks, instead of O(n) choices.
Examples of data gathered from our code can be viewed in Figures 2.1 and 2.4.
This computational method is far from a panacea. Very few real-world graphs follow
strict block models, and even idealized graphs often have too many types to permit
e cient simulation. However, this code has been useful in verifying results for simple
star, clique, and cloud graphs and in suggesting further results. For example, simu-
lation on the clique suggested the possibility of certain parameter spaces resulting in
higher strategic performance than myopic performance.
2.10 Conclusions
We have demonstrated that the common assumption of myopic decision making
by agents participating in cascades can have significant consequences. For the spe-
cific model of Chierichetti et al., we find that assuming strategic instead of myopic
agent decision making leads to markedly di↵erent cascade behavior. We show, by
48
counterexample, that their result of linear performance for any graph does not ap-
ply when agents are strategic. We have identified graphs for which the performance
di↵erence between myopic and strategic agents is (asymptotically) as large as pos-
sible, in either direction. More broadly, we illustrate methods for reasoning about
strategic cascade behavior and characterize the contrasting behavior of strategic and
myopic agents in a range of qualitatively distinct settings. Lastly, we prove some re-
sults for strategic agents on general graphs, and demonstrate the power of scheduler
commitment.
Modeling cascades with perfectly strategic agents is not necessarily more realistic
than modeling agents with limited rationality. Thus, I do not argue for the strategic
behavior we characterize as a definitive predictive model. Rather, my point is to
demonstrate the potential impact of alternative assumptions about agent decision
making on networks. It is likely that typical network decision making lies somewhere
between myopic and strategic, and by characterizing the behavioral poles I hope to
provide guidance for understanding the range within. Of course, substantial work
remains to achieve a full understanding of behavior between these poles.
I consider cascades to be representative of a broader class of scenarios involving
dynamic decision on networks. For these too one should expect the spectrum of
behaviors, myopic to strategic, to exhibit qualitative variety in generated outcomes.
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CHAPTER III
Nonbacktracking centrality
3.1 Introduction
I introduce network centrality measures in Section 1.2.5. Eigenvector centrality
and its variants are some of the most widely used of all centrality measures. They
are commonly used in social network analysis [180] and form the basis for ranking
algorithms such as the HITS algorithm [102] and the eigenfactor metric [20].
As we argue in this chapter, however, eigenvector centrality also has serious flaws.
In particular, we show that, depending on the details of the network structure, the
leading eigenvector of the adjacency matrix can undergo a localization transition in
which most of the weight of the vector concentrates around one or a few nodes in
the network. While there may be situations, such as the solution of certain physical
models on networks or searching for network hubs, in which localization of this kind
is useful or at least has some scientific interest, in the present case it is undesirable,
significantly diminishing the e↵ectiveness of the centrality as a tool for quantifying
the importance of nodes. Moreover, as we will show, localization can happen un-
der common real-world conditions, for instance in networks with power-law degree
distributions.
As a solution to these problems, we propose a new centrality measure based on the
leading eigenvector of the Hashimoto or nonbacktracking matrix [83, 105]. This mea-
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sure has the desirable properties of (1) being closely equal to the standard eigenvector
centrality in dense networks, where the latter is well behaved, while also (2) avoiding
localization, and hence giving useful results, in cases where the standard centrality
fails. Overall, we contribute to network science knowledge by explaining a irregular-
ity in a popular centrality measure and providing a new related measure fixing this
irregularity.
3.2 Localization of eigenvector centrality
A number of numerical studies of real-world networks have shown evidence of
localization phenomena in the past [65, 69, 62, 44, 72]. In this chapter we formally
demonstrate the existence of a localization phase transition in the eigenvector cen-
trality and calculate its properties using techniques of random matrix theory.
The fundamental cause of the localization phenomenon we study is the presence of
hubs within networks, nodes of unusually high degree, which are a common occurrence
in many real-world networks [14]. Consider the following simple undirected network
model consisting of a random graph plus a single hub node, which is a special case of
a model introduced previously in [134]. In a network of n nodes, n  1 of them form
a random graph in which every distinct pair of nodes is connected by an undirected
edge with independent probability c/(n   2), where c is the mean degree. The nth
node is the hub and is connected to every other node with independent probability
d/(n   1), so that the expected degree of the hub is d. In the regime where c   1
it is known that (with high probability) the spectrum of the random graph alone
has the classic Wigner semicircle form, centered around zero, plus a single leading
eigenvalue with value c+1 and corresponding leading eigenvector equal to the uniform
vector (1, 1, 1, . . .)/
p
n plus random Gaussian noise of width O(1/
p
n) [172]. Thus
the eigenvector centralities of all vertices are O(1/
p
n) with only modest fluctuations.
No single node dominates the picture and the eigenvector centrality is well behaved.
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If we add the hub to the picture, however, things change. The addition of an extra
vertex naturally adds one more eigenvalue and eigenvector to the spectrum, whose
values we can calculate as follows. Let X denote the (n   1) ⇥ (n   1) adjacency
matrix of the random graph alone and let the vector a be the first n  1 elements of
the final row and column, representing the hub. (The last element is zero.) Thus the
full adjacency matrix has the form
A =
0BBBBBBBB@
X a
aT 0
1CCCCCCCCA
. (3.1)
Let z be an eigenvalue of A and let v = (v1|vn) be the corresponding eigenvec-
tor, where v1 represents the first n   1 elements and vn is the last element. Then,
multiplying out the eigenvector equation Av = zv, we find
Xv1 + vna = zv1, a
Tv1 = zvn. (3.2)
Rearranging the first of these, we get
v1 = vn(zI X) 1a, (3.3)
and substituting into the second we get
aT (zI X) 1a = z, (3.4)
where I is the identity. Writing the matrix inverse in terms of its eigendecomposition
(zI  X) 1 =Pi xi(z    i) 1xTi , where xi is the ith eigenvector of X and  i is the
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corresponding eigenvalue, Eq. (3.4) becomes
(aTx1)2
z   (c+ 1) +
n 1X
i=2
(aTxi)2
z    i = z, (3.5)
where we have explicitly separated the largest eigenvalue  1 = c+1 and the remaining
n  2 eigenvalues, which follow the semicircle law.
Although we don’t know the values of the quantities aTxi appearing in Eq. (3.5),
the left-hand side as a function of z clearly has poles at each of the eigenvalues  i
and a tail that grows as 1/z for large z. Moreover, for properly normalized x1 the
numerator of the first term in the equation is O(1/n) and hence this term diverges
significantly only when z   (c + 1) is also O(1/n), i.e., when z is very close to the
leading eigenvalue c + 1. Hence the qualitative form of the function must be as
depicted in Fig. 3.1 and solutions to the full equation correspond to the points where
this form crosses the diagonal line representing the right-hand side of the equation.
These points are marked with dots in the figure.
As the geometry of the figure makes clear, the solutions for z, which are the
eigenvalues of the full adjacency matrix of our model including the hub vertex, must
fall in between the eigenvalues  i of the matrix X, and hence satisfy an interlacing
condition of the form z1 >  1 > z2 >  2 > . . . >  n 1 > zn, where we have numbered
both sets of eigenvalues in order from largest to smallest. In the limit where the
network becomes large and the eigenvalues  2 . . . n 1 form a continuous semicircular
band, this interlacing imposes tight bounds on the solutions z3 to zn 1, such that they
must follow the same semicircle distribution. Moreover, the leading eigenvalue z1 has
to fall within O(1/n) of  1 = c+ 1, and hence z1 ! c+ 1 in the large size limit.
This leaves just two unknown eigenvalues, z2 lying above the semicircular band
and zn lying below it. In the context of the eigenvector centrality it is the one at
the top that we care about. In Fig. 3.1 this eigenvalue is depicted as lying below the
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Spectral band
z
Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of the solution of Eq. (3.5). The curves represent
the left-hand side of the equation, which has poles at the positions of the eigenvalues  i
(marked by the vertical dashed lines). The diagonal line represents the right-hand
side and the points where the two cross, marked by dots, are the solutions of the
equation for z.
leading eigenvalue z1, but it turns out that this is not always the case, as we now
show.
Consider Eq. (3.5) for any value of z well away from c+ 1, so that the first term
on the left can be neglected (meaning that z is not within O(1/n) of c + 1). The
vector xi for i   2 is uncorrelated with a and hence the product aTxi is a Gaussian
random variable with variance d/n and, averaging over the randomness, the equation
then simplifies to
d
n
Tr(zI X) 1 = z. (3.6)
The quantity g(z) = n 1Tr(zI   X) 1 is a standard one in the theory of random
matrices—it is the so-called Stieltjes transform of X, whose value for a symmetric
matrix with iid elements such as this one is known to be [172]
g(z) =
z  pz2   4c
2c
. (3.7)
Combining Eqs. (3.6) and (3.7) and solving for z we find the eigenvalue we are looking
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for:
z2 =
dp
d  c. (3.8)
Depending on the degree d of the hub, this eigenvalue may be either smaller or
larger than the other high-lying eigenvalue z1 = c+1. Writing d/
p
d  c > c+1 and
rearranging, we see that the hub eigenvalue becomes the leading eigenvalue when
d > c(c+ 1), (3.9)
i.e., when the hub degree is roughly the square of the mean degree. Below this point,
the leading eigenvalue is the same as that of the random graph without the hub and
the eigenvector centrality is given by the corresponding eigenvector, which is well
behaved, so the centrality has no problems. Above this point, however, the leading
eigenvector is the one introduced by the hub, and this eigenvector, as we now show,
has severe problems.
If the eigenvector v = (v1|vn) is normalized to unity then Eq. (3.3) implies that
1 = |v1|2 + v2n = v2n
⇥
aT (zI X) 2a+ 1⇤, (3.10)
and hence
v2n =
1
aT (zI X) 2a+ 1 =
1
(d/n) Tr(zI X) 2 + 1
=
1
 dg0(z) + 1 ,
where g(z) is again the Stieltjes transform, Eq. (3.7), and g0(z) is its derivative.
Performing the derivative and setting z = d/
p
d  c, we find that
v2n =
d  2c
2d  2c, (3.11)
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which is constant and does not vanish as n!1. In other words, a finite fraction of
the weight of the vector is concentrated on the hub vertex.
The neighbors of the hub also receive significant weight: the average of their values
is given by
aTv1
d
=
vn
d
aT (zI X) 1a = vng(z) = vnp
d  c. (3.12)
Thus they are smaller than the hub centrality vn, but still constant for large n. Finally,
defining the (n  1)-element uniform vector 1 = (1, 1, 1, . . .), the average of all n  1
non-hub vector elements is
hvii = 1
Tv1
n  1 =
vn
n  11
T (zI X) 1a, (3.13)
where we have used Eq. (3.3) again. Averaging over the randomness and noting that
X and a are independent and that the average of a is d1/(n  1), we then get
hvii = dvn
n  1g(z) =
1
n  1
dvnp
d  c, (3.14)
which falls o↵ as 1/n for large n.
Thus, in the regime above the transition defined by (3.9), where the eigenvector
generated by adding the hub is the leading eigenvector, a non-vanishing fraction of
the eigenvector centrality falls on the hub vertex and its neighbors, while the average
vertex in the network gets only an O(1/n) vanishing centrality in the limit of large n,
much less than the O(1/
p
n) centrality received by the average vertex below the
transition. This is the phenomenon we refer to as localization: the abrupt focusing of
essentially all of the centrality on just a few vertices as the degree of the hub passes
above the critical value c(c + 1). In the localized regime the eigenvector centrality
picks out the hub and its neighbors clearly, but assigns vanishing weight to the average
node. Thus, in this regime the dynamic range of centrality is dramatically reduced,
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Figure 3.2: Bar charts of centralities for three categories of node for four examples of
the model network studied here, as described in the text. All plots share the same
scale. Error bars are small enough to be invisible on this scale.
reducing our ability to distinguish between nodes.
3.2.1 Numerical results
As a demonstration of the localization phenomenon, we show in Fig. 3.2 plots of
the centralities of nodes in networks generated using our model. Each plot shows the
average centrality of the hub, its neighbors, and all other nodes for a one-million-
node network with c = 10. The top two plots show the situation for the standard
eigenvector centrality for two di↵erent values of the hub degree—d = 70 and d = 120.
The former lies well within the regime where there is no localization, while the latter
is in the localized regime. The di↵erence between the two is striking—in the first
the hub and its neighbors get higher centrality, as they should, but only modestly so,
while in the second the centrality of the hub vertex becomes so large as to dominate
the figure.
The extent of the localization can be quantified by calculating an inverse par-
ticipation ratio S =
Pn
i=1 v
4
i . In the regime below the transition where there is no
localization and all elements vi are O(1/
p
n) we have S = O(1/n). But if one or more
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elements are O(1), then S = O(1) also. Hence if there is a localization transition in
the network then, in the limit of large n, S will go from being zero to nonzero at
the transition in the classic manner of an order parameter. Fig. 3.3 shows a set of
such transitions in our model, each falling precisely at the expected position of the
localization transition.
3.2.2 Power-law networks
So far we have looked only at the localization process in a simple model network,
but localization occurs in more realistic networks as well. In general, we expect it
to be a problem in networks with high-degree hubs or in very sparse networks, those
with low average degree c, where it is relatively easy for the degree of a typical
vertex to exceed the localization threshold. Many real-world networks fall into these
categories. Consider, for example, the common case of a network with a power-law
degree distribution, such that the fraction pk of nodes with degree k goes as k ↵ for
some constant exponent ↵ [14]. We can mimic such a network using the so-called
configuration model [129, 144], a random graph with specified degree distribution.
There are again two di↵erent ways a leading eigenvalue can be generated, one due to
the average behavior of the entire network and one due to hub vertices of particularly
high degree. In the first case the highest eigenvalue for the configuration model
is known to be equal to the ratio of the second and first moments of the degree
distribution hk2i/hki in the limit of large network size and large average degree [38,
134]. At the same time, the leading eigenvalue must satisfy the Rayleigh bound
z   xTAx/xTx for any real vector x, with better bounds achieved when x better
approximates the true leading eigenvector. If d denotes the highest degree of any
hub in the network and we choose an approximate eigenvector of form similar to
the one in our earlier model network, having elements xi = 1 for the hub, 1/
p
d for
neighbors of the hub, and zero otherwise, then the Rayleigh bound implies z   pd.
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SFigure 3.3: Numerical results for the inverse participation ratio S as a function of
hub degree d for networks generated using the model described in the text with
n = 1000 000 vertices and average degree c ranging from 4 to 11. The solid curves are
eigenvector centrality; the horizontal dashed curves are the nonbacktracking central-
ity. The vertical dashed lines are the expected positions of the localization transition
for each curve, from Eq. (3.9).
Thus the eigenvector generated by the hub will be the leading eigenvector whenever
p
d > hk2i/hki (possibly sooner, but not later).
In a power-law network with n vertices and exponent ↵, the highest degree goes
as d ⇠ n1/(↵ 1) [55] and hence increases with increasing n, while hk2i ⇠ d3 ↵ and
hki ⇠ constant for the common case of ↵ < 3. Thus we will have pd > hk2i/hki
for large n provided 12 > 3   ↵. So we expect the hub eigenvector to dominate and
the eigenvector centrality to fail due to localization when ↵ > 52 ,
1 something that
happens in many real-world networks. (Similar arguments have also been made by
Chung et al. [38] and by Goltsev et al. [72].) We give empirical measurements of
localization in a number of real-world networks in Table 3.1 below.
1Intuitively, as ↵ increases, the distribution of degrees becomes more uneven. Though the average
hub size decreases with increasing ↵, the average degree decreases even more quickly, and thus
increasing ↵ increases localization.
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3.3 Nonbacktracking centrality
So if eigenvector centrality fails to do its job, what can we do to fix it? Quali-
tatively, the localization e↵ect arises because a hub with high eigenvector centrality
gives high centrality to its neighbors, which in turn reflect it back again and inflate
the hub’s centrality. We can make the centrality well behaved again by preventing
this reflection. To achieve this we propose a modified eigenvector centrality, similar
in many ways to the standard one, but with an important change. We define the
centrality of node j to be the sum of the centralities of its neighbors as before, but
the neighbor centralities are now calculated in the absence of node j. This is a natural
definition in many ways—when I ask my neighbors what their centralities are in order
to calculate my own, I want to know their centrality due to their other neighbors,
not myself. This modified eigenvector centrality has the desirable property that when
typical degrees are large, so that the exclusion or not of any one node makes little
di↵erence, its value will tend to that of the standard eigenvector centrality. But in
sparser networks of the kind that can give problems, it will be di↵erent from the
standard measure and, as we will see, better behaved.
Our centrality measure can be calculated using the Hashimoto or nonbacktracking
matrix [83, 105], which is defined as follows. Starting with an undirected network
with m edges, one first converts it to a directed one with 2m edges by replacing
each undirected edge with two directed ones pointing in opposite directions. The
nonbacktracking matrix B is then the 2m⇥ 2m non-symmetric matrix with one row
and one column for each directed edge i! j and elements
Bk!l,i!j =  jk(1   il), (3.15)
where  ij is the Kronecker delta. Thus a matrix element is equal to one if edge i! j
points into the same vertex that edge k ! l points out of and edges i ! j and
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k ! l are not pointing in opposite directions between the same pair of vertices, and
zero otherwise. Note that, since the nonbacktracking matrix is not symmetric, its
eigenvalues are in general complex, but the largest eigenvalue is always real, as is the
corresponding eigenvector.
The element vi!j of the leading eigenvector of the nonbacktracking matrix now
gives us the centrality of vertex i ignoring any contribution from j, and the full
nonbacktracking centrality xj of vertex j is defined to be the sum of these centralities
over the neighbors of j:
xj =
X
i
Aijvi!j. (3.16)
In principle one can calculate this centrality directly by calculating the leading eigen-
vector of B and then applying Eq. (3.16). In practice, however, one can perform the
calculation faster by making use of the so-called Ihara (or Ihara–Bass) determinant
formula, from which it can be shown [105] that the vector x of centralities is equal
to the first n elements of the leading eigenvector of the 2n⇥ 2n matrix
M =
0B@A I D
I 0
1CA , (3.17)
where A is the adjacency matrix as previously, I is the n⇥n identity matrix, and D is
the diagonal matrix with the degrees of the vertices along the diagonal. SinceM only
has marginally more nonzero elements than the adjacency matrix itself (2m+ 2n for
a network with m edges and n vertices, versus 2m for the adjacency matrix), finding
its leading eigenvector takes only slightly longer than the calculation of the ordinary
eigenvector centrality.
To see that the nonbacktracking centrality can indeed eliminate the localization
transition, consider again our random-graph-plus-hub model and, as before, let us
first consider the random graph on its own, without the hub. Our goal will be to
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calculate the leading eigenvalue of the nonbacktracking matrix for this random graph
and then demonstrate that no other eigenvalue ever surpasses it even when the hub is
added into the picture, and hence that there is no transition of the kind that occurs
with the standard eigenvector centrality.
Since all elements of the nonbacktracking matrix are real and nonnegative, the
leading eigenvalue and eigenvector satisfy the Perron–Frobenius theorem, meaning
the eigenvalue is itself real and nonnegative as are all elements of the eigenvector for
appropriate choice of normalization. Note moreover that at least one element of the
eigenvector must be nonzero, so the average of the elements is strictly positive.
Making use of the definition of the nonbacktracking matrix in Eq. (3.15), the
eigenvector equation zv = Bv takes the form
zvk!l =
X
i!j
Bk!l,i!jvi!j =
X
i!j
 jk(1   il)vi!j
=
X
ij
Aij jk(1   il)vi!j =
X
i
Aik(1   il)vi!k (3.18)
or
zvj!l =
X
i( 6=l)
Aijvi!j, (3.19)
where we have changed variables from k to j for future convenience. Expressed
in words, this equation says that z times the centrality of an edge emerging from
vertex j is equal to the sum of the centralities of the other edges feeding into j. For
an uncorrelated, locally tree-like random graph of the kind we are considering here,
i.e., a network where the source and target of a directed edge are chosen independently
and there is a vanishing density of short loops, the centralities on the incoming edges
are drawn at random from the distribution over all edges—the fact that they all point
to vertex j has no influence on their values in the limit of large graph size. Bearing
this in mind, let us calculate the average hvi of the centralities vj!l over all edges in
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the network, which we do in two stages. First, making use of Eq. (3.19), we calculate
the sum over all edges originating at vertices j whose degree kj takes a particular
value k:
z
X
j!l:
kj=k
vj!l = z
X
jl:kj=k
Ajlvj!l =
X
jl:kj=k
Ajl
X
i( 6=l)
Aijvi!j
=
X
ij:kj=k
Aijvi!j
X
l( 6=i)
Ajl = (k   1)
X
ij:kj=k
Aijvi!j
= hvi(k   1)
X
ij:kj=k
Aij = hvi(k   1)knk, (3.20)
where nk is the number of vertices with degree k and we have in the third line made
use of the fact that vi!j has the same distribution as values in the graph as whole to
make the replacement vi!j ! hvi in the limit of large graph size.
Now we sum this expression over all values of k and divide by the total number
of edges 2m to get the value of the average vector element hvi:
zhvi = hvi
2m
1X
k=0
(k   1)knk = hvihk
2i   hki
hki . (3.21)
Thus for any vector v we must either have hvi = 0, which as we have said cannot
happen for the leading eigenvector, or
z =
hk2i   hki
hki . (3.22)
For the particular case of the Poisson random graph under consideration here, this
gives a leading eigenvalue of z = c, the average degree.
This result has been derived previously by other means [105] but the derivation
given here has the advantage that it is easy to adapt to the case where we add a hub
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vertex to the network. Doing so adds just a single term to Eq. (3.21) thus:
zhvi = hvi
2m
" 1X
k=0
(k   1)knk + (d  1)d
#
, (3.23)
where d is the degree of the hub, as previously. Hence the leading eigenvalue is
z =
(n  1) hk2i   hki + (d  1)d
2m
. (3.24)
For constant d and constant (or growing) average degree, however, the term in d
becomes negligible in the limit of large n and we recover the same result as before
z = c.
Thus no new leading eigenvalue is introduced by the hub in the case of the non-
backtracking matrix, and there is no phase transition as eigenvalues cross for any
value of d.
It is worth noting, however, that there are other mechanisms by which high-lying
eigenvalues can be generated. For instance, if a network contains a large clique (a
complete subgraph in which every node is connected to every other) it can generate
an outlying eigenvalue of arbitrary size, as we can see by making use of the so-called
Collatz–Wielandt formula, a corollary of the Perron–Frobenius theorem that says that
for any vector v the leading eigenvalue satisfies
z   min
i:vi 6=0
[Bv]i
vi
. (3.25)
Choosing a v whose elements are one for edges within the clique and zero elsewhere,
we find that a clique of size k implies z   k 2, which can supersede any other leading
eigenvalue for su ciently large k. The corresponding eigenvector is localized on the
clique vertices, potentially causing trouble once again for the eigenvector centrality.
This localization on cliques would be an interesting topic for further investigation.
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(a) Eigenvector centrality (b) Nonbacktracking centrality
Figure 3.4: Eigenvector and nonbacktracking centralities for the electronic circuit
network from Table 3.1. Node sizes are proportional to centrality (and color also
varies with centrality).
3.3.1 Numerical results
As a test of our nonbacktracking centrality, we show in the lower two panels of
Fig. 3.2 results for the same networks as the top two panels. As the figure makes clear,
the measure now remains well behaved in the regime beyond the former position of the
localization transition—there is no longer a large jump in the value of the centrality
on the hub or its neighbors as we pass the transition. Similarly, the dashed curves in
Fig. 3.3 show the inverse participation ratio for the nonbacktracking centrality and
again all evidence of localization has vanished.
The inverse participation ratio also provides a convenient way to test for local-
ization in other networks, both synthetic and real. Table 3.1 summarizes results for
eleven networks, for both the traditional eigenvector centrality and the nonbacktrack-
ing version. The synthetic networks are generated using the random-graph-plus-hub
model of this chapter and the configuration model with power-law degree distribu-
tion, and in each case there is evidence of localization in the eigenvector centrality
in the regimes where it is expected and not otherwise, but no localization at all, in
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Non-
Network Nodes Eigenvector backtracking
S
yn
th
et
ic Planted hub, d = 70 1 000 001 2.6⇥ 10 6 1.4⇥ 10 6
Planted hub, d = 120 1 000 001 0.2567 1.4⇥ 10 6
Power law, ↵ = 2.1 1 000 000 0.0089 0.0040
Power law, ↵ = 2.9 1 000 000 0.2548 0.0011
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
Physics collaboration 12 008 0.0039 0.0039
Word associations 13 356 0.0305 0.0075
Youtube friendships 1 138 499 0.0479 0.0047
Company ownership 7 253 0.2504 0.0161
Ph.D. advising 1 882 0.2511 0.0386
Electronic circuit 512 0.1792 0.0056
Amazon 334 863 0.0510 0.0339
Table 3.1: Inverse participation ratio for a variety of networks calculated for tradi-
tional eigenvector centrality and the nonbacktracking version. The first four networks
are computer-generated, as described in the text. The remainder are, in order: a
network of coauthorships of papers in high-energy physics [111], word associations
from the Free Online Dictionary of Computing [18], friendships between users of the
Youtube online video service [127], a network of which companies own which oth-
ers [145], academic advisors and advisees in computer science [47], electronic circuit
838 from the ISCAS 89 benchmark set [126], and a product co-purchasing network
from the online retailer Amazon.com [111].
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any case, for the nonbacktracking centrality. A similar picture is seen in the real-
world networks—typically either localization in the eigenvector centrality but not the
nonbacktracking version, or localization in neither case. Figure 3.4 illustrates the
situation for one of the smaller real-world networks, where the values on the highest-
degree vertex and its neighbors are overwhelmingly large for the eigenvector centrality
(left panel) but not for the nonbacktracking centrality (right panel).
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter I have shown that the widely used network measure known as eigen-
vector centrality fails under commonly occurring conditions because of a localization
transition in which most of the weight of the centrality concentrates on a small num-
ber of vertices. The phenomenon is particularly visible in networks with high-degree
hubs or power-law degree distributions, which includes many important real-world
examples. I propose a new spectral centrality measure based on the nonbacktracking
matrix which rectifies the problem, giving values similar to the standard eigenvec-
tor centrality in cases where the latter is well behaved, but avoiding localization in
cases where the standard measure fails. The new measure is found to give significant
decreases in localization on both synthetic and real-world networks. Moreover, the
new measure can be calculated almost as quickly as the standard one, and hence is
practical for the analysis of very large networks of the kind common in recent studies.
The nonbacktracking centrality is not the only possible solution to the problem
of localization. For example, in studies of other forms of localization in networks
it has been found e↵ective to introduce a regularizing “teleportation” term into the
adjacency and similar matrices, i.e., to add a small amount to every matrix element
as if there were a weak edge between every pair of vertices [5, 155]. This strategy
is reminiscent of Google’s PageRank centrality measure [29], a popular variant of
eigenvector centrality that includes such a teleportation term, and recent empirical
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studies suggest that PageRank may be relatively immune to localization [63]. The
use of eigenvector centrality or PageRank depends on the network and importance
process one is dealing with [26]. PageRank is more appropriate for directed graphs in
which the importance contribution should be weighted inversely by a node’s degree,
while eigenvector centrality is more appropriate for importance processes with parallel
duplication on undirected networks, such as the influence of attitudes. Eigenvector
centrality is widely used, and thus those using it for network understanding will benefit
from the analysis of localization given in this chapter. It would be a worthwhile
topic for future research to develop theory similar to that presented here to describe
localization (or lack of it) in PageRank and related measures. Ultimately, as I also
discussed in Chapter II, the assumptions one makes about how centrality works can
have a large impact on the outcome of one’s centrality measure.
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CHAPTER IV
Uncertain networks
4.1 Introduction
Most current techniques for the analysis of networks begin with the assumption
that the network data available to us are reliable, a faithful representation of the true
structure of the network. But many real-world data sets, perhaps most of them, in
fact contain errors and inaccuracies. Thus, rather than representing a network by a
set of nodes joined by binary yes-or-no edges, as is commonly done, one would ideally
express this uncertainty by specifying a full distribution over possible networks. This
distribution would be unwieldy, but with the simplifying assumption of edgewise-
independent errors we need to specify a calibrated probability of connection only
between each pair of nodes, which represents our certainty (or uncertainty) about
the existence of the corresponding edge. If most of the probabilities are close to
zero or one then the data are reliable—for every node pair we are close to being
certain that it either is or is not connected by an edge. But if a significant fraction
of pairs have a probability that is neither close to zero nor close to one then we are
uncertain about the network structure. These probabilities could come from first-
principles knowledge of the error process, or from calibration performed according to
some ground truth [152]. In recent years an increasing number of network studies
have started to provide probabilistic estimates of uncertainty in this way, particularly
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in the biological sciences.
One simple method for dealing with uncertain networks is thresholding : we assume
that edges exist whenever their probability exceeds a certain threshold that we choose.
In work on protein-protein interaction networks, for example, Krogan et al. [104]
assembled a sophisticated interaction data set that includes explicit estimates of the
likelihood of interaction between every pair of proteins studied. To analyze their
data set, however, they then converted it into a conventional binary network by
thresholding the likelihoods, followed by traditional network analyses. While this
technique can certainly reveal useful information, it has some drawbacks. First, there
is the issue of the choice of the threshold level. Krogan et al. used a value of 0.273
for their threshold, but there is little doubt that their results would be di↵erent if
they had chosen a di↵erent value and little known about how to choose the value
correctly. Second, thresholding throws away potentially useful information. There
is a substantial di↵erence between an edge with probability 0.3 and an edge with
probability 0.9, but the distinction is lost if one applies a threshold at 0.273—both fall
above the threshold and so are considered to be edges. Third, thresholded probability
values fail to conserve basic network properties such as the expected number of edges,
meaning that thresholded networks are essentially guaranteed to be wrong, often by a
wide margin. If, for instance, we have 100 node pairs connected with probability 0.5
each, then on average we expect 50 of those pairs to be connected by edges in the true
network. If we place a threshold on the probability values at, say, 0.273, however,
then all 100 of them will be converted into edges, a result su ciently far from the
expected value of 50 as to have a very low chance of being correct.
In this chapter we develop an alternative and principled approach to the anal-
ysis of uncertain network data. We focus in particular on the problem of commu-
nity detection in networks, one of the best studied analysis tasks. We make use of
maximum-likelihood inference techniques, whose application to networks with defi-
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nite edges is well developed [146, 39, 70, 50]. Here we extend those developments
to uncertain networks and show that the resulting analyses give significantly better
results in controlled tests than thresholding methods. As a corollary, our methods
also allow us to estimate which of the uncertain edges in a data set is mostly likely
to be a true edge and hence reconstruct, in a probabilistic fashion, the true structure
of the underlying network.
A number of authors have considered related questions in the past. There ex-
ists a substantial literature on the analysis of weighted networks, meaning networks
in which the positions of the edges are exactly known but the edges carry varying
weights, such as strengths, lengths, or volumes of tra c. Such weighted networks
are somewhat similar to the uncertain networks studied in this chapter—edges can
be either strong or weak in a certain sense—but have importantly di↵erent semantics
of weight generation. For instance, the data sets we consider include probabilities
of connection for every node pair, whereas weighted networks have weights only for
node pairs that are known to be connected by an edge. More importantly, in our
uncertain networks we imagine that there is a definite underlying network but that
it is not observed; all we see are noisy measurements of the underlying truth. In
weighted networks the data are considered to be exact and true and the variation of
edge weights represents an actual physical variation in the properties of connections.
Methods for analyzing weighted networks include simple mappings to unweighted
networks and generalizations of standard methods to the weighted case [138]. Infer-
ence methods akin to those we use here have also been applied to the weighted case [1]
and to the case of a nity matrices, as used for example in computer vision for image
segmentation [161]. A little further afield, Harris and Srinivasan [82] study a noisy
model of network failures in which edges are deleted with uniform probability, while
Saade et al. [165] use spectral techniques to detect node properties, but not com-
munity a liations, when the underlying network is known but the node properties
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depend on noisy edge labels. Guimer and Sales-Pardo [79] similarly give a frame-
work for network inference in the presence of noise, but their model assumes one can
observe only an unweighted network with possibly erroneous edges. Using inference
techniques similar to those in this chapter, Xu et al. [187] have studied the predic-
tion of edge labels and Kurihara et al. [107] have applied inference to a case where
the data give the frequency of interaction between nodes. Lastly, Bassett et al. [17]
have studied correlation matrices, which can be view as a type of weighted network,
and give a technique for computing the probability that correlations are the result of
chance, though this type of data is quite distinct from the edge probabilities studied
in this chapter.
Several intellectual contributions distinguish our work from the existing litera-
ture. Our primary contribution is the model itself, which gives a new framework for
analyzing uncertain network data using any number of models, not just those with
community structure. Our approach might in future also lead to new techniques for
adapting existing weighted methods to the analysis of uncertain networks in a rigor-
ous manner, potentially leading to new belief propagation or spectral methods [51].
While our maximum likelihood estimation method is the optimal way of recovering
model parameters, tractability demands relaxed methods which may be suboptimal.
As we discuss below, we use several heuristics for finding the maximum likelihood,
and these heuristics only guarantee convergence to a global optimum in the limit of
large sparse graphs, with su cient random restarts. For any given network instance,
it is quite possible that a previously studied algorithm for weighted networks may
give an approximately optimal solution, but we leave a broad empirical comparison
to further work.
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4.2 Methods
We focus on the problem of community detection in networks whose structure is
uncertain. We suppose that we have data which, rather than specifying with certainty
whether there is an edge between two nodes i and j, gives us only a probability Qij
that there is an edge. We assume that the probabilities are independent, though
correlated probabilities are certainly possible.
At the most basic level our goal is to classify the nodes of the network into non-
overlapping communities with assortative structure. More generally we may also be
interested in disassortative structures or mixed structures in which di↵erent groups
may be either assortative or disassortative within the same network. Conceptually,
we assume that even though our knowledge of the network is uncertain, there is
a definite underlying network in which each edge either exists or does not, but we
cannot see this network. The underlying network is assumed to be undirected and
simple (i.e., it has no multi-edges or self-edges). The edge probabilities we observe
are a noisy representation of the true network, but they nonetheless can contain
information about structure—enough information, as we will see, to make possible
the accurate detection of communities in many situations.
Our approach to the detection problem takes the classic form of a statistical infer-
ence algorithm. We propose a generative model for uncertain community-structured
networks, then fit that model to our observed data. The parameters of the fit tell us
about the community structure.
4.2.1 The model
The model we use is an extension to the case of uncertain networks of the standard
stochastic block model, described in Section 1.2.8.
Given the parameters  r and !rs, one can write down the probability that we
generate a particular network in which node i is assigned to group gi and the placement
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P (A,g| ,!)
Random network model
A
Network instance  1(x)
Noise process
 0(x)
Q
Uncertain network
Aij = 1
Aij = 0
Figure 4.1: The model of uncertain network generation used in our calculations. A
community assignment g and network A are drawn from a random network model
such as the stochastic block model. The experimental uncertainty is represented by
giving each pair of nodes i, j a probability Qij of being connected by an edge, drawn
from di↵erent distributions for edges Aij = 1 and nonedges Aij = 0.
of the edges is described by an adjacency matrix A with elements Aij = 1 if there is
an edge between nodes i and j and 0 otherwise:
P (A, g| ,!) = P (g| )P (A|g,!)
=
Y
i
 gi
Y
i<j
!Aijgigj(1  !gigj)1 Aij . (4.1)
Here   represents the vector of group probabilities  r and ! represents the matrix of
probabilities !rs.
In extending the stochastic block model to uncertain networks we imagine a multi-
step process, illustrated in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, in which the network is first generated
using the standard stochastic block model and then the definite edges and nonedges
are replaced by probabilities, reflecting uncertainty or noise in the network data. The
exact shape of the noise depends on the detailed e↵ects of the experimental procedure
used to measure the network, which we assume to be unknown. We assume only that
the edge likelihoods are calibrated [152] probabilities in a sense defined below in
Eq. (4.4). However, it still turns out to be possible to perform precise inference on
the data.
We represent the noise process by two unknown functions. The function  1(Q) rep-
resents the probability density on the interval from 0 to 1 that a true edge between two
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Underlying network A
0.01
1.0
0
0.54
0.87
0.7
5 0.66
Uncertain network QNoise process β β10 ,
0 0.5 1
Q
Edges
Non-edges
Figure 4.2: Simple example of the generation of two uncertain networks from an initial
network with three nodes. The two networks generated (right-hand side) di↵er only
in their noise distributions,  0(Q) and  1(Q), whose probability density functions
(PDFs) are shown in the center. The lower pair of distributions corresponds to a
low-noise setting in which the PDFs for edges and nonedges are quite distinct and
the resulting probability matrix Q retains most of the information from the original
adjacency matrix A. The upper pair of distributions corresponds to a high-noise
setting in which the two PDFs are almost the same and the final matrix Q retains
little of the original network structure.
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nodes in the original (unobserved) network gives rise to a measured probability Q of
connection between the same nodes in the observed (probabilistic) data. Conversely,
the function  0(Q) represents the probability density that a nonedge gives rise to
probability Q.
Given these two functions and our edge-wise independence assumption, we can
write an expression for the probability (technically, probability density) that a true
network represented by adjacency matrix A gives rise to a matrix of observed edge
probabilities Q = {Qij} thus:
P (Q|A) =
Y
i<j
⇥
 1(Qij)
⇤Aij⇥ 0(Qij)⇤1 Aij . (4.2)
The crucial observation that makes our calculations possible is that the func-
tions  0 and  1 are not independent, because the numbers Qij that they generate
are not just any edge weights but are specifically probabilities and are assumed to
be calibrated [152]. The calibration assumption requires that, in expectation over
all node pairs, a pair with edge probability Qij = Q must be connected by an edge
(Aij = 1) with probability Q. For example, 90% of all node pairs with Qij = 0.9
should, in expectation, be connected by edges.
If there are m edges in total in our true underlying network, then in expectation
there are m 1(Q) edges and [
 
n
2
  m] 0(Q) nonedges with observed edge probability
Q. Hence for every possible value of Q we must have
m 1(Q)
m 1(Q) + (
 
n
2
  m) 0(Q) = Q. (4.3)
Rearranging, we then find that
 1(Q)
 0(Q)
=
Q/⇢
(1 Q)/(1  ⇢) , (4.4)
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where
⇢ =
m 
n
2
  (4.5)
is the so-called density of the network, the fraction of possible edges that are in fact
present.1 Since we don’t know the true network, we don’t normally know the value
of m, but it can be approximated by the expected number of edges
P
i<j Qij, which
becomes an increasingly good estimate as the network gets larger, and from this figure
we can calculate ⇢.2
Note that Eq. (4.4) implies that  0(1) = 0 and  1(0) = 0, and that fixing any
two of  0,  1, or ⇢ determines the third. The equation is also compatible with the
choice  0(Q) =  (Q),  1(Q) =  (Q 1), where  (x) is the Dirac delta function, which
corresponds to the conventional case of a perfectly certain network with Qij = Aij.
Using Eq. (4.4) we can now write Eq. (4.2) as
P (Q|A) =
Y
i<j
1  ⇢
1 Qij  0(Qij)
⇥
Y
i<j
✓
Qij
⇢
◆Aij✓1 Qij
1  ⇢
◆1 Aij
. (4.6)
Thus the noise function factors from our maximum-likelihood expression. The first
product is a constant with respect to A and hence will have no e↵ect on our likelihood
maximization, because we care only about the position of the likelihood maximum
and not its value. Henceforth, we will neglect this factor. Then we combine Eqs. (4.1)
and (4.6) to get an expression for the likelihood of the data Q and the community
1For randomized models without a fixed density, ⇢ is the expected value of the density.
2A fully sound algorithm would require a complete MLE estimate of ⇢. Here we simply estimate
by edge counting.
77
assignments g, neglecting constants and given the model parameters   and !:
P (Q, g| ,!) =
X
A
P (Q|A)P (A, g| ,!)
/
Y
i
 gi
Y
i<j
X
Aij=0,1

Qij!gigj
⇢
 Aij(1 Qij)(1  !gigj)
1  ⇢
 1 Aij
=
Y
i
 gi
Y
i<j

Qij!gigj
⇢
+
(1 Qij)(1  !gigj)
1  ⇢
 
. (4.7)
Our goal is now, given a particular set of observed data Q, to maximize this
likelihood to find the best-fit parameters   and !. In the process we will determine
the community assignments g as well (which are frequently the primary objects of
interest).
4.2.2 Fitting to empirical data
Fitting the model to an observed but uncertain network, represented by the prob-
abilities Qij, means determining the values of the parameters   and ! that maximize
the probability of generating the particular data we see. In other words, we want to
maximize the marginal likelihood of the data given the parameters:
P (Q| ,!) =
X
g
P (Q, g| ,!). (4.8)
Equivalently, we can maximize the logarithm of this quantity, which gives the same
result (since the logarithm is a monotone function) but is often easier to maximize.
Direct maximization by di↵erentiation gives rise to a set of implicit equations that
have no simple solution, so instead we simplify with Jensen’s inequality, Eq. (1.5).
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Applying Jensen’s inequality to (4.8), we get
logP (Q| ,!)  
X
g
q(g) log
P (Q, g| ,!)
q(g)
=
X
g
q(g)
X
i
log  gi +
1
2
X
g
q(g)
X
ij
log

Qij!gigj
⇢
+
(1 Qij)(1  !gigj)
1  ⇢
 
 
X
g
q(g) log q(g)
=
X
i
X
r
qir log  r +
1
2
X
ij
X
rs
qijrs log

Qij!rs
⇢
+
(1 Qij)(1  !rs)
1  ⇢
 
 
X
g
q(g) log q(g), (4.9)
where qir is the marginal probability within the probability distribution q(g) that
node i belongs to community r:
qir =
X
g
q(g) gi,r, (4.10)
and qijrs is the joint marginal probability that nodes i and j belong to communities r
and s respectively:
qijrs =
X
g
q(g) gi,r gj ,s, (4.11)
with  ij being the Kronecker delta,  ij = 1 () i = j.
Following Eq. (1.6), the exact equality in (4.9), and hence the maximum of the
right-hand side, is achieved when
q(g) =
P (Q, g| ,!)P
g P (Q, g| ,!)
=
Q
i  gi
Q
i<j
h
Qij!gigj
⇢ +
(1 Qij)(1 !gigj )
1 ⇢
i
P
g
Q
i  gi
Q
i<j
h
Qij!gigj
⇢ +
(1 Qij)(1 !gigj )
1 ⇢
i . (4.12)
Thus, calculating the maximum of the left-hand side of (4.9) with respect to the
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parameters  ,! is equivalent to a double maximization of the right-hand side with
respect to q(g) (by choosing the value above) so as to make the two sides equal,
and then with respect to the parameters. At first sight, this seems to make the
problem more complex, but numerically it is in fact easier—the double maximization
can be achieved in a relatively straightforward manner by alternately maximizing
with respect to q(g) using Eq. (4.12) and then with respect to the parameters. Such
alternate maximizations can trivially be shown always to converge to a local maximum
of the log-likelihood. They are not guaranteed to find the global maximum, however,
so commonly we repeat the entire calculation several times from di↵erent starting
points and choose among the results the one which gives the highest value of the
likelihood.
Once we have converged to the maximum, the final value of the probability dis-
tribution q(g) is given by Eq. (4.12) to be
q(g) =
P (Q, g| ,!)
P (Q| ,!) = P (g|Q, ,!). (4.13)
In other words, q(g) is the posterior distribution over community assignments g
given the observed data Q and the model parameters. Thus, in addition to telling
us the values of the parameters, our calculation, which we discuss in more detail in
Section 4.2.3, tells us the probability of any assignment of nodes to communities.
Specifically, the one-node marginal probability qir, Eq. (4.10), tells us the probabil-
ity that node i belongs to community r and, armed with this information, we can
calculate the most probable community that each node belongs to, which is the pri-
mary goal of our calculation. These marginals also allow us to assess the strength of
our community structure, as when the data poorly support community structure the
posterior distribution simply becomes uniform.
We still need to perform the maximization of (4.9) over the parameters. We note
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first that the final sum is independent of either   or ! and hence can be neglected.
Maximization of the remaining terms with respect to   is straightforward. Di↵eren-
tiating with respect to  r, subject to the normalization condition
P
r  r = 1, gives
 r =
1
n
X
i
qir. (4.14)
Maximization with respect to ! is a little more tricky. Only the second term
in (4.9) depends on !, but direct di↵erentiation of this term yields a di cult equation,
so instead we apply Jensen’s inequality (1.5) again, giving
X
ij
X
rs
qijrs log

Qij!rs
⇢
+
(1 Qij)(1  !rs)
1  ⇢
 
 
X
ij
X
rs
qijrs

tijrs log
Qij!rs
⇢tijrs
+ (1  tijrs) log
(1 Qij)(1  !rs)
(1  ⇢)(1  tijrs)
 
, (4.15)
where tijrs is any number between zero and one. The exact equality, and hence the
maximum of the right-hand side, is achieved when
tijrs =
Qij!rs/⇢
Qij!rs/⇢+ (1 Qij)(1  !rs)/(1  ⇢) . (4.16)
Thus, by the same argument as previously, we can maximize the left-hand side
of (4.15) by repeatedly maximizing the right-hand side with respect to tijrs using
Eq. (4.16) and with respect to !rs by di↵erentiation. Performing the derivative and
setting the result to zero, we find that the maximum with respect to !rs falls at
!rs =
P
ij q
ij
rst
ij
rsP
ij q
ij
rs
. (4.17)
The optimal values of the !rs can now be calculated by iterating Eqs. (4.16) and (4.17)
alternately to convergence from a suitable initial condition.
The quantity tijrs has a simple physical interpretation, as we can see by applying
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Eq. (4.4) to (4.16), giving
tijrs =
!rs 1(Qij)
!rs 1(Qij) + (1  !rs) 0(Qij) . (4.18)
But by definition
!rs = P (Aij = 1|gi = r, gj = s), (4.19)
 1(Qij) = P (Qij|Aij = 1), (4.20)
 0(Qij) = P (Qij|Aij = 0), (4.21)
and hence
tijrs =
P (Aij = 1|gi = r, gj = s)P (Qij|Aij = 1)
P (Qij|gi = r, gj = s)
= P (Aij = 1|Qij, gi = r, gj = s). (4.22)
In other words, tijrs is the posterior probability that there is an edge between nodes i
and j, given that they are in groups r and s respectively. This quantity will be useful
shortly when we consider the problem of reconstructing a network from uncertain
observations.
We now have a complete algorithm for fitting our model to the observed data.
The steps of the algorithm are as follows:
1. Make an initial guess (for instance at random) for the values of the parameters  
and !.
2. Calculate the distribution q(g) from Eq. (4.12).
3. Calculate the one- and two-node marginal probabilities qir and q
ij
rs from Eqs. (4.10)
and (4.11).
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4. From these quantities calculate updated values of   from Eq. (4.14) and !
by iterating Eqs. (4.16) and (4.17) to convergence starting from the current
estimate of !.
5. Repeat from step 2 until q(g) and the model parameters converge.
The end result is a maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters   and ! along with
the posterior distribution over community assignments q(g) and the probability tijrs
of an edge between any pair of nodes.
Equation (4.17) can usefully be simplified a little further, in two ways. First, note
that Eq. (4.16) implies that tijrs = 0 whenever Qij = 0. All of the real-world data sets
we have examined are sparse, meaning that a large majority of the probabilities Qij
are zero. This means that most of the terms in the numerator of (4.17) vanish and
can be dropped from the sum, which speeds up the calculation considerably. Indeed
tijrs need not be evaluated at all for node pairs i, j such that Qij = 0, since this sum is
the only place that tijrs appears in our calculation. Moreover it turns out that we need
not evaluate qijrs for such node pairs either. The only other place that q
ij
rs appears is in
the denominator of Eq. (4.17), which can be simplified by using Eq. (4.11) to rewrite
it thus: X
ij
qijrs =
X
g
q(g)
X
i
 gi,r
X
j
 gj ,s = hnrnsi, (4.23)
where h. . .i indicates an average over q(g) and nr =
P
i  gi,r is the number of nodes in
group r, for community assignment g. For large networks the number of nodes in a
group becomes tightly peaked about its mean value so that hnrnsi ' hnrihnsi where
hnri =
P
g q(g)
P
i  gi,r =
P
i q
i
r. Hence
!rs =
P
ij q
ij
rst
ij
rsP
i q
i
r
P
j q
j
s
. (4.24)
This obviates the need to calculate qijrs for node pairs such that Qij = 0 (which is most
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node pairs), and in addition speeds the calculation further because the denominator
can now be evaluated in time proportional to the number of nodes in the network,
rather than the number of nodes squared, as in Eq. (4.17). (And the numerator can
be evaluated in time proportional to the number of nonzero Qij, which is small.)
4.2.3 Belief propagation
In principle, the methods of the previous section constitute a complete algorithm
for fitting our model to observed network data. In practice, however, it is an impracti-
cal one because it’s unreasonably slow. The bottleneck is the sum in the denominator
of Eq. (4.12), which is a sum over all possible assignments g of nodes to communities.
If there are n nodes and k communities then there are kn possible assignments, a
number that grows with n so rapidly as to prohibit explicit numerical evaluation of
the sum for all but the smallest of networks.
This is not a new problem, it is common to most EM algorithms. The traditional
way around it is to approximate the distribution q(g) by importance sampling using
Markov chain Monte Carlo. In this chapter, however, we use a di↵erent method,
proposed recently by Decelle et al. [50, 51] and specific to networks, namely belief
propagation.
Originally developed in physics and computer science for the probabilistic solution
of problems on graphs and lattices [151, 125], belief propagation is a message passing
method in which the nodes of a network exchange messages or beliefs, which are
probabilities representing the current best estimate of the solution to the problem of
interest. In the present case we define a message ⌘i!jr expressing the probability that
node i belongs to community r if node j is removed from the network. The removal of
a node is crucial, since it allows us to write a self-consistent set of equations satisfied
by the messages, whose solution gives us the distribution q(g) over group assignments.
Although the equations can without di culty be written exactly and in full, we will
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here approximate them to leading order only in the small quantities !rs. We find this
approximation to give excellent results in our applications and to give considerably
simpler equations, as well as giving a faster final algorithm.
Within this approximation, the belief propagation equation for the message ⌘i!jr
is:
⌘i!jr =
 r
Zi!j
exp
✓
 
X
k,s
qks!rs
◆ Y
k( 6=j)
Qik 6=0
X
s
⌘k!is

Qik!rs
⇢
+
(1 Qik)(1  !rs)
1  ⇢
 
, (4.25)
where Zi!j is a normalization coe cient that ensures
P
r ⌘
i!j
r = 1, having value
Zi!j =
X
r
 r exp
✓
 
X
k,s
qks!rs
◆ Y
k( 6=j)
Qik 6=0
X
s
⌘k!is

Qik!rs
⇢
+
(1 Qik)(1  !rs)
1  ⇢
 
. (4.26)
qir is, as before, the one-node marginal probability of Eq. (4.10), which can itself be
conveniently calculated directly from the messages ⌘i!jr via
qir =
 r
Zi
exp
✓
 
X
j,s
qjs!rs
◆ Y
j
Qij 6=0
X
s
⌘j!is

Qij!rs
⇢
+
(1 Qij)(1  !rs)
1  ⇢
 
. (4.27)
The normalization coe cient Zi is given by
Zi =
X
r
 r exp
✓
 
X
j,s
qjs!rs
◆ Y
j
Qij 6=0
X
s
⌘j!is

Qij!rs
⇢
+
(1 Qij)(1  !rs)
1  ⇢
 
. (4.28)
These equations are exact if the set of node pairs i, j with edge probabilities
Qij > 0 forms a tree or is at least locally tree-like (meaning that arbitrarily large
local neighborhoods take the form of trees in the limit of large network size). For
non-trees, which includes most real-world networks, they are only approximate, but
previous results from a number of studies show the approximation to be a good one
in practice [125, 50, 51, 188, 192, 124]. Probability data of the kind we consider
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might further deviate from a strict tree-like form if they include a large number of
low-probability edges, but nonetheless we find the belief propagation method to work
well.
Solution of the equations is by iteration. Typically we start from the current
best estimate of the values of the beliefs and iterate to convergence, then from the
converged values we calculate the crucial two-node marginal probability qijrs by noting
that
qijrs = P (gi = r, gj = s|Qij)
=
P (gi = r, gj = s)P (Qij|gi = r, gj = s)P
rs P (gi = r, gj = s)P (Qij|gi = r, gj = s)
. (4.29)
where all data Q other than Qij are assumed given in each probability. The proba-
bilities in these expressions are equal to
P (gi = r, gj = s) = ⌘
i!j
r ⌘
j!i
s , (4.30)
P (Qij|gi = r, gj = s) =  0(Qij) 1  ⇢
1 Qij
⇥

Qij!rs
⇢
+
(1 Qij)(1  !rs)
1  ⇢
 
. (4.31)
Substituting these into (4.29), we get
qijrs =
⌘i!jr ⌘
j!i
s
h
Qij!rs
⇢ +
(1 Qij)(1 !rs)
1 ⇢
i
P
rs ⌘
i!j
r ⌘
j!i
s
h
Qij!rs
⇢ +
(1 Qij)(1 !rs)
1 ⇢
i . (4.32)
Our final algorithm then consists of alternately (a) iterating the belief propaga-
tion equations (4.25) to convergence and using the results to calculate the marginal
probabilities qir and q
ij
rs from Eqs. (4.27) and (4.32), and (b) iterating Eqs. (4.16)
and (4.24) to convergence to calculate new values of the !rs and using Eq. (4.14) to
calculate new values of  r. In practice the algorithm is e cient—in other tests of
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belief propagation it has been found fast enough for applications to networks of a
million nodes or more.
4.2.4 Degree-corrected model
Our method gives a complete algorithm for fitting the standard stochastic block
model to uncertain network data represented by the matrix Q of edge probabilities.
As pointed out previously by Karrer and Newman [95], however, the stochastic block
model gives poor performance for community detection on many real-world networks
because the model assumes a Poisson degree distribution, which is strongly in conflict
with the broad, frequently fat-tailed degree distributions seen in real-world networks.
Because of this conflict it is often not possible to find a good fit of the stochastic
block model to observed network data, for any parameter values, and in such cases
the model can return poor performance on community detection tasks.
The fix for this problem is straightforward. The degree-corrected stochastic block
model is identical to the standard block model except that the probability of an edge
between nodes i, j that fall in groups r, s is didj!rs (instead of just !rs), where di
is the actual degree of node i in the network. This modification allows the model
to accurately fit arbitrary degree distributions, and community detection algorithms
that perform fits to the degree-corrected model are found to return excellent results
in real-world applications [95].
We can make the same modification to our methods as well, estimating di withP
j Qij. The developments follow exactly the same lines as for the ordinary (uncor-
rected) stochastic block model. The crucial equations (4.16) and (4.24) become
tijrs =
Qijdidj!rs/⇢
Qijdidj!rs/⇢+ (1 Qij)(1  didj!rs)/(1  ⇢) (4.33)
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and
!rs =
P
ij q
ij
rst
ij
rsP
i diq
i
r
P
j djq
j
s
, (4.34)
while the belief propagation equation (4.25) becomes
⌘i!jr =
 r
Zi!j
exp
✓
 didj
X
k,s
qks!rs
◆
⇥
Y
k( 6=j)
Qik 6=0
X
s
⌘k!is

Qikdidj!rs
⇢
+
(1 Qik)(1  didj!rs)
1  ⇢
 
, (4.35)
with corresponding modifications to Eqs. (4.26) to (4.28) and Eq. (4.32).
In the following sections we describe a number of example applications of our
methods. Among these, the tests on synthetic networks (Section 4.3.1) are performed
using the standard stochastic block model, without degree-correction, while the tests
on real-world networks (Section 4.3.2) use the degree-corrected version.
4.3 Results
We have tested the methods described in the previous sections both on computer-
generated benchmark networks with known structure and on real-world examples.
4.3.1 Synthetic networks
Computer-generated or synthetic networks provide a controlled test of the per-
formance of our algorithm. We generate networks with known community structure
planted within them and then test whether the algorithm is able accurately to detect
that structure.
For the tests reported here, we generate networks using the standard (not degree-
corrected) stochastic block model and then add noise to them to represent the network
uncertainty, using functions  0 and  1 as defined in Section 4.2.1. We use networks
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of size n = 4000 nodes, divided into two equally-sized communities, and as the noise
function  1(Q) for the edges we use a beta distribution:
 1(Q) =
Qa1 1(1 Q)b1 1
B(a1, b1)
, (4.36)
where B(a, b) is Euler’s beta function. As the noise function  0(Q) for the nonedges
we use a beta distribution plus an additional delta-function spike at zero:
 0(Q) = c
Qa0 1(1 Q)b0 1
B(a0, b0)
+ (1  c) (Q). (4.37)
The delta function makes the matrix Q of edge probabilities realistically sparse, in
keeping with the structure of real-world data sets, with a fraction 1   c of nonedges
having exactly zero probability in the observed data, on average.
Thus there are a total of five parameters in our noise functions: a0, b0, a1, b1,
and c. Not all of these parameters are independent, however, because our functions
still have to satisfy the constraint (4.4). Substituting Eqs. (4.36) and (4.37) into (4.4),
we see that for the constraint to be satisfied for all Q > 0 we must have a0 = a1   1,
b0 = b1 + 1, and
c =
1  ⇢
⇢
B(a1, b1)
B(a0, b0)
=
1  ⇢
⇢
B(a1, b1)
B(a1   1, b1 + 1)
=
1  ⇢
⇢
a1   1
b1
. (4.38)
Thus there are really just two degrees of freedom in the choice of the noise functions.
Once we fix the parameters a1 and b1, everything else is fixed also. Alternatively, we
can fix the parameter c, thereby fixing the density of the data matrix Q, plus one or
other of the parameters a1 and b1.
The networks we generate are now analyzed using the non-degree-corrected algo-
rithm of Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3. We estimate ⇢ from Q and assume we know k. To
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quantify performance we assign each node i to the community r for which its proba-
bility qir of membership, Eq. (4.10), as computed by the algorithm, is greatest, then
compare the result to the known true community assignments from which the network
was generated. Success (or lack of it) is quantified by computing the fraction of nodes
placed by the algorithm in the correct groups. We also compare the results against
the naive (but common) thresholding method discussed in the introduction [104], in
which edge probabilities Qij are turned into binary yes-or-no edges by cutting them
o↵ at some fixed threshold ⌧ , so that the adjacency matrix element Aij is 1 if and
only if Qij > ⌧ . Community structure in the thresholded network is analyzed using
the standard stochastic block model algorithm described in, for example, Refs. [50]
and [51].
As we vary the parameters of the underlying network and noise functions the
performance of both algorithms varies. When the community structure is strong and
the noise is weak both algorithms (not surprisingly) do well, recovering the community
structure nearly perfectly, while for weak enough community structure or strong noise
neither algorithm does better than chance. But, as shown in Fig. 4.3a, there is a
regime of intermediate structure and noise in which our algorithm does significantly
better than the naive technique. The figure shows the fraction of correctly classified
nodes in the naive algorithm as a function of the threshold ⌧ (data points in the
figure) compared against the performance of the algorithm of this chapter (dashed
line) and, as we can see, the latter outperforms the former no matter what value of ⌧
is used. Note that the worst possible performance still classifies a half of the nodes
correctly—even a random coin toss would get this many right—so this is the minimum
value on the plot. For high threshold values ⌧ approaching one, the threshold method
throws away essentially all edges, leaving itself no data to work with, and hence does
little better than chance. Conversely for low thresholds the threshold method treats
any node pair with a nonzero connection probability Qij as having an edge, even
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Figure 4.3: Tests of the method described in this chapter on synthetic benchmark
networks. (a) Fraction of nodes placed in the correct community for uncertain net-
works generated using a stochastic block model with n = 4000 nodes, two groups
of equal size, edge probabilities !11 = !22 = 0.02, !12 = !21 = 0.014, and noise
parameters a1 = 1.4 and b1 = 2 (see Eq. (4.36)). The horizontal dashed line shows
the performance of the algorithm described in this chapter. The points show the
performance of a naive algorithm in which the uncertain network is first converted
to a binary network by thresholding the edge probabilities and the result then fed
into a standard community detection algorithm. The results for each algorithm are
averaged over 20 repetitions of the experiment with di↵erent networks. Statistical
errors are comparable in size to the data points. (b) Fraction of nodes classified into
their correct communities for stochastic block model networks with varying amounts
of noise in the data. The parameters are the same as for (a) but with the sparsity
parameter c fixed at 1/4n (see Eq. (4.37) and the ensuing discussion) and varying the
parameter b1, which controls the level of noise in the data.
when an edge is wildly unlikely, thereby introducing large amounts of noise into the
calculation that again reduce performance to a level little better than chance. The
optimal performance falls somewhere between these two extremes, around ⌧ = 0.25
in this case, but even at this optimal point the thresholding method’s performance
falls far short of the algorithm of this chapter.
Figure 4.3b shows a di↵erent test of the method. Again we use networks generated
from a stochastic block model with two groups and calculate the fraction of correctly
classified nodes. Now, however, we vary the amount of noise introduced into the
network to test the algorithm’s ability to recover structure in data of varying quality.
The parameters of the underlying network are held constant, as is the parameter c
that controls the sparsity of the data matrix Q. This leaves only one degree of
freedom, which we take to be the parameter b1 of the noise process (see Eq. (4.36)).
A network with little noise in the data is one in which true edges in the underlying
network are represented by probabilities Qij close to 1, in other words by a noise
distribution  1(Q) with most of its weight close to 1. Such distributions correspond
to small values of the parameter b1. Noisier data are those in which the values
of the Qij are smaller, approaching the values for the nonedges, thereby making it
di cult to distinguish between edges and nonedges. These networks are generated
by larger values of b1. Figure 4.3b shows the fraction of correctly classified nodes as
a function of b1, so the noise level is increasing, and the quality of the simulated data
decreasing, from left to right in the figure.
As we can see, the algorithm returns close to perfect results when b1 is small—
meaning that the quality of the data is high and the algorithm almost sees the true
underlying structure of the network. Performance degrades as the noise level in-
creases, although the algorithm continues to do significantly better than chance even
for high levels of noise, indicating that there is still useful information to be extracted
even from rather poor data sets.
4.3.2 Protein interaction network
As a real-world example of our methods we have applied them to protein-protein
interaction networks from the STRING database [174]. This database contains pro-
tein interaction information for 1133 species drawn from a large body of research
literature covering a range of di↵erent techniques, including direct interaction exper-
iments, genomic information, and cross-species comparisons. The resulting networks
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are of exactly the form considered in this chapter. For each network there is assumed
to be a true underlying network in which every pair of proteins either interacts or
doesn’t, but, given the uncertainty in the data on which they are based, STRING pro-
vides only probabilistic estimates of the presence of each interaction. Thus the data
we have for each species consists of a set of proteins—the nodes—plus a likelihood
of interaction for each protein pair. A significant majority of protein pairs in each of
the networks are recorded as having zero probability of interaction, so the network is
sparse in the sense assumed by our analysis and conducive to fast computation.
In the STRING database as well as the work of Krogan et al. [104], protein pairs
are recorded as having zero interaction probability when they never bind in high
throughput experiments. Though a true zero probability of interaction is unlikely
due to the possibility of human or equipment error, proteins which do not bind are
most likely to have a value of zero. In principle one could add a small estimate of
error to every cell of the matrix, but a small enough error would make no di↵erence
in the final outcome.
We analyze the data using the degree-corrected version of our algorithm described
in Section 4.2.4, which is appropriate because the networks in the STRING database,
like most real-world networks, have broad degree distributions.
Figure 4.4a shows the communities found in a three-way split of the protein-protein
interaction network of the bacterium Borrelia hermsii HS1. Node colors denote the
strongest community a liation for each node, as quantified by the one-node marginal
probability qir, with node size being proportional to the probability a node is in its
most likely community (so that larger nodes are more certain). In practice, most
nodes belong wholly to just one community.
For comparison, we also show in Fig. 4.4b the communities found in the same
network by the naive thresholding algorithm discussed earlier in which a node pair i, j
is considered connected by an edge if and only if the probability Qij exceeds a certain
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(a) Method of this chapter (b) Thresholding method
Figure 4.4: Communities found by (a) the algorithm described in this chapter and
(b) the thresholding algorithm, in a three-way split of the protein interaction network
of the bacterium Borrelia hermsii HS1, taken from the STRING database. Nodes
are laid out according to the communities in (a) and the layout is the same in both
panels.
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threshold, which here is set at 0.25, though other thresholds gave similar results. By
contrast with the synthetic networks of the previous section, we do not know the
true underlying communities for this network and so cannot calculate the fraction
of correctly classified nodes, but it is clear from the figures that the new technique
gives significantly di↵erent results from the thresholding method, particularly for the
community that appears in the upper right of the figure.
A closer examination of the data reveals a possible explanation. The communities
at the left and bottom in both panels of Fig. 4.4 consist primarily of high-probability
edges and are easily identified in the data, so it is perhaps not surprising that both
algorithms identify these communities readily and are largely in agreement. However,
the third community, in the upper right of the figure, consists largely of edges of
relatively low probability and the thresholding method has more di culty with this
case because many edges fall below the threshold value and so are lost, which may
explain why the thresholding method divides the nodes of this community among the
three groups.
To give a simple picture, imagine a community whose nodes are connected by very
many internal edges, but all of those edges have low probability. Because there are
so many of them, the total expected number of true internal edges in the underlying
network—the number of node pairs times the average probability of connection—
could be quite high, high enough to create a cohesive network community. Our
algorithm, which takes edge probabilities into account, will allow for this. The thresh-
olding algorithm on the other hand can fail because the edges all have low probability,
below the threshold used by the algorithm, and hence are discarded. The result is that
the thresholding algorithm sees no edges at all and hence no community. The funda-
mental problem is that thresholding is just too crude a tool to see subtle patterns in
noisy data.
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4.4 Edge recovery
A secondary goal in our analysis of uncertain networks is to deduce the structure
of the (unobserved) underlying network from the uncertain data. That is, given the
matrix Q of edge probabilities, can we make an informed guess about the adjacency
matrix A? We call this the edge recovery problem. It is related to, but distinct from,
the well studied link prediction problem [112], in which one is given a binary network
of edges and nonedges but some of the data may be erroneous and the problem is to
guess which ones. In the problem we consider, by contrast, the data given are assumed
to be correct, but they are incomplete in the sense of being only the probabilities of
the edges, rather the edges themselves.
The simplest approach in the present case is simply to use the edge probabili-
ties Qij themselves to predict the edges—those node pairs i, j with the highest proba-
bilities are assumed most likely to be connected by edges. But if we know, or believe,
that our network contains community structure, then we can do a better job. If we
know where the communities in the network lie, at least approximately, then given
two pairs of nodes with similar values of Qij, the pair that are in the same community
should be more likely to be connected by an edge than the pair that are not (assuming
assortative mixing).
It turns out that our EM algorithm gives us precisely the information we need to
combine our edge probabilities and network structure to perform edge recovery. The
posterior probability (given network parameters  ,! and final data Q) of having an
edge between any pair of nodes i, j can be written as
P (Aij = 1|Q, ,!)
=
X
rs
P (Aij = 1|gi = r, gj = s,Q, ,!)P (gi = r, gj = s|Q, ,!)
=
X
rs
tijrsq
ij
rs, (4.39)
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where we have made use of Eq. (4.22) and the definition of qijrs. Both t
ij
rs and q
ij
rs
are calculated in the course of running the EM algorithm, so we already have these
quantities available to us and calculating P (Aij = 1) is a small extra step.
Figure 4.5 shows a test of the accuracy of our edge predictions using synthetic
test networks once again. In these tests we generate networks with community struc-
ture using the standard stochastic block model, as previously, then run the network
through the EM algorithm and calculate the posterior edge probabilities of Eq. (4.39)
above. We compare the results against competing predictions based on the prior edge
probabilities Qij alone.
The figure shows receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves of the results. To
construct an ROC curve, one asks how many edges we would get right, and how many
nonedges we would get wrong, if we were to simply predict that the fraction x of node
pairs with the highest probabilities of connection are in fact connected by edges. The
ROC curve is the plot of the fraction of true edges correctly predicted (true positive
rate, or TPR) against the fraction of nonedges incorrectly predicted (false positive
rate, or FPR) for values of x from zero to one. By definition the curve always lies on
or above the 45-degree line and the higher the curve the better the results, since a
higher curve implies more true positives and fewer false ones.
Figure 4.5 shows the ROC curves both for our method and for the naive method
based on the raw probabilities Qij alone and we can see that, for the particular
networks studied here, the additional information revealed by fitting the block model
results in a substantial improvement in our ability to identify the edges of the network
correctly. One common way to summarize the information contained in an ROC curve
is to calculate the area under the curve, where an area of 0.5 corresponds to the poorest
possible results—no better than a random guess—and an area of 1 corresponds to
perfect edge recovery. For the example shown in Fig. 4.5, the area under the curve for
our algorithm is 0.89 while that for the naive algorithm is significantly lower at 0.80.
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Figure 4.5: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the edge recovery
problem on a synthetic network generated using a two-group stochastic block model
with n = 4000 nodes, !11 = !22 = 0.05, !12 = !21 = 0.001, and noise parame-
ters b1 = 4 and c = 1/4n. The three curves show the performance of the algorithm
of this chapter, the naive algorithm based on the raw probabilities Qij alone, and a
hypothetical ideal algorithm that knows the values of the parameters used to generate
the model (so that one does not have to run the EM algorithm at all). The diagonal
dashed line represents is curve generated by an algorithm that does no better than
chance.
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Also shown in the figure is a third curve representing performance on the edge
recovery task if we assume we know the exact parameters of the stochastic block
model that were used to generate the network, i.e., that we don’t need to run the EM
algorithm to learn the parameter values. This is an unrealistic situation—we very
rarely know such parameters in the real world—but it represents the best possible
prediction we could hope to make under any circumstances. And, as the figure shows,
this best possible performance is in this case indistinguishable from the performance of
our EM algorithm, indicating that the EM algorithm is performing the edge recovery
task essentially optimally in this case.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have described methods for the analysis of networks represented
by uncertain measurements of their edges. I gave a method for performing the com-
mon task of community detection on such networks by fitting a network generative
model to the data using a combination of an EM algorithm and belief propagation. I
also show how the resulting fit can be used to reconstruct the true underlying network
by making predictions of which nodes are connected by edges. Using controlled tests
on computer-generated benchmark networks, I show that these methods give better
results than previously used techniques that rely on simple thresholding of proba-
bilities to turn indefinite networks into definite ones. And I have given an example
application of our methods to a bacterial protein interaction network taken from the
STRING database.
The methods described in this chapter could be extended to the detection of
other types of structure in networks. If one can define a generative model for a
structure of interest then the developments of Section 4.2 can be applied, simply
replacing the likelihood P (A, g| ,!) in Eq. (4.7) with the appropriate probability of
generation. Generative models have been recently proposed for hierarchical structure
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in networks [39], overlapping communities [2], ranking or stratified structure [9], and
others. In principle, these methods could be extended to any of these structure types
in uncertain networks.
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CHAPTER V
Coauthorship and citation
5.1 Introduction
Citation networks [153] and coauthorship networks [78, 77, 135] are distinct net-
work representations of bodies of academic literature that have both been the subject
of quantitative analysis in recent years. In a citation network the nodes are papers
and a directed edge runs from paper A to paper B if A cites B in its bibliography. In
a coauthorship network the nodes are authors and an undirected edge connects two
authors if they have written a paper together. Both kinds of network can shed light
on habits and patterns of academic research. Citation networks, for instance, can give
a picture of the topical connections between papers, while coauthorship networks can
shed light on patterns of collaboration such as the size of collaborative groups or the
frequency of repeated collaboration.
In this chapter we analyze networks of citation and coauthorship derived from a
large data set made available by the American Physical Society (APS), which consists
of bibliographic and citation data for the Physical Review family of physics journals
and spans the entire history of those journals, more than a hundred years, from their
inception in 1893 to 2009.1 The data set is unusual both because of the length of time
it spans and also because it contains information on both citation and coauthorship
1More details about the data set can be found on the web at https://publish.aps.org/datasets.
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for the same body of literature. A number of previous analyses of the data have been
published [159, 33, 164] but our work adopts a somewhat di↵erent viewpoint from
other studies in focusing on the interactions between authorship and citation, as well
as on long time-scale patterns in the data. In particular, the simultaneous availability
of citation and coauthorship data allow us to associate citations not only with papers
but with individual authors, so that we can tell whether or not a particular author
cites another. Combining this insight with the temporal aspects of the data we find,
for example, that researchers cite their own or coauthors’ papers more quickly after
publication than they do the work of others; that authors show a strong tendency
to return the favor of a citation from another author, especially a previous coauthor;
that, contrary to some recent conjectures, having a common coauthor does not make
two authors likely to collaborate in future [135, 45, 87]; and that there has not (at
least within the journals we study) been any increase over time in self-citations, the
number holding roughly constant at about 20% of all citations for over a century.
Overall, we contribute an innovative model for understanding academic networks and
add to the body of knowledge about scientific publishing.
5.2 The data set
In its raw form the data set we study contains records for 462 090 papers published
in the various Physical Review journals, each identified with a unique numerical label.
Data for each paper include paper title, date of publication, the published names and
a liations of each of the authors, and a list of the numerical labels of previous Physical
Review papers cited. The data set is unusual in two respects: the long period of time
it covers, which spans 116 years from 1893 to 2009, and the fact that it includes
citation data and hence allows us to compare coauthorship patterns with citations, at
least for that portion of the citation network that appears in the Physical Review—
citations to and from non-Physical-Review journals, of which there are many, are not
102
included.
Before performing any analysis, however, there are some hurdles to overcome.
Foremost among them is the fact that the name of an author alone does not neces-
sarily identify him or her uniquely. Two authors may have the same name, or the
same author may be identified di↵erently in di↵erent publications (with or without
a middle initial, for example). Unlike some journals, such as those of the American
Mathematical Society,2 the Physical Review does not maintain unique author iden-
tifiers that can be used to attribute authorship unambiguously. As a first step in
analyzing the data, therefore, we have processed it using a number of disambiguation
techniques in order to infer actual author identity from author names as accurately
as possible. Details of the disambiguation process are given in Appendix B.1.
In addition, we have performed a modest culling of the data to remove outliers,
the most substantial action being the removal of all papers with fifty or more authors,
which are primarily recent papers in experimental high-energy physics. (Almost all
of them, about 91%, were published either in Physical Review D, which covers high-
energy physics, or Physical Review Letters; the remainder were in Physical Review
C, which covers nuclear physics.) As we show shortly, though papers with more than
fifty authors are only a small fraction of the whole (about 0.7%), their inclusion skews
results for the last thirty years substantially by comparison with the rest of the time
period. For results whose outcome depends strongly on the presence or not of these
papers, we quote results both with and without, for comparison.
Table 5.1 gives some basic parameters of the resulting data set.
2A description of the unique author identifier system used by the American Mathematical Society
can be found at http://www.istl.org/01-summer/databases.html.
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Papers with 50
All papers authors or fewer
Total papers 460889 457516
Total authors 235533 226641
Authors per paper 5.35 3.34
Citations per paper 10.16 10.16
Number of collaborators 59.44 17.24
Papers per author 10.47 6.74
Table 5.1: Mean values of some statistics for our data set, with and without papers
having over 50 authors.
5.3 Analysis
In the next few sections we present a variety of analyses of the Physical Review
data set. We begin by looking at some basic parameters of authorship and coauthor-
ship.
5.3.1 Authorship patterns
Figure 5.1 shows a cumulative distribution function for the number of papers an
author publishes, aggregated over the entire data set. That is, the figure shows the
fraction of authors who published n papers or more as a function of n, which is a
crude measure of scientific productivity. The axes in the figure are logarithmic, and
the approximate straight-line form of the distribution function implies that scientific
productivity follows, roughly speaking, a power law, a result known as Lotka’s law,
first observed by Alfred Lotka in 1926 [113] and confirmed by numerous others since.
(It has also been suggested that the distribution is log-normal rather than power-
law [168]. It is known to be hard to distinguish empirically between log-normal and
power-law distributions [40].) In Fig. 5.1 we give separate curves with and without
the papers that have fifty or more coauthors. As the figure shows, the di↵erence
between the two is primarily in the tail of the distribution, among the authors who
have published the largest number of papers, indicating that a significant fraction
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Figure 5.1: Probability that an author wrote more than a given number of papers.
Red circles indicate values calculated from the full data set; black squares are values
from the data set after papers with fifty or more authors have been removed. The
plot is cut o↵ around 500 papers because there is very little data beyond this point.
of the most productive authors are those in large collaborations. In fact, if one
compiles a list of the fifty authors publishing the largest numbers of papers, only one
of them remains on that list after papers with fifty or more authors are excluded. This
probably results from a combination of two e↵ects: first, larger groups can publish
more papers simply because they have more people available to write them; and
second, a large and productive group of collaborators contributes many apparently
prolific authors to the statistics—each of the many coauthors separately gets credit
for being highly productive. It is precisely because of biases of this kind that we
exclude papers with many authors from some of our calculations.
We can remedy this problem to some extent by measuring productivity in a more
sophisticated fashion. Rather than just counting up all the papers an author was
listed on, we can instead divide up the authorship credit for a paper among the
contributing authors so that, for example, each author on a two-author paper is
credited with half an authorship for that paper. This reduces significantly the impact
of large collaborations on the statistics, though the distribution of number of papers
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Figure 5.2: Fraction of papers written by the most prolific authors (with credit for
multi-author papers divided among coauthors, as described in the text). The red
(grey) curve represents values calculated from the full data set; the black curve rep-
resents values after papers with fifty or more authors have been removed. Note that
the two curves are almost indistinguishable. The dashed line indicates the form the
curve would take if all authors published the same number of papers.
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authored is still highly skewed, with certain authors producing much more science
than others. A common way to visualize such skewed distributions is to use a Lorenz
curve, a plot of the fraction of papers produced by the most prolific authors against
the fraction of authors that produced them. Such a curve is shown for our data
set in Fig. 5.2, and the sharp rise in the curve at the left-hand side indicates the
concentration of scientific productivity among the most productive scientists. Note
for instance that productivity appears roughly to follow the so-called 80–20 rule,
such that about 80% of the output is produced by the 20% most productive authors.
Notice also that there is almost no di↵erence in the Lorenz curves with and without
the 50-plus-author papers, precisely because we have divided up the authorship credit
so that the e↵ect of many-author papers is diminished.
The distribution can be further quantified by measuring a Gini coe cient, which
is defined as the excess area under the Lorenz curve compared to the case where
everyone has the exact same productivity. In our data set, the Gini coe cient is 0.70,
a relatively large figure as such coe cients go, indicating high skew. (Gini coe cients
are perhaps best known in the context of wealth inequality. For comparison, the Gini
coe cient of the global household wealth distribution in 2000 was 0.892 [46].)
The data set also allows us to measure the productivity of the entire field of physics
over time, something that cannot be done with many other data sets. Figure 5.3 shows
the total number of papers published in the Physical Review in five year time blocks
since 1893. With the important caveat that these results are for a single collection
of journals only, and one moreover whose role within the field has evolved during
its history from provincial up-start to one of the leading physics publications on the
planet, we see that there is a steady increase in the volume of published work, which
appears roughly to follow an exponential law (a straight line on the semi-logarithmic
scales of the figure). An interesting feature is the dip in the curve in the 1940s, which
coincides with the second World War, followed by a recovery in the 1950s, perhaps
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Figure 5.3: Number of papers published in each five-year block. Red circles indicate
numbers calculated from the full data set; black squares are calculated from the data
set after papers with fifty or more authors have been removed. Note that the two
values are almost indistinguishable. The straight line is the best-fit exponential.
attributable in part to increased science funding in the postwar period. The combined
result of these deviations, however, is only to put the curve back on the same path of
exponential growth after the war that it was already on before it. In his early studies
of secular trends in scientific output, Derek de Solla Price [48, 49] noted a similar
exponential growth interrupted by the war, and measured the doubling time of the
growth process to be in the range from 10 to 15 years. The best exponential fit to
our data gives a compatible figure of 11.8 years.
Figure 5.4 shows the corresponding plot of the number of unique authors in the
data set in each five-year block as a function of time. Like the number of papers
published, the number of authors appears to be increasing exponentially, and with
a roughly similar (but slightly smaller) doubling time of 10.4 years. Thus, despite
the marked increase in productivity of the field as a whole, it appears that each
individual scientist has produced a roughly constant, or even slightly decreasing,
number of papers per year over time.
The natural complement to measurement of the number of papers per author is
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Figure 5.4: Number of unique authors who published a paper in each five-year block.
Red circles indicate numbers calculated from the full data set, while black squares
are calculated from the data set after papers with fifty or more authors have been
removed. Note that the two values are almost indistinguishable. The straight line is
the best-fit exponential.
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Figure 5.5: Number of authors per paper averaged over five-year blocks. Red circles
indicate the full data set; black squares are the data set after papers with fifty or
more authors have been removed.
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measurement of the number of authors per paper, i.e., the size of collaborative groups.
Figure 5.5 shows the mean number of authors per paper in our data set as a function
of time, and there is a clear increasing trend throughout most of the time period
covered, with the average size of a collaborative group rising from a little over one
a century ago to about four today. A similar e↵ect has been noted previously by,
for example, Grossman and Ion [77], for the case of mathematics collaborations. In
our calculations we have again calculated separate curves with and without papers
having fifty or more authors and a comparison between the two reveals a startling
e↵ect: while there is almost no di↵erence at all between the curves prior to about 1975,
there is a large and rapidly growing gap between them in the years since. Without
these papers the growth in group sizes has been slow and steady for decades; with
them it departs dramatically from historical trends after the 1970s, indicating a large
and growing role in physics (or at least in physics publication) for big collaborations.
An alternative view of the same trend is given in Fig. 5.6, which shows the number
of unique coauthors an author has, on average, during each five year time block. Every
coauthor in a time block is counted, even if he or she was also counted in a previous
time block (but previous coauthors are not counted unless they are also coauthors
in the new time block). As the figure shows, this number has also risen significantly
over the last century, from a little over one to more than ten today (and more than
sixty if one includes collaborations with fifty or more members). Since we only have
data from the Physical Review, it is likely that we miss some collaborators, so these
numbers are in practice only lower bounds on the actual numbers.
5.3.2 Citation patterns
Let us now add the citation portion of the data set to our analyses and examine
citation patterns over time in the Physical Review, as well as interactions between
citation and coauthorship.
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Figure 5.6: Average number of unique coauthors of an author, averaged in five-year
blocks. Red circles indicate the full data set; black squares are the data set after
papers with fifty or more authors have been removed.
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Figure 5.7: Average numbers of citations made (black squares) and received (red
circles) per paper, in five-year blocks.
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Figure 5.7 shows the average number of citations by a paper and to a paper,
over the time period covered by the Physical Review data set. The black curve, the
number of citations that a paper makes, shows a steady increase over time—authors
used to cite fewer papers and have been citing steadily more in recent decades. One
possible explanation for this phenomenon is the increase in the volume of literature
available to be cited, although it has also been conjectured that authors have been
under greater pressure in recent decades, for example from journal editors or referees,
to add more copious citations to papers [185].
The red curve in Fig. 5.7 is the average number of citations received by a paper,
which shows more irregular behavior, rising to a peak twice before dropping o↵ in
recent times. A number of e↵ects are at work here. First, if (as we will shortly see)
most citations are to papers in the recent past, then a steady increase in citations
by papers should lead to an increase in citations to papers published slightly earlier.
Behavior of this kind has been observed in previous studies, such as the comprehensive
study by Wallace et al. using data from the Web of Science [177]. The growth in
number of citations received cannot continue to the very end of the data set, however,
since the most recent papers are too recent to have accrued a significant number of
citations and hence we expect a drop at the rightmost end of the curve, as seen in
the figure.
There is, however, also a notable dip in the red curve around 1970, whose origin
is less clear. (It is not seen, for instance, in the work of Wallace et al.) In examining
the data for this period in detail, we find that the dip in citations per paper is due
primarily to an increase in the number of papers published in the Physical Review
(which expanded considerably during this period), while the number of citations
received by those papers, in aggregate, remains roughly constant. The increase in
papers published may have been in part a response to the general expansion of US
physics research during the 1960s, following the establishment of the National Science
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Foundation, but the data indicate that the greater volume of research did not, at least
initially, result in a greater number of citations received, and hence the ratio of the
two displays the dip visible in Fig. 5.7. However, the upward trend in the curve
reestablishes itself from about 1970 onward, suggesting that in the long run there was
an increase not only in the number of papers published, but also in the number that
are influential enough to be later cited.
It is interesting to compare the data for citations received with the predictions of
theoretical models for the citation process. Perhaps the best known class of models are
the preferential attachment models we describe in Section 1.2.7 [14], and particularly
the 1976 model of Price [154], a simple model in which the rate at which a paper
receives citations is assumed to vary linearly with the number it already has. In
its most naive application, this model makes predictions that di↵er strongly from
the observations plotted in Fig. 5.7. The model predicts that the largest number of
citations should go to the oldest papers and the smallest to the youngest, so that the
red curve in the figure should be monotonically decreasing. There are a number of
possible explanations for the disagreement. A popular theory is that papers “age”
over time, becoming less well cited as they become older [193, 166], perhaps because
their field has moved on to other things, because they have been superseded by more
advanced or accurate work, or because their results are so well known that authors
no longer feel the need to cite them. Were this the case, most citations would be
to recent papers, and the curve of citations received would mostly mirror the curve
of citations given, albeit with a time lag whose length would be set by the rate at
which papers age. An alternative theory, for which there is some empirical evidence,
is that preferential attachment models do represent citation patterns quite well within
individual subfields [139], but not when applied to the literature as a whole. A central
parameter in the preferential attachment models is the date of the start of a subfield,
and since di↵erent subfields have di↵erent start dates, the model might be expected
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Figure 5.8: Fraction of citations made more than a given number of years after
publication. Black diamonds include all citations, blue squares are self-citations, red
circles are co-author citations, and green triangles are distant citations.
to work within subfields but not for the overall data set.
Figure 5.8 tests the aging of papers within the Physical Review data set by plotting
the fraction of citations that are to papers a certain time in the past. Let us focus
for the moment on the black curve, which includes all citations in the entire data
set. The figure shows that there does indeed appear to be a strong aging e↵ect,
with the citation rate dropping o↵ approximately exponentially over time (which
would be a straight line on the semi-logarithmic scales of the plot). This finding is in
agreement with previous studies of aging [193], which also found exponential decay.
An alternative interpretation of the data, however, is that there is no aging occurring
at all, and that the drop in citations is a purely mechanical e↵ect that results from
dilution of the literature—in a small, young field there are only a few papers to cite
and hence each receives a lot of citations; in an older field there are more papers and
so individual citation rates fall o↵. To the extent that it has been tested, the latter
theory appears to agree well with available citation data and also with the prediction
of the preferential attachment models [94], so at present the evidence for (or against)
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Figure 5.9: Fraction of citations made, by type, in five-year blocks. There were no
citations made in the 1890–1894 block. Blue squares represent self-citations, red
circles are co-author citations, and green triangles are distant citations.
aging in our data set is inconclusive.
5.3.3 Interactions between citation and coauthorship
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Physical Review data, however, is the
window it gives us on the interplay between citation and coauthorship. One way to
probe this interplay is to divide citations according to the collaborative roles assumed
by the authors of the citing and cited papers and then compare the resulting cita-
tion patterns. In the present work, we divide citations into three classes, following
Wallace et al. [178]: self-citations, where the citing and cited papers shared at least
one coauthor; coauthor citations, where at least one author of the citing paper has
previously collaborated with at least one author of the cited paper (but there are
no common authors between papers, so that self-citations and coauthor citations are
disjoint); and distant citations, which includes all citations other than self-citations
and coauthor citations. (Other authors who have examined citation and collaboration
have gone further and considered also citations between coauthors of coauthors [178],
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but this proves computationally unfeasible in the present case because of the size of
the Physical Review data set.) We emphasize that we only consider individuals to
be coauthors if they have previously coauthored when the citation occurs. Coauthor-
ship that comes after the citation is not counted. Also our data are limited to the
Physical Review, so the number of coauthor citations will in reality be higher than
presented here, both because some citations are missing from our data and because
some coauthorships are.
Figure 5.9 shows the fraction of citations that fall into each of the three classes
as a function of the year of publication of the citing paper. Roughly speaking, the
three curves appear flat over time. There is a modest increase in the fraction of
coauthor citations (the lowest, red curve in the figure), but this can be explained
by the increase in the number of coauthors available for citation, shown in Fig. 5.6,
which is of a similar magnitude. In other respects, the rule of thumb seems to be that
a constant 20% or so are self-citations, 75 or 80% are distant citations, and the small
remaining fraction are to coauthors.
The distribution of time between the publication dates of a new paper and the
papers it cites is shown for the three classes of citation in Fig. 5.8, as the blue, red,
and green curves. Here we do notice a significant di↵erence between the classes.
In particular, the self-citations (in blue) fall o↵ faster than coauthor and distant
citations. This implies that a larger fraction of self-citations occur rapidly after
publication, compared with citations in the other classes. This is not unexpected,
given that a researcher presumably knows about their own research sooner, and in
more detail, than they know about others’. We note also that coauthor citations are
slightly earlier than distant citations, which again seems reasonable. One must be
careful in the interpretation of these results, however. An alternative explanation for
the same observations is that a paper can be cited by others long after the author
retires or leaves the field, which could make the average delay for citations by others
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Citation type Mean delay (years)
Self-citations 4.12
Coauthor citations 6.92
Distant citations 9.02
All citations 7.89
Table 5.2: Mean time delay between a paper’s publication date and the dates of the
papers it cites.
Citation type Made (%) Received (%)
Self-citation 68.9 60.3
Coauthor citation 42.0 31.3
Both 35.6 26.3
Either 75.0 64.2
Either given both possible 76.4 66.4
Table 5.3: Percentage of papers that make or receive at least one citation of a given
type.
longer than that for self-citation. There is no way to tell, purely from the delay
statistics themselves, which explanation is the better one.
Table 5.2 summarizes the mean delay to citation for the three citations classes.
We explore the di↵erences between citation classes further in the next section.
5.3.4 Self-citation and coauthor citation
Consider Table 5.3, which gives the percentages of papers that make or receive at
least one self-citation or coauthor citation, provided that such a citation is possible.
Nearly 70% of papers cite at least one paper by the same author (or one of the same
authors, if there are several), and 60% of them receive such a citation. These numbers
may at first appear large, and raise concerns, given the use of citation counts as a
measure of impact, that authors might be inflating their counts by self-citing [84, 15].
But taken with the fact that the number of citations per paper and the fraction which
are self-citations are both sizable, these large numbers are not unexpected. Figure 5.9
shows that overall self-citation has remained constant and moderate, around 20%, and
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that there has been no sizable recent excess in self-citation.
A more interesting question is whether researchers have a tendency to reciprocate
citations by others. If author A cites a paper of author B, does B return the favor
by later citing A? To address this question we measure the fraction of citations of
one author by another (excluding citations of one’s own papers) that are reciprocated
in one or more later publications. We calculate separate figures for pairs of authors
who have previously co-authored a paper and those who have not and find that
13.5% of citations between non-coauthors are reciprocated when possible, while an
impressive 43.8% of citations between coauthors are reciprocated. (Keep in mind
that no authors can overlap between a citing and a cited paper for the citation to
be considered a coauthor citation and not a self-citation.) Both these numbers are
very high compared to the expected reciprocity if citations were made uniformly at
random, but this doesn’t necessarily imply a tit-for-tat return of citations. A citation
is presumptively an indication that two papers fall in similar subject areas, and thus
the presence of a citation greatly increases the chances that the authors are working
in the same area, which in turn increases the likelihood of citation in general and
therefore the chances of reciprocated citation. In the case of previous coauthors
the chances of working in the same field are likely even higher. Unfortunately, we
currently do not have any model of the citation process detailed enough to make a
quantitative prediction of the size of this e↵ect against which we could compare our
measurements to test for significance.
5.3.5 Transitivity
In coauthorship, it has been observed that if A has coauthored a paper with B
and B with C, then A and C are more likely also to have coauthored a paper. In
Section 1.2.4 we define a so-called clustering coe cient that quantifies this e↵ect,
measuring the average probability that the coauthor of your coauthor is himself your
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coauthor [182], and such coe cients have been measured in many networks [13, 93, 45,
143]. Typically one finds that the values are significantly higher than one would expect
if network connections were made purely at random, and our coauthorship network
is no exception. For the data set studied here we find a clustering coe cient of 0.212,
which is comparable with other figures reported for coauthorship networks [135].
In this case, however, the nature of the data set allows us to go further. The
conventional explanation for high transitivity in networks relies on a triadic closure
mechanism, under which two authors who share a common coauthor are more likely
to collaborate in future, perhaps because they revolve in the same circles, attend the
same conferences, work at the same institution, or are introduced to one another by
their common acquaintance [135, 45, 87]. The present data set’s time-resolved nature
allows us to test this hypothesis directly. We can calculate what fraction of the
time individuals who share a common coauthor but have not previously collaborated
themselves later write a paper together. This is related to an independently derived
measure by Opsahl [147], and similar to our nonbacktracking centrality in Chapter III
in that no backtracking is allowed between the two networks. When we make this
measurement for the Physical Review data we find the fraction of such author pairs
to be only 0.0345—a much smaller fraction than the clustering coe cient of the whole
network reported above. One reason for this small figure is that a large fraction of
the transitivity seen in coauthorship networks comes from papers with three or more
authors, which automatically contribute closed triads of nodes to the coauthorship
network. Such triads however are excluded from our calculation of the probability of
later collaboration. The large di↵erence between the two probabilities we calculate
implies that only a small fraction of the network transitivity comes from true triadic
closure processes.
Nonetheless, the triadic closure process does appear to be present in our data set.
Figure 5.10 shows the probability of future coauthorship between two individuals as
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Figure 5.10: Probability of future coauthorship with another author as a function
of the number of shared coauthors. The number of shared coauthors is counted at
the time of first coauthorship or the date of either coauthor’s last published paper,
whichever comes first.
a function of their number of common coauthors, and we see that the probability
increases sharply, a finding that is consistent with previous results [135, 23].
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter I have analyzed a large data set from the Physical Review family of
journals, taking a network perspective. Rather than focus solely on either citation or
coauthorship networks, as most previous studies have done, I have instead combined
the two, which allows the study of questions about the ways in which people—and
not just papers—cite one another, and the extent to which scientists collaborate with
those they cite or cite those with whom they collaborate. The time-span of the data
set is unusually large, covering more than a century of publication, which allows us to
study long-term changes in collaboration and citation patterns that are not accessible
with smaller data sets.
My main findings are that the Physical Review appears to be growing exponen-
tially, with a doubling rate slightly less than 12 years, and the number of citations per
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paper within the journals also appears to be growing. The fraction of self-citations
and citations among coauthors is more or less constant over time, and authors tend
to cite their own papers sooner after publication than do their coauthors, who in
turn cite sooner than non-coauthors. We observe a strong tendency towards recipro-
cal citations, researchers who cite another author often receiving a citation in return
later on, with especially high rates for citations between coauthors. Contrary to some
previous claims [135, 45, 87], however, there is only a small triadic closure e↵ect in
the coauthorship patterns; two researchers who share a common coauthor but have
never collaborated themselves have only a rather small probability of collaborating
in future—about 3.5%. This number is nonetheless much higher than the probability
for two randomly chosen researchers, and moreover increases sharply as the number
of common coauthors increases.
A limitation of our analysis is that the data come from a single family of journals
in a single field. There are, however, some results for other journals and fields that
suggest that the observed patterns extend beyond physics and the Physical Review.
In one recent study, for example, Huang et al. [89] examined a collection of papers
in computer science drawn from the CiteSeer database of online preprints. They
find, as we also do, that the number of papers and number of authors both increase
roughly exponentially over time, while the number of authors per paper and number
of coauthors per author increase roughly linearly. Wuchty et al. [186] examined a
large set of papers drawn broadly from the sciences and engineering, using data from
the commercial Web of Science database (formerly the Science Citation Index). They
observe in particular that the average number of authors on a paper has increased
steadily over time, at least for papers with more than one author, which again agrees
qualitatively with our observations. Do¨bler [176] studied a data set representing
the fields of mathematics, logic, and physics from 1800 to 1998 and found again that
collaboration has increased over time, albeit intermittently, and at a rate that depends
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on the field.
There are many other questions that could be addressed with the data we have
analyzed, the unusually long time-span and combination of publication and citation
data opening up a variety of possibilities. For instance, we know which papers are
published in which of the various Physical Review journals, and hence we have a
crude measure of paper topic, which would allow us to answer questions about how
the patterns of coauthorship and citation vary between fields within physics. We could
also study geographical variations by making use of the data on authors’ institutional
a liations [149]. Our analysis of long-term historical trends could also be extended;
for the researcher interested in the history of US physics, there are, no doubt, many
interesting signatures of historical events hidden within the data. The data set also
o↵ers the possibility of tracking the careers of individual scientists, possibly over long
periods of time, or of tracking research on a particular topic. And finally, any of our
analyses could be extended to data sets that cover other journals or fields other than
physics, if and when such data become available. All of these would make excellent
subjects for future investigation.
122
CHAPTER VI
Conclusions
Better network science tools deepen our ability to analyze and understand the
world and increase network data collection. A profusion of network data sets, how-
ever, places increasing demands on the tools of network theory. This thesis addresses
four network science issues, deepening our ability to understand network data. I
explore the potential impact of modeling assumptions on network processes, and I
highlight the power of assumptions about node decision making behavior in the con-
text of network cascades. I address measures of network structure, and use spectral
techniques to refine a popular network centrality construct. I improve methods of
incorporating available data into network inference, specifically the usage of proba-
bilistic information about the presence of edges. Lastly, I examine the combination of
multiple network types for data analysis, specifically by analyzing joint coauthorship
and citation networks. I describe these issues in detail below.
Strategic cascades In Chapter II I have shown the importance of assumptions
about agent decision making in modeling and have improved our understanding of
cascade scheduling on networks with strategic agents. For the specific model of
Chierichetti et al. [35], I have shown that assuming strategic instead of myopic agent
decision making can lead to di↵erent cascade behaviors to the largest extent that
the model allows. More broadly, I illustrate methods for reasoning about strategic
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cascade behavior and characterize the contrasting behavior of strategic and myopic
agents in a range of qualitatively distinct settings.
I consider cascades to be representative of a broader class of scenarios involving
dynamic decision on networks. For these too one should expect the spectrum of
behaviors, myopic to strategic, to exhibit qualitative variety in generated outcomes.
This chapter helps guide the creation of better models for networks of strategic agents
in the future.
Nonbacktracking centrality In Chapter III I have shown that the widely used
network measure known as eigenvector centrality fails under commonly occurring
conditions because of a localization transition in which most of the weight of the
centrality concentrates on a small number of vertices. The phenomenon is particularly
visible in networks with high-degree hubs or power-law degree distributions, which
includes many important real-world examples. I propose a new spectral centrality
measure based on the nonbacktracking matrix which rectifies the problem, giving
values similar to the standard eigenvector centrality in cases where the latter is well
behaved, but avoiding localization in cases where the standard measure fails. The new
measure is found to give significant decreases in localization on both synthetic and
real-world networks. Moreover, the new measure can be calculated almost as quickly
as the standard one, and hence is practical for the analysis of very large networks of
the kind common in recent studies. This chapter gives a better tool for ranking nodes
in networks with hubs, and has already attracted interest from practitioners studying
the US road network and other networks with hubs.
Uncertain networks In Chapter IV I have described methods for the analysis of
networks gathered by uncertain measurements of their edges. I gave a method for
performing the common task of community detection on such networks by fitting a
network generative model to the data using a combination of an EM algorithm and be-
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lief propagation. I also show how the resulting fit can be used to reconstruct the true
underlying network by predicting which nodes are connected by edges. Using con-
trolled tests on computer-generated benchmark networks, I show that these methods
give better results than previously used techniques that rely on simple thresholding of
probabilities to turn indefinite networks into definite ones. Additionally I have given
an example application of our methods to a bacterial protein interaction network
taken from the STRING database [174]. The methods I present have been used by
scientists studying brain networks and protein-protein interaction networks.
The methods described in this chapter could be extended to the detection of other
types of structure in networks. They have attracted interest from theorists interested
in extending my method to networks with correlated noise.
Coauthorship and citation In Chapter V I have analyzed a large data set from
the Physical Review family of journals, taking a network perspective. Rather than
focus solely on either citation or coauthorship networks, as most previous studies
have done, I have instead combined the two. This combination allows the study of
questions about the ways in which people—and not just papers—cite one another,
and the extent to which scientists collaborate with those they cite or cite those with
whom they collaborate. The timespan of the data set is unusually large, covering more
than a century of publication, allowing us to study long-term changes in collaboration
and citation patterns that are not accessible with smaller data sets. This chapter has
contributed a new lens for viewing academic networks, and has resulted in numerous
findings which increase our understanding of the physics community.
The expansion of network science continues, with endless room for better theories.
The widening scope of network science calls for a unification of the fragmented stud-
ies. This is an important direction of future work—the development of fundamental
network science techniques to unite the many possible avenues of network science
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application.
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APPENDIX A
Strategic cascades
A.1 Clique
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The proof of this theorem follows naturally from several lem-
mas which we prove in the rest of this section. We outline the proof here.
There are two cases of behavior to consider: ⇡ < 1 and ⇡   1. In the first case a
simple backward induction argument shows that all cliques are inCPNC (Lemma A.1).
The second case is more involved. We first show that if Kn 2 (CPNC [CTC ) for some
n, p, and ⇡, then all larger cliques must also be in (CPNC [CTC ) for the same p and
⇡ (Lemmas A.2 and A.3). Finally, we show that any p and ⇡ combination eventually
gives a Kn 2 (CPNC [CTC ) for some large enough n (Lemma A.4). The intuition for
this final lemma is that, for very large cliques, the cost of ending up on the wrong side
of a cascade is very large. Thus, agents always prefer to join a guaranteed cascade
over choosing their type if choosing their type has some probability of being on the
wrong side of the cascade.
Let d = mY  mN denote the di↵erence between the current number of Y decisions
and the current number of N decisions. We begin by addressing clique behavior in
the first case, ⇡ < 1.
128
Lemma A.1. If ⇡ < 1 then every clique is in CTC .
Proof. Consider the behavior of the last scheduled node. It chooses its type only if
d = 0. If d 6= 0, then it receives at least 1 more utility for choosing the majority, but
only ⇡ < 1 more utility for choosing its own type. Now by induction, assume that
agents after time ⌧ > 1 choose their type if d = 0 and otherwise choose the current
majority. We must show that the node ↵ at time ⌧ will do the same.
If d   2 then no matter what ↵ chooses, by the inductive hypothesis, the rest
of the nodes will be in a Y -cascade. Thus ↵ will receive at least 2 more utility for
choosing the majority (Y ), but only ⇡ more utility for choosing its type, so it will
always choose Y .
If d = 1, then if ↵ chooses Y , it will cause a Y -cascade and receive ⌧   1 util-
ity for agreement with currently undecided nodes and receive 1 more utility for its
agreement with currently decided nodes. If ↵ chooses N , then with probability 1  p
the next node will cause an N -cascade, but with probability p the next node will
cause a Y -cascade. In the former case ↵ receives ⌧   1 utility for its agreement with
currently undecided nodes. In the latter case, ↵ receives 0 utility for its agreement
with currently undecided nodes. ↵’s expected payo↵ from agreement with currently
undecided nodes for choosing N is (1   p)(⌧   1). Without considering payo↵ from
choosing its type, c↵ = Y yields 1+ p(⌧   1) more utility than c↵ = N . So, no matter
the value of t↵, c↵ = Y .
If d = 0, the inductive hypothesis gives that c↵ starts a cascade of ↵’s choice.
Thus by playing c↵ = t↵, it gets ⇡ additional utility. The analysis for d =  1 and
d   2 are analogous to the cases already covered.
For the remainder of the section we assume ⇡   1. Additionally, we refer to
agents on the clique according to when they are scheduled. On Kn, we call the first
scheduled node n and the last scheduled node 1. We begin by showing that, as n
increases, cliques that enter into (CPNC [CTC ) stay that way.
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d: -1 0 1
n N N ?
n+ 1 N N N
(a) N -type decision
d: -1 0 1
n N N ?
n+ 1 N ? ?
(b) Y -type decision
Figure A.1: CPNC behavior
Lemma A.2. For large enough cliques such that (n + 1)(1   p)2 > ⇡, if Kn 1 2
(CPNC [CTC ) and Kn 2 CPNC (a predetermined N-cascade), then Kn+1 2 (CPNC [
CTC ).
Proof. We prove this by cases, depending on how n behaves if d = 1. A diagram of
behavior we know by assumption or can readily infer is shown in Figure A.1.
We characterize cn+1 if it is tn+1, conditional on cn when d = 1.
Case 1 : cn = Y if d = 1 and tn = N . Then it must be the case that Kn 1 2 CTC ,
so this results in a Y -cascade. Thus cn+1 = tn+1 and Kn+1 2 CTC .
Case 2 : cn = N if d = 1 and tn = N . This corresponds to CPNC . Consider the
possible payo↵s. cn+1 = Y gives a (1  p)2 probability of cn 1 = cn = N . This causes
a N -cascade, by the assumption that Kn 1 2 (CPNC [ CTC ), and results in only ⇡
payo↵:
Payo↵ for N = n+ 1
Payo↵ for Y  (1  (1  p)2)(n+ 1 + ⇡) + (1  p)2⇡ = n+ 1 + ⇡   (1  p)2(n+ 1)
So in case 2, cn+1 = N , regardless of type, if (n + 1)(1   p)2 > ⇡. Thus Kn+1 2
CPNC .
Lemma A.3. For large enough cliques such that (n + 1)(1   p)2 > ⇡, if Kn 1 2
(CPNC [CTC ) and Kn 2 CTC (the first agent, n, chooses tn and starts a tn-cascade),
then Kn+1 2 (CPNC [CTC ).
Proof. We prove this by cases, conditional on cn and d. A diagram of behavior we
know by assumption or can readily infer is shown in Figure A.2.
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d: -1 0 1
n  1 N N Y
n N N ?
n+ 1 N N ?
(a) N -type decision
d: -1 0 1
n  1 N ? Y
n ? Y Y
n+ 1 ? ? ?
(b) Y -type decision
Figure A.2: CTC behavior
d: -1 0 1
n  1 N N Y
n N N N
n+ 1 N N ?
(a) N -type decision
d: -1 0 1
n  1 N Y Y
n Y Y Y
n+ 1 ? ? ?
(b) Y -type decision
Figure A.3: CTC , case 2 behavior
We characterize cn+1 if tn+1 = Y , conditional on cn and d.
Case 1 : cn = Y if d = 1 and tn = N . Then it must be the case that Kn 1 2 CTC ,
so this results in a Y -cascade. Thus cn+1 = tn+1 and Kn+1 2 CTC .
Case 2 : cn = N if d = 1 and tn = N , and cn = Y if d =  1 and tn = Y . Then
it must be the case that Kn 1 2 CTC . The known behavior for this case is shown in
Figure A.3. Since cn = Y if d =  1 and tn = Y , cn+1 = Y when d = 0 and tn+1 = Y .
Thus Kn+1 2 CTC
Case 3 : cn = N if d = 1 and tn = N , and cn = N if d =  1 and tn = Y . Then
it must be the case that Kn 1 2 CTC . The known behavior for this case can be seen
in Figure A.4. By the same math as in case 2 of the proof of Lemma A.2, we get
cn+1 = N , regardless of type, if (n+ 1)(1  p)2 > ⇡. Thus Kn+1 2 CPNC .
d: -1 0 1
n  1 N N Y
n N N N
n+ 1 N N ?
(a) N -type decision
d: -1 0 1
n  1 N Y Y
n N Y Y
n+ 1 ? ? ?
(b) Y -type decision
Figure A.4: CTC , case 3 behavior
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Next, we show that a clique eventually falls into CPNC or CTC .
Lemma A.4. For any p and ⇡, there exists some large enough n such that Kn, Kn+1 2
(CPNC [CTC ).
Proof. Fix p and ⇡. By backward induction one can see that there is always an N -
cascade when d = b ⇡c. Call this threshold d. Additionally, note that an N -type
node always chooses N when d  0. This can be seen by application of Theorem 2.17
and Lemma A.5.
So, for large enough n, there must be an N -cascade when d = d + 1. This can
be seen by application of Lemma A.6 and the observations that d = d gives a certain
N -cascade but d = d+ 2 does not give a certain Y -cascade.
This argument can be repeated to show that there must be an N -cascade when
d = d+2. This reasoning can be iterated until it breaks down at d = 0. But the node
choosing at d = 0 always has the option of a certain N -cascade (for large enough
n). So it will choose Y only if it also is faced with the option of a certain Y -cascade.
In this case, a node chooses its type t and starts a cascade of that type. By the
same reasoning the next node n + 1 also either chooses N or its type and starts a
cascade.
Lemma A.5. Decisions are monotonic in d. If cn = Y for some di↵erence d and
type t, then cn = Y for di↵erence d + 1 and the same type. Similarly, if cn = N for
some di↵erence d and type t, then cn = N for di↵erence d  1 and the same type.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that agent n is scheduled to make a decision
and d > 0, tn = N . Let qY = 1 be the probability of a Y -cascade if cn = Y and qN < 1
be the probability of an N -cascade if cn = N . Also assume that, if an N -cascade does
not occur, then a Y -cascade occurs and n gets only some constant payo↵ D. Then
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k d:  2  1 0 1 2
0 Choice: N S S S Y
Choice: N N S Y Y
1 E[N matches]: 3 2 1  p 1  p 1  p
E[Y matches]: p p p 2 3
Choice: N N S Y Y
2 E[N matches]: 4 3 2 1  p 0
E[Y matches]: 0 p 2 3 4
Figure A.5: The choice of a node on the clique for varying d, k, and t
consider n’s payo↵s:
Payo↵ for N = qNn+ (1  qN)D + ⇡
Payo↵ for Y = n
For large enough n, the payo↵ for Y will always surpass the payo↵ for N .
Lemma A.6. On a large enough clique Kn, a node always prefers a certain (proba-
bility 1) cascade over an uncertain (probability less than 1) cascade, no matter d, p,
or ⇡.
These two lemmas, combined with Theorem 2.17, are used to show that the range
of di↵erences for which nodes consider choosing their type shrinks as n grows larger.
Eventually the range shrinks enough that nodes have the option of a guaranteed
cascade, completing the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. We consider strategic users on a clique of size > 1 with 1 
⇡ < 1 + p. We show, using backward induction, that the first agent to choose always
selects its type and that all following agents select the same choice. A demonstration
of the backward induction can be found in Figure A.5.
Figure A.5 displays the choice a node would make if there were k undecided agents
and the di↵erence between choices already made, d = mY  mN , is given in the top
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row. N (resp. Y ) means that both agents choose N (resp. Y ) no matter their type. S
means that the choices are Split: agents choose their type. The rows below “Choice”
display the expected number of matches from other agents if an agent chooses N or
Y .
To obtain the behavior observed for k = 1, we need (1 p)+⇡ < 2 and p+⇡ < 2,
or, rearranging: ⇡ < 1 + p and ⇡ < 1 + (1   p). Since p < (1   p), this is satisfied
with any ⇡ < 1 + p.
The behavior for k = 2 follows directly from the behavior observed for k = 1, as
all inequalities are only made looser. The behavior for k > 2 follows inductively from
the behavior for k  2. Assuming an agent with k   1 remaining undecided agents
chooses its type only when d = 0, an agent with k remaining undecided agents will
behave similarly. The inequalities for this decision are identical to the inequalities for
k = 2 with a multiplier of k on each side. Our table shows that, once the balance of
choices shifts in one direction, it is in a node’s best interest to choose the same way.
Thus the first node to choose starts a cascade of the type that it selects.
Theorem 2.2 has the following immediate corollary:
Corollary A.7. For any clique graph with any 1  ⇡ < 1 + p, in the limit of n,
the optimal strategic performance is 1 + 1p(1   p)(1   2p) times the optimal myopic
performance.
Proof. This follows from the fact that two Y decisions are required to start a myopic
Y -cascade and only one is required to start a strategic Y -cascade. Thus in the limit
of n, the probability of a Y -cascade is p
2
p2+(1 p)2 ⇡ p2 for myopic agents, a well-known
bound from the “gamblers ruin” problem, but is p for strategic agents. The result
immediately follows.
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k d:  3  2  1 0 1 2 3
0 Choice S S S S S Y Y
Choice N S S S S Y Y
1 E[N matches] 4 3  p 2  p 1  p 1  p 1  p . . .
E[Y matches] 1 + p 1 + p 1 + p 1 + p 3 4 5
Choice . . . N . . . S . . . Y . . .
2 E[N matches] . . . 4 . . . 2  2p . . . (1  p)(2  p) . . .
E[Y matches] . . . 1 + 2p . . . . . . . . . 5 . . .
Choice . . . . . . N . . . S . . . . . .
3 E[N matches] . . . . . . 4 . . . 3 O(p) . . . . . .
E[Y matches] . . . . . . 1 +O(p) . . . 5 . . . . . .
Choice . . . . . . . . . N . . . . . . . . .
4 E[N matches] . . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . .
E[Y matches] . . . . . . . . . 1 +O(p) . . . . . . . . .
Table A.1: Utilities for node decisions on a clique with one external neighbor choosing
Y .
A.2 Council and cloud
Proof of Lemma 2.5. We prove this lemma by directly comparing expected utilities
from Table A.1. We explicitly list utilities for direct comparison, when relevant and
non-obvious. All utilities assume there is an external neighbor choosing Y with prob-
ability 1. Here d = mY  mN and k is the number of currently undecided agents in
the clique.
We can see from Table A.1 that, for small enough p, and the appropriate 2 < ⇡ <
3, the first scheduled node in the clique will choose N . We can also see that the table
continues for cliques larger than size 6, as payo↵s are shifting in favor of N as the
clique grows.
Proof of Lemma 2.9. If a(1  p) + ⇡ < bp, then agent 2 will always match the choice
of 3. The case in which 2’s payo↵ is greatest for not matching 3 (and thus the lemma
is hardest to satisfy) is t2 = N , c1 = N , and t3 = Y . In this case 2 will obtain payo↵
a + ⇡ + b(1   p) for choosing N , or payo↵ ap + b for choosing Y . A comparison of
these payo↵s shows that 2 will choose Y when a(1   p) + ⇡ < bp, which is true by
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assumption. So 2 will choose Y , matching with 3. All other combinations of types
result only in a higher payo↵ to 2 for matching with 3.
Proof of Lemma 2.10. Note that 3 will always match 2 because b > b(1   p) + ⇡ >
bp + ⇡, by assumption (these inequalities simplify to bp > ⇡). In the worst case, 1
has chosen Y and t2 = N . In this case, 2 will obtain utility of a + b for choosing Y
and utility of a(1  p) + ⇡ + b for choosing N . Thus 2 will choose Y if ap > ⇡, which
we assume to be true.
A.3 Omitted miscellaneous results
Proof of Theorem 2.12. This theorem follows from the fact that the cascade schedul-
ing problem can be expressed as a finite extensive form game with perfect information.
When nodes are never indi↵erent between choices, the unique PBE can be constructed
using backward induction, following Mas-Colell et al. [121, Prop. 9.B.2]. When nodes
resolve their indi↵erence in a consistent way, such as choosing their type, the same
backward induction still selects a unique PBE.
Proof of Theorem 2.13. Let I be the set containing all agent-situation pairs (i, R)
where an agent is indi↵erent between its two choices. (i, R) means that the situation
is R and the next agent to choose is i. Let I be the set of agent-situation pairs where
agents are not indi↵erent. I is finite, so there must be some pair (i⇤, R⇤) 2 I where
i⇤ has minimal di↵erence between utility for Y and N . Denote this di↵erence  , and
let ✏ = |  2 |. Then no other agent-situation pair in I results in a di↵erent decision in
F 0, assuming behavior of i for all (i, R) 2 I remains the same. Under F , all agents
in all situations in I have equal utility for both choices but choose their type, by
assumption. Under F 0, all agents in all situations in I have ✏ greater utility for their
type, thus make the same decision as in F .
The following Lemma shows that a Y -type node will always choose Y if an N -
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type node would have chosen Y in a similar situation and will be used in the proof
of Theorem 2.14
Lemma A.8. Let iY be an agent in situation RY and iN be an agent in situation RN ,
with tiY = Y and tiN = N . If RY and RN are identical except for some N decisions
in RN may be Y decisions in RY , and the nonadaptive schedule S is the same for
both nodes, then it is never the case that ciN = Y but ciY = N .
Proof of Lemma A.8. Let us compare the utilities from choosing Y for iY and iN , and
assume for the sake of contradiction that iN prefers Y but iY does not. Then iY ’s
utility must be greater for choosing N , and iN ’s utility must be greater for choosing Y .
Below we let #Y (U), #N(U) be the expected number of Y , N decisions, respectively,
in the set of agents U ✓ V at the end of the game. The expected value E is over the
randomness of agent types.
Utility comparison for iY :
⇡ + E(#Y (nb(iY )) | ciY = Y ) < E(#N(nb(iY )) | ciY = N).
Utility comparison for iN :
E(#Y (nb(iN)) | ciN = Y ) > ⇡ + E(#N(nb(iN)) | ciN = N).
Between these two inequalities only ⇡ has moved, and the conditions of RY favor
the left side of the first inequality. Facing the same schedule, both inequalities cannot
be true, thus we have reached a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2.14. Generate the type distribution for F 0 in the following way.
Independently draw n = |V | types from {Y,N}, selecting Y with probability p and
N with probability 1   p. This gives us a vector of F 0s base types, t = (t1, . . . , tn).
Next generate a vector of F 0s true types, t0 = (t01, . . . , t
0
n), by switching N -types to
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Y -types with probability (p0   p)/(1  p).
t0i =
8>>>><>>>>:
Y : ti = Y
Y , with probability p
0 p
1 p : ti = N
N : otherwise
This results in each agent in F 0 being Y -type with independent probability p0, as
desired. However, now each random draw of base types for F 0, t, can be coupled with
a corresponding draw of types for F , s. The true types of F 0, t0, have Y s in the same
places as s but with some additional Ns turned to Y s. By Lemma A.8 one can see
that t0 results in at least as many Y choices.
Proof of Lemma 2.20. First, we note that cˆpi is monotone in its inputs and in p by
Lemma A.9.
In the base case, we have that cp1(t1) = c˚
p
1(t1) = cˆ
p
1(t1) which is monotone in the
inputs and in p because cˆp1 is.
Assume that the statement is true for all j < i. Note that cpi (t
(i)) = cˆpi (˚c
p
i 1(t
(i 1)), ti).
Thus cˆpi is monotone in inputs and p because we know cˆ
p
i is and c˚
p
i 1 is by induction.
Also c˚pi (t
(i)) = c˚pi 1(t
(i 1))   cˆpi (˚cpi 1(t(i 1)), ti). So c˚pi is monotone in inputs and p
because we know cˆpi is and c˚
p
i 1 is by induction.
Lemma A.9. Let RF be a situation in game F = (G, p, ⇡) and RF 0 be a situation in
game F 0 = (G, p0, ⇡) with 0 < p < p0 < .5. Let RF and RF 0 have the same nonadaptive
schedule and let RF and RF 0 be identical except for some N decisions in RF may be
Y decisions in RF 0. If the next scheduled agents in both games are the same type, and
if the agent chooses Y in game F , then the agent in game F 0 also chooses Y .
Proof of Lemma A.9. The proof of this lemma proceeds by a coupling of the unsched-
uled agents of F and F 0. First, each individual agent in F 0 is at least as likely to be
Y -type as a corresponding agent in F . By Lemma A.8, each individual agent is more
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likely to choose Y in F 0 as in F , and thus the current agent will only choose Y in F 0
if it would in F .
A.4 Omitted star results
Section A.4 is devoted to proving Theorem 2.15, which states that performance is
always greater with myopic agents than strategic agents on the star, no matter the
situation. A sketch is as follows.
We break the proof into two cases depending on the value of ⇡. We first handle
the case where ⇡   1 in Theorem A.10. We next consider the case where ⇡ < 1 and
the scheduler is limited to nonadaptive schedules in Theorem A.12. The final case,
where ⇡ < 1 with an adaptive schedule, is more involved. We first give a schedule,
Sopt, and show that it is weakly optimal in both the strategic and myopic settings
in Lemma A.14. We prove optimality by showing that scheduling the interior node
before a Y majority has been reached is never a better option. Lastly, we show higher
myopic performance under this optimal adaptive schedule by detailing the behavior
of agents under this schedule.
We begin by analyzing the case ⇡   1.
Theorem A.10. For any star graph with ⇡   1, for any schedule, the myopic per-
formance is greater than the strategic performance.
Proof. Game behavior is simple when ⇡   1: every exterior agent, strategic or myopic,
chooses its type. It is only the interior agent’s behavior that might di↵er.
For any fixed draw of agent types t = (t1, . . . , tn) with schedule S, myopic and
strategic agents behave identically except for the interior agent i. Thus, for any fixed
t, the situations in which S selects i to decide next for myopic agents are the same as
for strategic agents. A strategic i reasons that each of its undecided exterior neighbors
will choose Y with probability p < .5, and therefore expects more of its undecided
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neighbors to choose N than Y . A myopic interior agent ignores this fact and chooses
as if equal numbers of undecided neighbors will choose N and Y . Thus a strategic
interior agent is less likely to choose Y because it shifts its expected payo↵ in favor
of N .
Next, we consider the case ⇡ < 1. We first give a cursory examination of agent
behavior. A myopic exterior agent chooses its type if the interior agent has not yet
chosen. If the interior agent has chosen c and an exterior agent (strategic or myopic)
is scheduled to decide, it will also choose c because ⇡ < 1 guarantees that an agent
prefers a matching choice over choosing its type. Knowing this, a strategic interior
agent always chooses the majority choice of the already decided agents and breaks
ties with its type. A myopic interior agent behaves the same way.
We summarize the behavior of myopic exterior agents in a formal theorem, for
reference below.
Theorem A.11. For any star graph with ⇡ < 1, myopic exterior agents choose their
type if scheduled before the interior node and match the choice of the interior node if
scheduled after it.
Strategic and myopic agents di↵er only in the behavior of exterior agents scheduled
before the interior agent has decided. Myopic agents choose their type, as noted above,
but strategic agents choose based on what they expect the interior agent to choose.
A strategic Y -type exterior agent might choose N if it sees that many exterior agents
have already chosen N , and thus that the interior agent is likely to choose N . This
assessment, however, depends on the schedule.
We first address the case where the scheduler is limited to nonadaptive schedules.
Theorem A.12. For any star graph with ⇡ < 1, an optimal nonadaptive schedule
selects the interior agent first for both strategic and myopic agents.
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Proof. If the interior agent is scheduled first, it will choose its type and the exterior
agents will follow. This happens for both myopic and strategic agents, and guarantees
a performance of p. By Theorem 2.17 this is the best possible performance for a
nonadaptive schedule. Thus choosing the interior agent first is an optimal nonadaptive
schedule and, in this case, the strategic and myopic performance is identical.
We next define the adaptive schedule Sopt and prove its optimality for both strate-
gic and myopic agents.
Definition A.13. Schedule Sopt is the following:
1. Schedule exterior agents until a majority decide Y or all have decided, whichever
comes first.
2. Schedule the interior agent.
3. Schedule all remaining exterior agents.
The optimality of Sopt is summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma A.14. For any star graph with ⇡ < 1, Sopt is a weakly optimal adaptive
schedule for both strategic and myopic agents.
Proof. The combination of Theorems A.15 and A.16 shows that Sopt is weakly optimal
for myopic and strategic agents (establishing Lemma A.14). It is only weakly optimal:
for some parameter settings other schedules give equal performance. For example,
when ⇡ is su ciently small, a strategic exterior Y -type node will choose N when
d =  1, and thus scheduling the interior node first yields equal performance.
Theorem A.15. For both strategic and myopic agents on the star graph, Sopt gives
no worse performance than scheduling the interior agent first.
Proof. For both strategic and myopic agents, scheduling the interior agent first guar-
antees all exterior agents will match its decision. So all agents choose Y with proba-
bility p and N with probability 1  p. This gives pn performance.
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Sopt calls for scheduling an exterior agent, e, first. With probability p, te = Y .
If te = Y and ce = Y , then Sopt schedules the interior agent next and all agents
choose Y . This gives e utility ⇡ + 1, its maximum possible utility. So strategic e
always chooses Y if te = Y . And myopic e will choose its type, so will also choose
Y if te = Y . This alone gives pn performance, without considering outcomes for
te = N .
Theorem A.16. For any star graph, while exterior Y -decisions are not in the major-
ity, scheduling an exterior agent results in performance at least as high as scheduling
the interior agent.
Proof. Let d = mY   mN denote the di↵erence between the current number of Y
decisions and the current number of N decisions. First consider the case d < 0.
If scheduled, the interior node will choose N and all remaining exterior nodes will
choose N . This results in zero additional Y -adoptions, so scheduling an exterior node
instead, as Sopt does, must be at least as good.
The other possibility is d = 0, which reduces to the situation covered in the proof
of Theorem A.15.
Now that we’ve shown Sopt is an optimal adaptive schedule for strategic agents,
we give a detailed characterization of agent behavior under Sopt and show that this
behavior cannot lead to higher strategic performance than myopic performance.
The probability of ever getting a majority of exterior Y -adoptions, in the limit of
large n, is p1 p , a well known result in the mathematics of biased random walks.
We seek to show that strategic agents choose N in any situation where myopic
agents would choose N , and thus that strategic performance is lower than myopic
performance. By Theorem A.11 and Lemma A.14, it is su cient to show that, under
Sopt, N -type exterior nodes that are scheduled before the interior node always choose
N . To prove this we start by characterizing these agents’ strategies.
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d:  1 . . . Y ⇤(k) . . . N⇤(k) . . . 1
te = N N N N N N Y Y
te = Y N N Y Y Y Y Y
Figure A.6: Threshold behavior for exterior nodes, by type.
For the remainder of the section, we omit the word “exterior” when it is clear
from context and refer to the interior node as i. For a given situation, let d be the
di↵erence between the number of exterior nodes who have chosen Y and the number
who have chosen N : d = mY  mN . A low d value indicates that more nodes have
chosen N and indicates a higher likelihood of ci = N . Thus nodes are more inclined
to choose N for low values of d and more inclined to choose Y for high values of d.
Let i(d, k) denote the probability that node i will choose Y , as assessed from the
perspective of an exterior node in a situation with di↵erence d and k unscheduled
exterior nodes. Let u(t, c, d, k) denote the expected utility of a type t node, making
choice c, with a di↵erence of d when there are k unscheduled exterior nodes. We
begin counting at 1, so k = 1 refers to the choice of the final unscheduled exterior
node.
We say that exterior nodes execute a threshold strategy if there exists thresholds
Y ⇤(k) and N⇤(k) such that:
• d < Y ⇤(k): all agents choose N when k nodes remain to choose.
• Y ⇤(k)  d  N⇤(k): agents choose their type when k nodes remain to choose.
• N⇤(k) < d: all agents choose Y when k nodes remain to choose.
An illustration of these thresholds can be seen in Figure A.6.
We start out with the following theorem, which shows that the interior agent is
always more likely to choose Y if scheduled immediately instead of after one addi-
tional exterior node. This theorem serves as the base case for inductive arguments in
Theorem A.18 and Lemma A.19, defined below.
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Theorem A.17. i(d, 1)   i(d, 0) for all d, and both are monotone increasing in
d. Moreover, the final exterior agent and the interior agent (if scheduled last) play
threshold strategies where N⇤(1) = N⇤(0) = 1.
Proof. Behavior of exterior agents, and thus the value of i(d, k), falls into two classes:
⇡ + p < 1 and ⇡ + p   1. Our proof proceeds by finding i(d, 0) (the probability that
the interior node chooses Y when scheduled immediately) in both cases, and then
examining i(d, 1) (the probability that the interior node chooses Y when scheduled
after one additional exterior node) for each case individually.
In either case, the interior node chooses its type when it is scheduled only if d = 0.
It will choose Y if d > 0 and N if d < 0. Thus:
i(d, 0) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 d   1
p d = 0
1 d   1
In the case that ⇡ + p < 1, i(d, 1) = i(d, 0). We analyze i(d, 1) by considering
the behavior of the exterior node scheduled immediately before the interior node. We
call this final exterior node e. If d = 0 and k = 1, the interior node will match ce.
Knowing this, e should choose its type if d = 0 and k = 1.
If d =  1 then e should always choose N . If te = N this will guarantee a payo↵ of
1+⇡, the maximum possible. If te = Y , then selecting N yields payo↵ 1. Selecting Y
yields 1 + ⇡ if the interior node is Y -type, but only ⇡ if the interior node is N -type.
This gives expected payo↵ of p+ ⇡ < 1.
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In the case that ⇡ + p   1, similar analysis shows that:
i(d, 1) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 d   2
p2 d =  1
p d = 0
1 d   1
The theorem follows.
We use the below theorem to show that nodes always behave according to a
threshold strategy.
Theorem A.18. For any star graph with ⇡ < 1, under schedule Sopt, exterior nodes
scheduled before the interior agent execute a threshold strategy.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. At k = 0, by Theorem A.17, the interior
agent plays a threshold strategy. Assuming that after some node e all agents play a
threshold strategy, we show that e does also.
Assume without loss of generality that te = Y . Assume, for the sake of contra-
diction, that e plays a non-threshold strategy. This necessitates ce = Y for some d
but ce = N for some d + 1. In this case, e changes its choice to N if an additional
node has chosen Y . However, because all later scheduled nodes play according to
threshold strategies, an additional node choosing Y only increases the chance that
the interior node chooses Y , so e’s strategy is not rational. This gives a contradiction,
as desired.
Knowing that nodes behave according to a threshold strategy, we can prove the
following lemma, which is enough to complete the proof of Theorem 2.15, as discussed
above.
Lemma A.19. For any star graph with ⇡ < 1, under schedule Sopt, exterior nodes
scheduled before the interior always choose N if they are N-type.
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Proof. Lemma A.19 The proof of this lemma proceeds by induction on a slightly
stronger statement. By induction on k we show that N⇤(k) = 0 (which implies the
lemma), and that Y ⇤(k) is monotone decreasing in k. The base case is covered by
Theorem A.17.
We now prove the inductive step. Let k denote the the number of unscheduled
exterior nodes, and assume that for all k < `, N⇤(k) = 0 and Y ⇤(k) is monotone
decreasing in k. We now prove the statement for k = `.
Note that u(Y,N, Y ⇤(`  1), `) = 1 = u(Y,N, Y ⇤(`  1), `  1). By induction, we
know that Y ⇤(k) is monotone decreasing for k < `, so for any d < Y ⇤(`   1) we are
in an N -cascade situation. In this case agent ` receives a payo↵ of 1 for choosing N
because it will guarantee a match with the interior agent, but does not pick its own
type.
Also note that u(Y, Y, Y ⇤(`   1), `)   u(Y, Y, Y ⇤(`   1), `   1). This follows from
a coupling argument between two situations which we define. In situation 1, d =
Y ⇤(`  1) + 1 and there are `  1 unscheduled exterior nodes. In situation 2, we have
that d = Y ⇤(`  1) + 1 and there are `  2 unscheduled exterior nodes.
Couple the randomness so that the type of the agent scheduled with k unscheduled
exterior agents in situation 1 is the same as the type of the agent scheduled with k 1
unscheduled exterior agents in situation 2. Note that the randomness of the final
unscheduled exterior agent has not yet been fixed in schedule 1. Then by monotonicity
of Y ⇤(k) established by induction, whenever d decreases in situation 1, it also decreases
in situation 2 (though the converse is not necessarily true). The Y surplus d of
situation 1 with 1 unscheduled exterior node (k = 1), is at least the Y surplus d of
situation 1 with 0 unscheduled exterior nodes (k = 0). By Theorem A.17 we have
that the probability that the interior agent chooses Y in situation 1 is at least the
probability that the interior agent chooses Y in situation 2.
Finally, note that u(Y, Y, Y ⇤(`  1), `  1)   u(Y,N, Y ⇤(`  1), `  1) because, by
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the definition of Y ⇤(`  1) in this situation, Y -type agents choose Y .
Putting this together we get that u(Y, Y, Y ⇤(` 1), `)   u(Y, Y, Y ⇤(` 1), ` 1)  
u(Y,N, Y ⇤(`  1), `  1) = 1 = u(Y,N, Y ⇤(`  1), `  1). This shows that at Y ⇤(`  1)
with k nodes left unscheduled, a Y -type node chooses Y . Thus we have that Y ⇤(k)
is monotonically decreasing.
Lastly, we show that N⇤(`) = 0. This is equivalent to proving that a rational
N -type agent would choose N over Y , or that u(N,N, 0, `)   u(N, Y, 0, `), which
can also be written (1   i( 1, `   1)) + ⇡   1. Note that by the definition of Y ⇤(`)
we have that i(Y ⇤(`) + 1, `   1) + ⇡   1. But by the Lemma A.20 we see that
i(Y ⇤(`)+1, ` 1)  (1  i( 1, ` 1)), and so (1  i( 1, ` 1))+⇡   1, as desired.
This lemma relies on the following theorem, which allows us to compare the prob-
abilities of two random walks trying to reach opposite endpoints, or thresholds, by
traveling similar distances. Thus, whatever the thresholds Y ⇤(k) and N⇤(k) end up
being, the N -type node at N⇤(k) has a higher chance of ending up in an N -cascade
than the Y -type node at Y ⇤(k). By applying the following theorem, Lemma A.19
shows that N⇤(k) = 0 is always a valid threshold.
Theorem A.20. i(Y ⇤(`) + 1, `  1)  1  i( 1, `  1).
Proof. The proof follows from a coupling argument and some case analysis. Consider
two situations on the star with ` 1 undecided nodes: situation 1 with d1 = Y ⇤(`)+1
and, situation 2 with d2 =  1. Couple the randomness so that whenever a node
scheduled in situation 1 is Y -type the corresponding node in situation 2 is N -type.
It follows that at any later step either a) situation 1 has reached a Y -cascade, or b)
d2  Y ⇤(`)   d1. We show if a) is not satisfied then b) is. When a) is not satisfied,
situation 1 is not in a Y -cascade and agents choose their type. In this case, d1
can increase only if the currently choosing agent in situation 1 is Y -type. However,
whenever this happens the agent in situation 2 is N -type and so d2 decreases. This
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(a) Varying p, ⇡ = 0.9 (b) Varying ⇡, p = 0.45
Figure A.7: Strategic-to-myopic performance ratio on star, n=21.
preserves the truth of b).
The interior node in situation 1 chooses Y only if 1) a Y -cascade is reached, or
d1 = 0 when there are no remaining exterior nodes (k = 0) and ti = Y . If situation 1
enters a Y -cascade, then situation 2 enters an N -cascade because the former happens
only if d1 ever reaches 1, but then d2  Y ⇤(`)+1 so that situation 2 is an N -cascade.
If d1 = 0 when there are no unscheduled exterior nodes remaining and ti = Y in
situation 1, then in situation 2, we have that d2  0 and, by coupling, that ti = N ,
so that the interior node always chooses N .
We have shown than whenever the interior node chooses Y in situation 1, the
interior node chooses N in situation 2.
Computational star performance Figure A.7 graphs values of the strategic-to-
myopic performance ratio for a star of 21 agents to show asymptotic behavior, and
shows that the ratio approaches 1 but never exceeds it, as per Theorem 2.15.
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APPENDIX B
Coauthorship and citation
B.1 Data processing
As mentioned in the main text, we performed some pre-processing on the raw
Physical Review data to disambiguate author names and remove extreme outliers.
This appendix describes the steps taken.
B.1.1 Author name disambiguation
The data were supplied in two blocks: (1) a list of papers with associated infor-
mation, such as authors, author a liation, journal, and year of publication; (2) a
list of citations, using unique paper identifiers that correspond to entries in the first
block. There are, however, no unique identifiers for authors that are consistent be-
tween papers, making unambiguous author identification di cult. Not all authors
use the same form for their name on every publication, and there are many examples
of distinct researchers with the same name. Before using the data set, therefore, we
made an e↵ort to associate names of authors with unique people. As in previous work
on author disambiguation, our process starts by assuming every name on every pa-
per to represent a di↵erent individual [156], then computes a number of measures of
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author similarity and assumes authors who are su ciently similar by these measures
to be the same person. After completing this disambiguation process we checked a
subset of the results by hand to estimate error rates for the process and found that
it performs well. Details are as follows.
Our approach relies not only on the author names themselves to establish simi-
larity, but also on collaboration patterns and institutional a liation, since authors
with similar names who have many of the same collaborators or who are at the same
institution are more likely to be the same person. A liation information, however,
like the author names themselves, tends to be ambiguous and inconsistent, so our first
step is to combine a liations that are deemed similar enough. We measure similarity
using a variant of edit distance applied to the a liation text strings, implemented
using the Python di✏ib library.
Once the a liations are processed in this way, we process the author names as
follows:
1. We combine all authors with identical names who share an institutional a lia-
tion. It appears to be uncommon for two physicists at the same university to
publish under identical names, so this seems to be a safe step.
2. We find author pairs with similar but not identical names. Our criterion for
similarity at this stage is that authors should have identical last names and
compatible first/middle names (i.e., identical if fully written out, or compatible
initials where initials are used). Also authors should not have published together
on the same paper (which rules out, for example, family members with similar
names who publish together). For all pairs with similar names we then calculate
a further similarity measure based on how many a liations they share, how
many coauthors they share, whether their full names are identical, and whether
they have published in the same journal. Authors with a high enough similarity
are combined, most similar pairs first.
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We have tested the accuracy of this process by drawing two lists at random from
its output, the first containing 79 instances in which authors with similar names have
been combined into a single author, and the second containing 111 instances in which
they have not. We then performed, by hand, a blind search—without knowing the
choice the algorithm has made—for publicly available on-line information about the
names in question, to determine whether they do indeed represent the same or distinct
researchers. We find the false positive rate to be 3% (i.e., 3% of pairs are incorrectly
judged to be the same person when in reality they are distinct) and the false negative
rate to be 12%.
We also tested the e↵ect on our results of the disambiguation process by calculating
a number of the statistics reported in this chapter both for the disambiguated data
and for the raw data set before disambiguation, in which we naively assume that
every unique author string represents a unique author and every pair of authors with
the same string are the same person. We found substantial di↵erences between the
two in some of the most basic statistics, such as total number of distinct authors: the
number was 328 938 in the raw data set, but fell to 235 533 after disambiguation. On
the other hand some other statistics changed very little, indicating that these are not
particularly sensitive to details of author identification. For example, the clustering
coe cient changes from 0.222 in the raw data set to 0.212 in the disambiguated data
set.
B.1.2 Data culling
In addition to author disambiguation we cull the data according to a few simple
rules. There are a number of papers in the data set that have no authors listed,
primarily editorials and other logistical articles without scientific content. These we
remove entirely. As mentioned in the text, we also identify all papers with fifty or
more coauthors, and many of our calculations are performed in two versions, with
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Figure B.1: Histogram of the number of papers with a given number of authors.
The vertical line falls at fifty authors and corresponds roughly to the point at which
the distribution deviates from the power-law form indicated by the fit. The data
for ten authors and more have been binned logarithmically to minimize statistical
fluctuations.
and without these papers. The choice of fifty authors as the cuto↵ point was made
by inspection of the distribution of author numbers shown in Fig. B.1. As the figure
shows, the number of papers with a specific number of coauthors appears, roughly
speaking, to follow a power law (in agreement with some previous studies [136], but
not others [88]), but there is a marked deviation from the power-law form for the high-
est numbers of coauthors, above about fifty, indicating potentially di↵erent statistical
laws in this regime, and possibly di↵erent underlying collaborative processes.
We also removed from the data a small number of citations. In a few cases a paper
is listed as citing itself, which we assume to be an error. In a number of other cases
papers cite others that were published at a later time, which violates causality. These
too are assumed to be erroneous and are removed. Finally, the data indicate that
some papers cited the same other paper several times within the one bibliography;
such multiple citations we count as a single citation.
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